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ABSTRACT 
Circuit technology of the 1970-90 era appears fairly resilient to microwave radio frequency 
interference, with few reported occurrences of interference. However, a proposition has 
been developed which substantiates fears that new technologies, with their extremely high 
packing densities, small device p-n junctions and very high clock rates, will be very 
susceptible to interference throughout the microwave band It has been postulated that the 
mechanism for this upset is demodulation and that it will come about by either the 
predicted changes in the microwave RF environment by the year 2000, or by a suitable 
choice of phasing and frequency at high power. 
The postulation is studied by developing an overall ingress equation, relating incident 
power density at the aircraft to the load voltage at an avionic circuit component. The 
equation's terms are investigated to quantif' their contribution to the likelihood of 
interference. The operational RF environment for aircraft is studied and predictions of the 
current and maximum future environments are made. A practical investigation of 2-18 
GH.z airframe shielding is described, with comparison of the results with those from a 
number of other aircraft and helicopter types. A study of ingress into avionic boxes is 
presented and is followed by the results of an investigation of energy coupling via the 
cables and connectors, including the development and practical examination of a coupling 
model based on transmission line theory. A study is then presented of circuit technology 
developments, electronic component interference and damage mechanisms, and evidence of 
upset of electronic equipment is given. 
Investigations show that there is more 1-18 GHz upset of electronic equipment than 
originally thought and data suggest that thermal damage of active devices may dominate 
over-voltage stressing of p-n junctions. Aircraft investigations have shown that incident 
microwave radiation is attenuated approximately 20 dB by the airframe, in a complex 
fashion which does not lend itself to being modelled easily. Under some conditions this 
value of airframe attenuation is seen to approach zero, removing any shielding of avionics 
by the airframe for these cases. A predictor for airframe shielding independent of air 
vehicle type has been developed, based on cumulative density ftrnctions of all data from 
each of the aircraft types examined. The cable coupling model gives good agreement with 
measured data except for the dependency of load voltage on cable length and illuminating 
antenna position along the cable, for which an empirical equation has been developed. 
Computer power limitations and significant variations of most of the parameters in the 
overall ingress equation suggest that modelling of the complex innards of aircraft and 
avionics at these frequencies will remain impractical for the foreseeable fUture and that 
probabilistic models are the only achievable goal. 
It is concluded that all avionic circuit technologies may well be upset as postulated above 
or by speculative High Power Microwave weapons, but that careful use of existing aircraft 
and equipment design methodologies can offer adequate protection. An improved 
protection regime is proposed for future aircraft and a number of fUture research areas are 
identified to enable better understanding of the microwave hazard to aircraft. The three 
areas which will add most to this understanding are modelling of the precise microwave 
environment to be encountered, further airframe shielding measurements and analyses, from 
all incidence angles and on different aircraft types, and the construction and cumulative 
probability fUnction analyses of electronic component and equipment upset databases. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
Radio frequency electromagnetic (EM) radiation has the capability to interfere with the 
normal operation of any technological or biological system. The four main classes of 
susceptible systems are humans, electrically initiated explosive devices on aircraft and in 
weapons, flammable atmospheres and ground-based or flying (avionic) electronic 
equipment. For this interference (RFI) to occur the system must be susceptible at the 
exposure frequency or frequencies and the radiation intensity must be sufficiently high. The 
effects of RFI of electronic equipment can range from inconsequential to catastrophic and 
lethal, with a number of civil and military aircraft crashes caused by sub-GHz frequency 
energy as evidence of the latter. 
In the case of military aircraft illuminated by ground and airborne RF and radar transmitters, 
potential RFI of flying and weapon control systems is a real threat to mission success and 
aircrew survivability. Much world-wide effort has been expended in attempting to 
understand these electromagnetic threats and how to include protection measures in the 
design and construction of aircraft. As more and more civil aircraft are following the 
military aircraft route with fill authority digital fly-by-wire control systems, the hazard 
posed applies equally to military and civil aircraft, both fixed wing and helicopters. 
At the outset of this research Programme it was postulated that there may be avionic circuit 
upset problems caused by RFI in the supra-1 GHz part of the microwave (0.3-30 GHz) EM 
band, where little RFI had previously been reported. The combination of ever smaller and 
higher density circuit technologies used in avionics equipment, clock rates now in excess of 
100 MHz, and an increasing microwave RF environment (including speculative High Power 
Microwave weapons) all appeared to point towards upset problems at some point in the 
future. An initial proposition was developed which voiced the fear that new circuit 
technologies such as VHSIC, with their extremely high packing densities and small 
(1-10 micron) device p-n junctions, would be very susceptible to interference throughout 
the microwave band. 
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1.2 OBJECTWES OF THE RESEARCH 
The research described in this thesis is concerned with the quantification of the RFI risk to 
electronic equipment in the part of the microwave frequency band of most interest to BAe, 
L e. 1-18 0Hz, where most RF and radar transmitters to be encountered operate. The 
specific objectives of the research are outlined in brief below: 
a) To determine whether in fact avionics RFI can occur at these frequencies. if so, to 
determine whether it is an operational risk now or at what point in the fi.iture it will 
become evident. Further, to establish what circuit technologies are, or are likely to be 
adversely affected by microwave RFI. 
b) If microwave RFI is a realistic threat to electronics, to establish the signal parameters 
which cause the upset (e.g. frequency, power density, phase, modulation type and 
depth). 
c) To gain an understanding of the underlying mechanisms of the problem, in order to 
produce models and therefore aid the development of suitable protection strategies. 
d) To obtain research evidence to support the microwave EMC clearance of military 
aircraft with a minimum of tests on aircraft and a minimum of free space irradiation 
(atmospheric RF pollution), through appropriate and validated software models. 
1.3 THESIS ORGANISATION 
The previous sections of this chapter give a brief outline of the potential hazards to military 
and civil aircraft operations posed by microwave EM radiation and the research objectives 
necessary to quantii the hazard and suggest appropriate protection measures 
Chapter 2 is devoted to an examination of the microwave environment in which aircraft 
have to operate. It covers not only the definition of the current civil and military 
environment, but also arrives at a prediction of that for the year 2000. Finally it addresses 
the key shortfalls of current RF environment modelling tools and techniques. 
Chapter 3 presents an investigation of microwave energy ingress into airframes. It discusses 
prediction methods, reports on a major experimental study of airframe attenuation and 
considers others by the Defence Research Agency (Farnborough), concluding with a 
discussion of shielding measurements on metal and composite material panels in the BAe 
EMC Laboratory. 
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Chapter 4 considers energy ingress into avionic equipment boxes once it has penetrated the 
aircraft skin. An overall energy ingress equation is developed and the terms involving box 
material penetration and aperture ingress are examined and quantified. U.S. work on the 
energy coupling phenomenon is reviewed and the chapter concludes with a brief 
introduction to the subject of ingress via cable and connector combinations. 
Chapter 5 describes energy ingress via cable and connector combinations and an initial 
model is developed, based on transmission line equations, describing the transfer fbnction 
between energy incident on a wire entering an avionic box and the resultant voltage 
developed across a load within the box. Initial EMC Laboratory measurements of such 
coupling to a dunmy avionic box are compared with the initial model output and with data 
by the small number of U.K. and U.S. researchers who have published data. 
Chapter 6 gives the experimental results of a detailed laboratory investigation. 
Pseudo-swept (rather than spot) frequency test and measurement techniques enable a more 
comprehensive picture of cable ingress into boxes at these frequencies than previously 
published. Examination of the results and comparison with the initial model leads to a 
refined model and the determination of an empirical equation for load voltage as a fUnction 
of cable length and illuminating antenna position along the cable. 
Chapter 7 addresses the impact of microwave energy on avionic circuitry. Circuit 
technology advancements are discussed, and evidence of reported upset of electronics is 
presented. Electronic component upset mechanisms are considered, as is the use of circuit 
models as an aid to their prediction at these frequencies. The final term in the overall 
ingress equation commenced in Chapter 4 is determined and the topic of equipment and 
system upset prediction is covered. The chapter concludes with a consideration of 
protection strategies and a revised microwave upset protection regime is proposed. 
The final chapter briefly summarises the research and includes suggestions for fUrther 
research. 
Chapter 2 
THE MICROWAVE 
ELECTROMAGNETIC 
ENVIRONMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
To predict whether avionic circuitry of any technology will be upset by microwave energy, 
it is first necessary to quantify the power density levels the aircraft will be expected to 
operate in. The profile of power density vs. frequency is known as the Radio and Radar 
(RF) environment. Once quantified, it is then necessary to develop an ingress equation that 
relates incident Electromagnetic (EM) field on an airframe to voltage at the avionic circuit 
component. Such an equation (from Birken a aL [2-1]) has been developed further, 
identifying the constituent elements requiring modelling and those which are only ever likely 
to be derived from statistical treatment of empirical results. This is discussed in Chapter 4. 
It is shown that, from an assessment of the equation, there are three dominant factors. 
These are the external environment, shielding afforded to the avionics by the airframe and 
equipment box, and the susceptibility of the avionic circuitry in its box. 
Military aircraft and (increasingly) civil aircraft with high electronic content, e.g. MOO 
series, have defined safe distances and heights from 10 kHz - 40 GHz high power 
transmitters. These distances equate to field strength levels at which an adequate safety 
margin exists to prevent upset of electrical and electronic systems. Intentional or 
inadvertent approach closer than these distances hazards aircraft and/or weapons. Severe 
effects have been demonstrated as more than one aircraft has crashed directly as a result of 
flying too close to a high power transmitter. 
This chapter discusses the definition of the current microwave environment, supporting 
techniques and data, and develops a predicted worst case fhture environment. Environment 
prediction methods are then examined and the role, potential improvements and benefits of 
modem RF environment modelling tools are investigated. 
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2.2 CURRENT ENVIRONMENT 
Many RF transmitters use the microwave band which, by international convention, covers 
0.3-30 0Hz. However, current radars more commonly have operating frequencies in the 
range 0.540 GFIz. This research concentrates on the radar sub-band of most interest to 
BAe, 1-18 0Hz, as military aircraft are most likely to encounter radar transmitters in this 
band during operational use. Fig. 2.1 shows 0.8-40 0Hz military and civil usage. 
Figure 2.1: Usage Of 0.8-40 0Hz Band 
Ailen and Harlen of the National Radiological Protection Board provided a source list of RF 
and Microwave sources in the UK [2-2]. Unfortunately, it omitted military and civil aircraft, 
missile control radars, Government installations and ships in port. On assessing the 
document, predicting the increase since its publication in 1983 and estimating these omitted 
sources, the research work has shown that there are now between 44,500 and 45,000 
individual microwave transmitters in the U.K. alone. It should however be noted that not 
all of these transmitters would be operating at any given time. The figures exclude cellular 
telephones and microwave ovens, estimated to currently number over one million units in 
the UK, which are sources in the strictest sense, but contribute little to the overall RF 
environment. Of the 45,000 transmitters 537 (March 1995) are high power systems 
covered by the Ministry of Defence-operated High Intensity Radio Transmission Area 
(HIRTA) scheme [2-3]. The number of transmitters, including transmitter tretirements', is 
increasing at a rate of approximately 30 per annum at this time, a rate which is anticipated 
to continue over the next five years. HIRTA transmitters necessitate special horizontal and 
vertical avoidance distances to be observed when planning flight routes for fixed and rotary 
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wing military aircraft in UK airspace. 	 The increase reflects the migration of 
communications systems from the lower (e.g. HF) to microwave frequencies, where the 
same data rate can be transmitted for a lower percentage of the available bandwidth 
However, the computer prediction 1-IIRTA scheme covers primarily fixed ground high 
power transmitters, and these are mainly below 5 GH.z. Before September 1992, mobile 
transmitters (ground, sea or air) were not covered and accordingly the scheme was of very 
limited use when trying to get an accurate picture of the then current microwave 
environment. The scheme was updated in late 1992 [2-4], introducing data on UK 
ground-mobile transmitters, and shipborne and airborne transmitters [2-5], although only 
for RAF and Royal Navy and former Soviet Union transmitters in these latter two 
categories. Despite this major upgrade, the HIRTA scheme, although fulfilling its intended 
purpose of overcoming the problem of RADHAZ (RF Radiation Hazards) to aircraft, does 
not enable accurate definition of the RF environment. It is a model scheme for the rest of 
the world, where such schemes do not yet exist. This situation causes particular problems 
when attempting to quantify safety margins for BAe aircraft operations in foreign 
countries, where details of transmitter types, powers and locations are often unknown. 
There is no method at this time to allow determination of the actual microwave 
environment at a given point in UK airspace, since not all transmitters are included in the 
HIRTA scheme, and currently no environment measurements support the transmitter 
database. It has thus been concluded that measurements over a period of time, a difficult 
measurement task in itself, may be the only way to truly determine the exact microwave 
environment at a given location. Taylor and Hill [2-6] provided some of the first of the 
'real microwave environment' measurements in 1977. The measurements, taken from an 
aircraft at 10-33 thousand feet over the California, Oregon and Nevada areas of the US, 
covered the range 1-3 GFIz in 50 MHz bands. The power levels were measured in flight 
for the morning, afternoon and night cases, and the results showed that the 50 MI-h 
occupancy to be lowest (as predicted) at night. Although recent advances have been made 
in Electronic Intelligence gathering equipment to allow easier data gathering and 
subsequent analysis, this early paper gives an idea of the variability of the microwave 
environment and the probable impossibility of its total and accurate prediction. 
Ref. [2-7] covers the assessment of the RF environment at an operational, pseudo-military 
airfield in the UK. In the paper it was emphasised that the modelling and prediction 
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methods available at that time (1988) were inadequate for adequately defining the 
microwave 1ff environment, and that measurement with statistical treatment was the only 
sure way ahead. This situation was seen to have changed little by 1994 when the issue of 
accurate quantification and definition of the environment was discussed in Section 3 of the 
paper on RE Hazards Control [2-8], which forms Appendix A. In the paper the prime 
limitation of the HIRTA scheme was identified, that it (in common with other current 
assessment techniques) does not take into account the probability and time of irradiation of 
the aircraft by the transmitter(s) forming the environment. This aspect of time and 
probability of exposure is important in the determination of the potential for avionics upset 
and is discussed further in 2.3.2. 
Literature searching and discussions with BAe's EM Hazards Specialist yielded some 
documents which purport to define the current military and civil microwave environments. 
They are briefly discussed below and a summary definition of the current environment is 
obtained by taking the worst case of all of them and presenting this on Fig. 2.2 (both for 
Continuous Wave and Pulsed emissions). This is thought to be a good baseline definition 
in the absence of an accurate picture. 
Two NATO Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs), numbers 4234 [2-9] and 1307 
[2-10] cover the NATO definition of the environment. The former covers that for the 
design of materials for use in weapons systems, whilst the latter covers the maximum 
Naval EM environment. This second document essentially covered the NWS (Naval 
Weapons Specification) 6 environment [2-11] which has now been superseded by NES 
(Naval Environment Specification) 1006 [2-12], which is the prime UK high RE power 
EMC Qualification specification. 
The UK Minimum Service RE Environment (MSEREE) [2-13] largely reflects the two 
STANAGs above. A useful adjunct to the STANAGS is a paper by Larsen [2-14], where 
he presents peak and average for the total worst case environments for US, UK and French 
airports, and STANAG 3614AE [2-15]. This data is of particular interest since the French 
airport data is actually measured data, whereas the US and UK data is predicted. It should 
be noted that the worst case civil aircraft environment, initially indicated by MacDiarmid 
[2-16] and were later included in the European Civil Aircraft Equipment (EUROCAE) 
document [2-17], largely follows the military environment and is also included in Fig. 2.2. 
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A number of microwave transmitters exist on board the aircraft whose susceptibility to the 
external environment is under consideration, and the radar and Electronic Warfare jammer 
are the most powerful. These tend to pose little risk to on-board avionics as, to achieve 
high effective radiated powers, they use horn or phased array antennas, both of which yield 
beams with main lobes pointing away from the aircraft. These and the other (lower power) 
on-board microwave transmitters are therefore excluded from Fig. 2.2. As discussed later 
in Section 2.3.2, it will be seen that whilst the on-board environment may be 
inconsequential for the host aircraft, its transmitters form part of the external environment 
for any aircraft flying in formation with, or in close vicinity to it. Some extremely high 
power microwave sources are also discussed in Granatstein and Alexoff [2-18] which are 
not included in the current environment definition since most are currently only available 
under laboratory conditions. These are discussed further in Section 2.3.1. 
Figure 2.2: Current Microwave Environment 
10000 
04 
LU 
I I 	 I 	 I 	 I 
FREQUENCY (GHz) 
_PEAK PULSE - .MAXIMUM AVERAGE Q 
2.3 PREDICTED FUTURE ENVIRONMENT 
2.3.1 Worst Case Environment 
To establish a worst case predicted future environment, unclassified baseline data was 
required on both high power sources and possible resultant power densities, which could 
then be used to develop a prediction. Literature searching yielded two papers which in part 
provided this baseline data. Denny [2-19],[2-20] summarised the predicted microwave 
hazard to future circuit technologies in his papers entitled "The Projected Susceptibilities of 
VHSIC/VLSI Devices to the Year 2000 EM Environment" (1986) and "Projected Trends in 
IC/EM Environment Interaction" (1987). The data from the papers forming part of the 
baseline are given as Figures here: 2.3 'High Power Microwave Source Profile of the (1987) 
present' showing 5 OW peak in the 1-10 0Hz region and 2.4 '1 km predicted Peak Power 
Density Profile' showing approximately 3.5 to 20 MWnI 2 in the 1-10 0Hz region. 
Figure 2.3: High Power Microwave Sources 
Extracted from Denny [2-19], with Benford and Swegle data [2-22] 
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Figure 2.4: 1 km Predicted Power Density Profile 
Extracted from Denny [2-19] 
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Granatstein and Alexoff [2-18] is a prime modem reference work on High Power 
Microwave Sources. It was published in 1987 and is the primary source of predictions of 
the microwave threat for the future. The so-called "Granatstein limit" is a theoretical high 
pulse power limit which has a maximum value of 105 MW at 1-10 GHz. R. Parker 
authored Table 13.1 of [2-18], which is reproduced as Fig. 2.5 and shows the projected 
limits of ultra-high power microwave source (<100 ns technology). Reference [2-18] 
covers most of the current devices, e.g. Vircators (Virtual Cathode Oscillators), 
Magnetrons and Free Electron Lasers (FELs). 
Castro [21] noted in 1990 that the US were developing a new device called the multi-wave 
Cherenkov generator (MWCG), a similar type of which the Soviets were reported to have 
generated the then largest peak power, 15 GW, ever produced by a single assembly. 
Benford and Swegle, in their 1992 reference work High Power Microwaves [2-22], 
included the MWCG in data reflecting the 1990 status of peak powers of pulsed sources, 
and this data is included in Fig. 2.3 to demonstrate the progress made between 1987 and 
1990. They noted in 1992 that the present state of the art was >10 GW achieved by 
MWCG and Relativistic Klystron. This steady rate of progress was underlined in 1992 
when Green [2-23] reported an as yet un-ratified 20 GW from a single source, resulting 
from research under the Strategic Defense (sic) Initiative Organisation. Benford and 
Swegle also gave an opinion of the predicted future of 100 UW for peak pulse power, in 
agreement with [2-18], and average powers of 100 kW increasing to 1 MW. 
It should be noted that the peak levels on these predictions are 100 GW in the range 
1-20 GHz and, as such, are 20 times higher than those used by Denny in his predictions of 
IC upset levels for the year 2000 RF environment. Indications from Soviet and US work in 
this field, reinforced at a 1988 seminar on the latest advances in High Power Microwaves 
are that the 100 GW level may be reached by the year 2000, even if only by the use of 
paralleled Gyrotrons or Vircators with phased array horn antennas under laboratory 
conditions. The reported US near term experimental objective of 500 GWm 2 for pulsed 
FELs is discounted at this time. 
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Figure 2.5: Projected Limits Of Ultra-High Power Microwave Sources 
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As mentioned in Section 2.2, the present peak microwave environment is thought to be 
dominated by the external, rather than by on-board microwave sources. For the future, 
with moves to make military aircraft more 'stealthy' and have tighter emissions control, 
on-board transmitter powers are likely to stabilise and certainly be reduced in some areas. 
Evidence is already seen with the inception of low probability of intercept and spread 
spectrum radars, as well as terrain matching systems, which delete much of the requirement 
for forward transmitting terrain following radars. In addition there have been a number of 
mentions of the development of High Power Microwave "Beam Weapons" since 1987, 
[2-21] and [2-24] to [2-26]. In 1987 Audone [2-24] reported that it had just recently been 
proposed to develop weapons capable of radiating the aircraft with extremely high levels of 
energy. These weapons, he reported, would use generators based upon new pulsed plasma 
magneto-hydro-dynamic technology, which convert the chemical energy of an explosive 
cartridge directly into pulsed electrical energy. Whilst it is known from [2-21], [2-23], 
[2-25], [2-26] and other sources that since then work has been carried out in the US and 
USSR, it is believed that at the present rate of progress, it is unlikely that peak power 
density levels in the microwave band will exceed those predicted in Fig. 2.6. 
From consideration of the preceding items in this section and taking into account that the 
ground-based transmitter 'threat' may be as close as 150 m to the aircraft, the current 
prediction of the future microwave environment is given as that of Denny multiplied by 20 
and then scaled for 150 m and is presented in Fig. 2.6. It includes the dry air breakdown 
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power density at one atmosphere, 15.3 GWm 2 (2.4 MVm'), as an indicator of the eventual 
limiter to the microwave threat to aircraft. With present progress on high power pulse 
microwave sources, including that on multi-antenna arrays where the overall effect of air 
breakdown on the total effective radiated power is less, it is suspected that levels on this 
Fig. 2.6 may be reached within the next five years, even if only under laboratory conditions. 
Figure 2.6: Predicted Microwave Environment 
100,000 
10,000 
1,000 
In 
100 
0 
10 
CL 
IL 
DENNY 1km PREDICTION: 102CR 	 ISOm FROM DENNY PREDICTION 
NEW ISOm PREDICTiON 
	
AJR BREAXDOWN AT STP 
0.1 
2 	 5 	 10 	 20 	 50 	 100 	 200 
Frequency (GHz) 
2.3.2 Realistic Environment and Probability of Exposure 
Specification of the minimum necessary RF environment(s) in which aircraft have to operate 
is a key issue in the cost and development timescales of new and/or modified aircraft and 
their avionics [2-8]. Modern EMC specifications, which are usually based on a worst case 
static radar with generic RF parametrics permanently pointing directly at the aircraft' 
consideration with additional safety margins, simulate conditions which rarely, if ever, occur 
in real life. A number contain single value field strength levels across significant parts of the 
RF and radar bands, even though in some sub-bands transmitters do not exist. Thus, most 
avionics being designed and qualified today may be over-specified and there appears the 
possibility for cost and timescale reductions, which could be applicable across all military 
and civil platforms, if a better RF environment prediction were to exist or be developed. 
This issue is equally applicable to the design and specification of Electronic Warfare (EW) 
receivers, such as those in Radar Warners, Electronic Support Measures equipment and RF 
jammer systems. In this case a precise, time line definition of the RF environment is 
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required, in terms of power density, number of pulses per second and frequency 
sub-banding of energy reaching the aircraft. Currently, no BAe aircraft to date has had this 
definition established prior to contract award. Consequently, it is thought that such EW 
systems specified by BAe may, as for the EMC case, be over-specified. 
The time line power density vs. frequency profile the aircraft is subjected to during its 
various mission types and phases, for peace-time and under active operational conditions, 
also affects RADHAZ. This is required to be known to ensure that a.ircrew are not 
hazarded and that there is no unacceptable hazard posed to on-board fuel systems and 
weapon systems containing electro-explosive devices. For each of the above cases: EMC, 
EW and RADHAZ, the item requiring determination is the profile of power density vs. 
frequency vs. exposure time, L e. the probability of exposure, and, in the case of this 
research programme, the consequent probability of upset of avionic circuitry should the 
aircraft actually be irradiated with such an exposure profile. It is this exposure time aspect 
of the environment which, in conjunction with the aspect angle of aircraft irradiation 
(discussed in Section 2.3.2.2), is believed to be a substantial factor in determining the 
probability of upset of avionic circuitry, rather than merely the peak or mean power density 
to which the aircraft and its avionics are exposed. For example, if an aircraft in motion at 
300 feet altitude and 300 knots is perfectly tracked as it approaches and overflies a 
ground-based radar, then the aircraft will only be illuminated at any appreciable level of 
power density (i.e. >0. 1 of the maximum, which occurs when the aircraft is directly 
overhead the radar) for 2.8 seconds. This example is expanded in Fig. 2.7, which shows 
this transit time for the normal military aircraft low level operations regime of 100 to 500 
feet and through the speed envelope 200 to 600 Knots. In all cases this 'worst case' 
irradiation time is less than 10 seconds during which time the power density is above 0.5 of 
its maximum for only 56.3% of the transit time, further demonstrating the pessimism of the 
case of continuous irradiation at a fixed maximum power density. 
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Figure 2.7: Aircraft Transit Time Over A Ground Radar 
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In the case of non-tracking rotating, scanning or nodding (height-finder) radars the 
probability of the aircraft encountering the radar peak power density, Le. on the antenna 
boresight rather than elsewhere in its main beam or its side lobes and being exposed to 
power densities above 0.1 x the maximum from a given transmitter for more than 2 
seconds, is much less than unity; absolute quantification is discussed in Section 2.3.2.2. 
Far more likely, in typical aircraft vs. ground radar situations, is an exposure time of a few 
micro-seconds in any one radar's sweep. This aspect is complex and totally scenario 
dependent (i.e. quantity of radars, radar scan and RF parameters, their dispositions relative 
to the aircraft and aircraft flight path) and is discussed further in that Section. 
There is likely therefore to be considerable difference between an exposure consideration 
where the transmitter is pointing continuously at the aircraft and both are stationary, and 
one where relative angles and range are changing with time and the transmitter is also 
scanning. This may explain, as discussed in Chapter 7, why there are many less 
occurrences of microwave upset than would be expected from consideration of 
- the current microwave environment (see Section 2.2), 
- the low field strength levels to which earlier generation aircraft and avionics, many of 
which will remain in service for ten or more years, have been certified to (see Appendix 
B), and 
- the airframe attenuation which can be guaranteed on both metal- and composite-skinned 
aircraft (see Chapter 3). 
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A precise and accurate definition of the RF environment at a given point in space therefore 
necessitates fill knowledge of all transmitters, including their RF parametrics and azimuth 
and elevation beam patterns. In the common case of scanning, rotating and nodding 
antenna systems, the scan parametrics, e.g. rates, turn-around times (during which no 
transmissions take place) and start position, are also required to be known. This requires a 
large database of transmitter information for all but the simplest environment predictions. 
Computer models are then required to calculate, in the simplest case, free space loss 
between transmitter and aircraft to arrive at power density at the aircraft. This has to be 
calculated for all transmitters in the scenario and at high rates to ensure all received pulses 
(many of which are of the order of I p.ts duration) are included in the summation of power 
densities at the aircraft. 
In the next section the capabilities and shortfalls of existing RF environment prediction 
techniques used for EMC purposes are examined. The abilities and limitations of an 
existing BAe software tool, the EW Evaluation System (EWES) [2-28] with its Scenario 
Generator, are also explored with a view to providing the basis of an accurate and high 
quality RF environment prediction tool covering EMC, EW and RADHAZ requirements. 
2.3.2.1 EUROCAL and HIRTA prediction methods and limitations 
The U.K. Ministry of Defence operates a HIRTA scheme [2-4] for fixed and rotary wing 
military aircraft operating in the U.K., see Section 2.2. The need for such controls has been 
driven by the increasing avionics and electronic-controlled weapon systems content of 
military aircraft since the early 1960's. The weapons systems safety aspects have been 
covered via U.K. Ordnance Board documents, e.g. [2-13], which have existed in some form 
from those times. As the avionic content of military aircraft increased, e.g. the introduction 
of the Tornado and Harrier aircraft in the 1970's, the increased risk of upset was controlled 
by the introduction of the HIRTA scheme in 1984, which covers weapon, avionic and other 
electrical systems. 
No similar need existed for civil aircraft as they neither carried weapon systems nor, until 
the late 1980's, did they contain filly computerised flight safety critical systems. With the 
advent of electronics into critical areas of civil aircraft, such as on the European Airbus 
MOO series of aircraft with their fill authority digital fly-by-wire flight control systems, 
there emerged the need for an equal level of control of both civil and military aircraft 
avionics to ensure safe and correct operation in the proximity of high power radio and radar 
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transmitters. To control the risk to civil aircraft the U.K., in collaboration with other E.C. 
countries, their Airworthiness Authorities and the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) formed a body to address these issues, called the EURopean Organisation for Civil 
Aircraft Electronics (EUROCAE). EUROCAE Working Group 33, Sub-Groups 2 and 3 in 
conjunction with the U.S. Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) AE4R Committee have 
produced, between 1990 and 1994, four draft versions of an advisory document entitled 
'Guidance to the Certification of Aircraft Electrical and Electronic Systems for Operation in 
the High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) Environment'; [2-17] is the 1993 draft, from 
which the 1994 draft varies little in the area of RF environment prediction techniques and 
levels. This document defines, amongst other EMC design and test procedures and 
processes, the external (to aircraft) RF environment, from which, in turn, a design and test 
environment for civil aircraft is developed. It should however be noted that [2-17] does 
NOT cover RF hazards to Electro-Explosive Devices (which is covered by the FIIRTA 
scheme for military aircraft), humans or flammable atmospheres. Reference [2-17] actually 
contains six rather than one single definition of the civil aircraft environment, three for the 
European scenario and a matching set for the higher levels to be encountered in the 
International scenario. Their derivation, the underlying assumptions and calculation of 
field strength levels are now discussed. 
The flight envelope of aircraft defined by the ICAO standard allows unrestricted flight, 
during normal operations, within 500 feet of the ground with the exception of certain 
'restricted' [very high power transmitter] areas. The hypothesis that increasing field strength 
(due to diminishing aircraft-to-ground transmitter distance) equates directly to an increased 
likelihood of adverse effects in avionics is used to support the plausible argument that an 
aircraft emergency may result in deviation from normal flight path and may thus lead to 
exposure to a higher RF environment and an attendant increased risk. Consequently, 
although the derivation of environment is more involved (including assessment of approach 
and landing trajectories), the basic rationale used is one where a number of different classes 
of transmitters are categorised by the minimum distance an aircraft may approach them. 
The seven contributing environments to the total civil aircraft RF environment are given in 
Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Elements of Total Civil Aircraft RF Environment 
1)  Airport - Fixed Ground Emitters: Marker beacons, ILS (Localiser & Glide Slope), 
Weather Radar, TACAN, VHF and UHF communications and telemetry, Distance 
Measuring Equipment, Airport surface detection system, Airport and Air-route 
surveillance radars, Ground controlled approach radar, Non-directional beacon, 
Microwave landing system, Weather radar, ATC-RBS interrogator. 
2) Airport - Mobile Ground Emitter: Weather radar. 
3) Airport - Other Mobile GroundEmitters: HF, VI-IF and UHF communications, 
Doppler navigation radar, TACAN, Radio Altimeter, ATC-RBS beacon. 
4)  Aircraft-to-Aircraft (Interceptor): On-board radars; HF/VHF/UHF comms. 
5) Aircraft-to-A ircraft (Non-Interceptor): Weather radar, HF communications. 
6)  Ground Environment: Commercial HF, VHF FM and AM, and TV broadcast 
transmitters, Troposcatter communications, Radars, LORAN C installations. 
7)  Shipborne Environment: HF and UHF communications, Various radars, 1FF/SIP. 
The minimum distances between the aircraft under consideration and each of these 
transmitters in these environments was then defined, as reproduced in Table 2.2. The worst 
case environment, which includes the extreme situations of least probability, is entitled 
'Severe. The 'Normal' environment is based on the representative maximum EM 
environment profile found in the vicinity of a number of European airports, i.e. it covers 
the more realistic possible interference situations of higher probability and thus contains 
somewhat lower field strength levels than in the 'Severe' case. The environment to be used 
in the design and test process for flight safety critical systems is entitled 'Certification' and 
lies broadly between the 'Severe' and 'Normal' environments. 
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Table 2.2: Minimum Aircraft-to-Transmitter Distances 
TRANSMITTER MENTMUM DISTANCE (Feet)* 
SEVERE CERTIFICATION NORMAL 
Fixed airport transmitters: 
- Airport radar 500 S 500 S 500 S 
- Non-radar transmitters 250 S 250 S 250 S 
%'Iobile airport transmitters: 
- Aircraft ' s weather radar 150 D 150 D 250 D 
 -Allother SOD SOD SOD 
General ground transmitters: 
- 0-3 NM wedge from end of runway 500 5 500 S 500 S 
- 3-5 NM wedge from end of runway 500 S 1000 S 1000 S 
- 5-10 NM wedge from end ofrunway SOOS 1000 5 1500 S 
- 10-25 NM radii of aircraft 500 S 1000 S 2500 S 
4 ir-to-A ir: 
- Interceptor aircraft 100 D 100 D None 
- Non-interceptor aircraft 500 D 500 D None 
Ship-to-Air: 300 5 750 5 None 
* S = Slant range; D = direct range. 
The minimum distances for the matching set of environments for the International scenario 
are not given in [2-17] but are believed to be similar, with the differences in peak and 
average field strengths vs. frequency sub-banding being the result of higher power radar 
transmitters which may be encountered outside Europe (i.e. primarily in North America). 
The absolute values of field strength in the European and International environments in 
[2-17] are not discussed here as they have already been included in the considerations in 
Section 2.2 leading to the prediction of the worst case current microwave environment. 
Although a number of international agencies have been involved in the calculation of the 
field strengths at a civil aircraft from the transmitters described earlier in this section, it is 
relevant to discuss the methods used in support of defining the civil environment in the U.K. 
This is appropriate as the method used by EUROCAE is to use the I-URTA emitter database 
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and calculations (operated by BAeSEMA under contract to the U.K. MoD), as used in the 
definition of the military aircraft U.K. RF environment, described in Section 2.2. 
For each transmitter in turn, a worst case is statically modelled where it is assumed to be 
permanently pointing its boresight directly at the aircraft under consideration. RF emitter 
parametric data used in the calculation is either supplied by the transmitter's manufacturer 
or estimated by the HIRTA database operator. The equations used are based on optical 
point source theory to give far field power density (P 4) at the aircraft under consideration: 
GT *PT Pd = 
	
(Wm2) 2  
where: 	 GT= Antenna peak gain (as a ratio above isotropic) 
= Transmitter power, less antenna feeder losses (W) 
r = Distance between transmitter and aircraft (m) 
Appropriate near field adaptations, particularly relevant for sub-GHz emitters, and antenna 
radiation patterns only for sub-0.6 (3Hz emitters, where significant off-boresight elevation 
and azimuth sidelobes can be encountered, are given in Section 5 of [2-4]. For microwave 
antennas the transmitter-to-aircraft slant distance is compared to the near/intermediate field 
and intermediate/far field distances to establish whether the aircraft is in the Fresnel (near 
and intermediate) or Frauhofer (far) field of the antenna. The boundaries, N-I and I-F, are 
given by: 
(m) 
	
... (2.2) 
(m) 
where: 	 D = largest antenna dimension (m) 
X = wavelength of lowest antenna operating frequency (m) 
If the aircraft is calculated to be in the near field, which extends to 
	 (m) from the 
antenna where A is the area of the antenna (m), then in practice the following equation is 
used for maximum near field power density: 
Pd = 3PTGT (Wm2) 
This power density is assumed constant over the above distance, which is not the case in 
reality where substantial variation of electric and magnetic field strengths (and hence power 
density) occurs in this region. 
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The HIRTA scheme has limited treatment of co-located transmitters as it assumes that an 
aircraft will only be illuminated by the most powerful heightfinding (nodding) and tracking 
radars (if such exists at the site), and periodically by the most powerifil rotating search 
radar. The combined mean effective radiated power of these emitters is used as though it 
emanated in all directions from a single, more powerful radar. With the possible exception 
of hovering or slow moving helicopters at very low levels, the above represents an extreme 
worst case assessment as military aircraft moving at over 300 knots above a few hundred 
feet altitude are unlikely to be irradiated at any appreciable level by ground emitters for 
more than a few seconds in reality as discussed in Section 2.3.2. A number of assumptions 
are applicable to the definition of the RF environments and the field strengths calculated 
for each transmitter in the scenario contributing to the definition of each of those 
environments. Some are contained in [2-17] and [2-4] and others appear in Jaeger [2-27] 
(one of the contributors to [2-17]). These, with commentary, and other identified 
limitations and shortfalls are given in the following list. Together these represent 
significant over-estimation of the RF environment as a threat to military and civil aircraft. 
Thus the HIRTA scheme and the various additional assumptions applied in the EUROCAE 
environment definition, although adequate for their intended purpose, i.e. ensuring military 
and civil aircraft safety when in proximity to high power RF transmitters, are considered to 
be very conservative. The items are grouped together in perceived order of importance to 
the generation of high fidelity definition of the RF environment. 
High Importance: 
1) Continuous illumination of the aircraft by the transmitter is assumed, i.e. no modelling 
of emitter-aircraft relative motion and no consideration of sector scan, nodding, or 
antenna rotation. 
2) Transmit antenna modelling: Maximum main-beam gain of the emitter antenna is 
used; i.e. no beam shape (main-beam width, side- and back lobes) are used. Beam 
squint is not taken into account. Antenna heights above ground due to antenna towers 
that were not 'part of the basic package' are not considered. If maximum antenna 
elevation angle is not available, 90° is assumed. Shipborne emitter antenna height is 
assumed to be 150 feet. Transmit antenna polarisation is not considered, which could 
have significant impact on coupling of energy through the airframe and into the avionics 
equipment; this aspect is examined in Chapter 3. 
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3) Non-cumulativefield strength is calculated; i.e. the effects of illumination by more than 
one transmitter is not considered. Jaeger [2-27] claimed that 'Investigations have shown 
that the probability of addition is extremely low, as in the case of short wave 
transmitters, where some emitters are located at the same place.' This comment is 
probably only aimed at sub-GHz emitters and is unlikely to be true for an aircraft 
illuminated by a number of identical hostile fire control radars. 
4) Transmitted signal modulation is not considered apart from the simple duty cycle 
defined for EMC qualification of avionic equipment and aircraft (see Appendix B). 
Only using worst case RF parametrics rather than a realistic set vs. time is pessimistic 
(i.e. constant illumination by a CW source is unusual, whereas radar mode changes 
between search, track, lock-on and back to search are more realistic). 
5) Civil Aircraft height: Minimum heights of aircraft above ground transmitters are 
assumed to be as shown in Table 2.2. These result in much higher field strengths than 
would appear from a realistic assessment of the probability of an aircraft actually 
approaching this close, even during an emergency. As the field strength falls off as the 
inverse square of the inter-distance, any increase in the figures of Table 2.2 will 
appreciably reduce the field strength the aircraft would be expected to encounter. 
6) Average field strength is a function of the duty cycle of the transmitted waveform, 
usually expressed as Pulse Width (PW) in seconds multiplied by Pulse Repetition 
Frequency (PRF) in Hertz. Emitters often have a range of operating PWs and PRFs and 
often emitter documentation does not enable determination of the precise operational 
maximum duty cycle; in this case the maximum values of PW and PRF from the 
documentation are used for a conservative estimate. 
7) Frequency Sub-Banding: The highest individual field strength within the following 
frequency sub-bands is taken as the environment for the whole sub-band: 1-2, 2-4, 4-6, 
6-8, 8-12, 12-20 and 20-40 GHz. Thus, for example in the latter two radar bands, an 
environment may be specified where none or only low power emitters exist in large 
parts of the band. 
8) Transmitter RF characteristics: Transmitters are fixed frequency, PW and PRF; i.e 
frequency agility and inter-pulse variations of PW and PRF, which are usual in military 
radar systems, are not considered. This aspect can be visualised in Fig. 2.8, from 
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[2-29], where various types of radar pulse waveforms incident on an aircraft are depicted 
as a number of pulses vs. frequency and vs. angle of arrival at the aircraft. 
Figure 2.8: Radar Pulses Incident On Aircraft 
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Medium Importance 
1) Multipath: Although constructive ground reflections of I-IF band emissions are catered 
for (direct and reflected components assumed to be in phase), no consideration of 
multipath at microwave frequencies is made. At microwave frequencies a number of 
aspects require modelling: a) Multipath from other airborne transmitters (including 
forward ground bounce and from other aircraft in close proximity), b) Own transmitter 
returns (vertical ground bounce and from formation flyers). Specular and difihise 
reflections equate to signal phase difference and thus changed amplitude at aircraft. 
When considering reflections from formation flyers (which includes the interceptor vs. 
civil aircraft case) there is also a need for some level of Radar Cross Section modelling 
of the other aircraft involved. Such modelling, especially in real or near-real time, is 
computationally intensive. 
2) Terrain modelling: Flat earth is assumed, i.e. terrain is not included. Terrain modelling, 
including terrain screening, various terrain types and surface cultures within a scenario 
are required; including reflectivity aspects and sea states. 
3) Near field effects: These are dependent on frequency, transmit and receive antenna size 
and are generally more relevant to large aircraft or low flyers. Although the HIRTA 
scheme caters for sub-0.6 GHz antenna arrays (especially those at HF), it assumes a 
worst case maximum near-field power density at all points within an antenna's near field. 
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4) Repeatability: When modelling an environment with a moving aircraft and radars with 
appropriate scan motions it is important to be able to control antenna initial pointing 
angles, as these may be the dominant factors in whether and by how much the aircraft is 
illuminated by any given emitter in the scenario. The ability is thus required to specit' 
emitter boresight start values (e.g. all radars point North, centre of scan on velocity 
vector of aircraft, or random). With this capability the range of field strengths an aircraft 
will encounter can be determined as a function of aircraft approach time and radars' 
initial pointing angles. 
5) Modulation on Pulse: Improved fidelity is needed to better represent real radars. 
Lesser Importance 
1) Atmospheric effects: HIRTA and EUROCAE assume free space, i.e. no losses. 
Attenuation should be modelled varying representatively with frequency (including 
'ducting' effects) and rainfall rates. Fig. 2.9 shows RF signal attenuation vs. frequency 
for various rainfall rates. 
Figure 2.9: Atmospheric Attenuation of RE Signals 
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2) Emitters on platforms, particularly aircraft: Current systems largely employ 'point' 
platforms, e.g. each aircraft's emitters and sensors exist at one point in space. Need for 
wire grid 'model' of (at least) transmitting platform where emitter antennas may be 
placed. 
3) Transmitter Power: The I-IIRTA emitter database only contains emitters with an 
effective radiated power greater than 500 Watts (25 dBW). All microwave transmitters, 
irrespective of power, should be included in a high fidelity environment definition. 
2.3.2.2 EW Environment Simulator as an Accurate Prediction Tool 
BAe, in its role as a major aircraft manufacturer and systems integrator, has a suite of 
appropriate models and simulators to support the conceptualisation, design and 
development of whole aircraft and their systems. One of these tools, the Electronic Warfare 
Evaluation System (EWES) by Data Sciences (U.K.) Ltd., is of major relevance to the 
prediction of the RF environment for EMC purposes. EWES is a suite of computer 
programmes for the development of EW equipment such as radar warning receivers and 
radar jammers (active electronic countermeasures). The positions of ground emitters and 
trajectories of mobile ground and airborne emitters are entered into the ESPRJT (Enhanced 
Scenario Preparation Interactive Tool) front end programme to enable computation of the 
received RF environment, at any specified location or aircraft, by the EW Scenario 
Generator (EWSG). This generates a time-ordered history file of all RF parameters of 
pulsed and CW waveforms at the specified aircraft. Post-scenario run analysis of the RF 
profile encountered by the aircraft can be conducted by the EW Graphical Analysis 
(EWGA) package or data can be exported for analysis on a variety of other analysis tools. 
Although primarily an EW design tool, EWES generates much of the RF information 
required for EMC environment definition. The method of use, appreciable computing 
resources, typical EWSG data listings and commonly used EWGA outputs are given in 
Figures 2, 3, 6 and 7 of [2-30] which is reproduced as Appendix C. Reference [2-30], the 
1995 paper on environment definition published by this researcher with discussion support 
from his colleague, BAe's EWES specialist, includes the findings of Section 2.3.2. 
The EWES suite adequately addresses many of the limitations and removes a number of the 
assumptions of HIRTA and EUROCAE environment definition for military and civil 
aircraft, as listed in Section 2.3.2.1. Some areas, e.g. terrain modelling and screening and 
'repeatability, which are currently not in the EWES suite, are being implemented in a 1995 
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major upgrade to its capability. This upgrade is driven, inter a/ia, by the need to have 
common capabilities with BAe RF threat simulators (complex RF signal source generators 
with internal RF environment models, which have had such items specified by this 
researcher). Other shortfalls of, and potential improvements to the EWES suite are under 
investigation by this researcher as part of a BAe research programme. The potential use of 
EWES as an EMC environment prediction tool warrants further investigation. 
2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The precise definition of the external microwave environment levels is a key factor in 
determining whether or not microwave upset of any circuitry will occur. To date no 
definition of that level of quality is available. Although better predictions of the current 
environment have now been produced by the EUROCAE and HIRTA groups based on 
consideration of likely RF emitters to be encountered by civil aircraft operations at 500 feet 
height, on approach and take-off and landing, these predictions are overly pessimistic and 
are of little use to the definition of the military aircraft environment. 
Since it has been identified that the EWES environment modelling capability addresses 
most of the shortfalls of the other tools and techniques, it is believed that there is 
significant scope for its use to develop realistic environment predictions upon which an 
estimation of probability of upset of avionics can be superimposed to yield higher quality 
EMC specifications. This topic is currently under investigation by BA&s research groups. 
It is likely that the definitions of worst case current and future microwave environments 
arrived at in this research will continue to change in the near future, though probably at a 
lesser rate than in recent years. It is not considered that the peak values predicted in Fig. 
2.6 will be exceeded, with the exception of speculative High Power Microwave weapons 
(which are outside the scope of this research), however it is quite likely that the frequency 
profile may change. 
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Chapter 3 
MICROWAVE ENERGY INGRESS 
INTO AIRFRAMES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the early part of the research programme it was established that there were no suitable 
analysis tools in existence for the comprehensive modelling of energy ingress into airframes 
at microwave frequencies. However, more recently, software has become available with a 
limited applicability to this problem within affordable computing resources. Consequently 
attention was turned to a practical examination of the subject on a real aircraft. This 
examination allowed identification of average airframe attenuation factors at these 
frequencies, whilst highlighting actual ingress points on the airframe. Additionally this 
work supplied evidence on the dependency of energy ingress on the angle of arrival of the 
impinging EM wavefront. Microwave energy ingress into airframes is examined in some 
detail in this chapter, with commentary on prediction and modelling problems anticipated. 
3.2 PREDICTION METHODS 
The three-dimensional models used to date attempt to analyse a small portion of the 
airframe using one of three techniques: direct analytical, boundary element or finite 
difference. The Transmission Line Modelling (TLM) code is a time domain numerical 
technique [3-1] and is used for predicting fields, surface currents and wire currents on and 
in a body. Propagation is modelled by filling space and the body therein with a network of 
transmission lines. Through equivalence to Maxwell's equations the solution of the 
network, resulting in fields and currents, can be solved exactly. The frequency range over 
which the technique can be used depends on node spacing within the network; at least 6 
nodes per wavelength (X) are needed [2-17]. 
The Numerical EM Code (NEC) is a frequency domain, boundary integral code for 
calculating the scattered field and surface current on conducting bodies [3-2]. The body's 
surface is discretised into either flat panels or wires. Self and mutual impedance of each 
wire and panel are inserted into a matrix which, when inverted and multiplied by the driving 
tbnction (incident field), gives a matrix of currents on the panels or wires. These produce 
the surface current on the body. Frequency range of operation is computing resource-
limited as panels and wires must be smaller than 21 8 [2-17], although 710 is often seen in the 
literature and smaller segment lengths can be required depending on local geometric 
constraints. Solution computing time is proportional to the square of the number of panels 
or wires for matrix filling, and to its cube for matrix inversion. NEC is but one code in this 
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class of thin-wire integral equation based moment methods, with MOM-313 as another, 
BAe-generated code [3-3]; see [34] for a comprehensive review of this class of methods. 
Finite-Difference Time-Domain (FDTD) codes can model the complex environment inside 
a box, but computer memory and processing restrictions limit the volume of surrounding 
space to significantly less than is required for the practical modelling of whole aircraft 
above 0.5 0Hz. The technique, based on basic discretisation algorithms by Yee [3-5], is an 
implementation of a time domain solution of Maxwell's equations. The body is modelled as 
a series of rectangles or parallelpipeds and the response at each time step is calculated using 
the results of the previous step. This solution can be transposed to the frequency domain 
with high accuracy, using a Fourier transform, and the frequency range of FDTD is 
dependent on the grid cell size. Ref. [2-17] indicates that five cells are required to resolve 
the shortest wavelength. Whilst methods of moment codes can also be used to model large 
objects, they require prohibitively greater memory requirements than FDTD methods [3-6]. 
All the above codes pose significant computing problems when the modelling of whole 
aircraft in the microwave region is considered. For accurate results when attempting 
modelling, NEC, using the criterion for example means segment lengths of at most 1.7 
to 30 mm for the range 1 to 18 GHz. Thus, as SAAB (Sweden) experience has shown [3-7] 
using the FDTD technique, it is only possible to model airframe panel joints at 40 0Hz 
(where = 0.75 mm), the highest frequency of current interest in the EMC arena [3-8], 
[3-9] and [2-17], even with powerful CRAY computers. Clearly to model microwave 
ingress for a whole aircraft using such techniques would be a monumental task, even for the 
powerful computers available today. This is recognised within BAe; in a 1995 internal 
BAe presentation by the Industrial Supervisor, BAe's EM Hazards Specialist, it was stated 
that with current and extensive Divisional computing capabilities of 2.5 giga-FLOPS (peak) 
using a 32 process Parsytec Explorer it still takes 20 days to model the 15 million cells 
needed to represent a full fighter airframe at only 100 MHz. Even using the BAe corporate 
facilities at the Super-Computing Centre at Famborough, the CRAY T3D and YMP 
computers, this figure only reduces to 3 days, still far too high and costly to be of use in 
practical EMC design applications. To perform similar modelling at 10 0Hz would 
multiply this figure by I 0. It is thus predicted that using conventional techniques, e.g. 
NEC, and even assuming that the linear (on a log scale) rise in giga-FLOPS of affordable 
computing power continues, that microwave modelling of full fighter airframes using direct 
solutions will remain unattainable in the foreseeable future. 
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However, it is believed within BAe that a combination of asymptotic methods or the 'ray 
tracing' technique for far field analysis and use of direct solution methods for analysis of 
selected areas of field and structure interaction may offer a whole aircraft modelling 
solution at frequencies up to 18(1Hz within the next five years. This combination, whilst in 
its infancy, offers much promise for the affordable and timely future analysis of complex 
structures of fighter aircraft size. In the intervening period the use of very high power 
computers now available renders such computational problems possible for relatively small, 
part-aircraft structures, even though, for example, to model the fields in a simple I in cubic, 
empty avionic bay would require 37 million cubic cells to analyse in three dimensions at 
10(1Hz, using t as the cell size. However, if it were possible to use A as the cell size then 
in such cases the figure would be substantially reduced. 
Computer-Aided Design (CAD) models are used as the highest quality source of data on a 
given aircraft's exterior shape for direct, computer-to-computer importation into EM 
modelling codes. For example, CATIA (Computer-Aided Three-dimensional Interactive 
Application) [3-10], BAe's main aircraft CAD tool, currently provides data with a resolution 
of 5 mm for use in EM ingress modelling at up to 100 MHz. 5 mm equates, using the 
criterion, to an upper modelling limit of 6 (1Hz, and the resolution would need reducing to 
0.75 mm to meet that criterion, or to 0.935 mm for the [NEC] one. CATIA already has 
sufficient resolution and accuracy to provide skin data to support EM modelling up to 40 
(1Hz, with data already generated for detail manufacturing of EF2000 at a minimum 
resolution 0.025 mm and accuracy better than this, but the data sets for a whole aircraft at 
even 1 mm resolution preclude their current use in this respect. Thus, despite the advances 
predicted in the preceding paragraphs, at present realistic whole aircraft modelling at 
frequencies up to 40 (1Hz is thought to be impractical due to the processing load entailed. 
A further complication of modelling whole aircraft at 40 (1Hz is the need to model not only 
the aircraft skin, but also the complex internal support structure of the airframe and the 
equipments interspersed in that structure. Modelling of both the skin and the internal 
contents would need to be to the same resolution, equating to considerable computing 
capability increase above that available now, unless substantial simplification concerning 
internal equipments can be made and justified. Variations in internal construction between 
individual aircraft of a given type also makes direct modelling inappropriate. Derivation of 
values of airframe attenuation based upon practical measurements is thus likely to offer the 
best and most cost-effective solution to this problem at present. 
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An overall energy ingress equation has been developed, see Section 4.2, in which the first 
line of defence against avionic upset by the environment predicted in Chapter 2 is the 
shielding afforded to the circuitry by the airframe. However, practical considerations limit 
the magnitude of shielding achievable and only an arbitrary, frequency independent 
attenuation of 6-20 dB is used by military aircraft designers as an estimate for airframe 
attenuation. It was thus decided that the early phase of this research programme should 
concentrate on attempting to quantify the values of airframe attenuation to be found on 
most, metal-skinned fighter aircraft. Even though modem fighter aircraft are increasingly 
being manufactured using non-metallic materials, for the foreseeable future it is envisaged 
most fighter aircraft in the world will remain primarily metal in construction. The 
implications of using other airframe materials, e.g. Carbon Fibre Composites (CFC), is 
discussed in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 in comparison to those of 'standard' metal-skinned 
aircraft. As discussed earlier in this section, modelling at these microwave frequencies is 
not currently practicable and hence a practical programme of investigations on an aircraft 
followed. The objectives of this programme were constrained to measuring the absolute 
attenuation afforded by the airframe, examining any wavefront polarisation or angle of 
arrival dependency, and establishing whether energy ingress was via avionic bay peripheral 
slots or by some other, internal, energy transportation route. 
Prior to conducting the investigations on the aircraft, cut-off frequencies for bay door 
peripheral slots and panel ingress characteristics were predicted. A model was developed 
which uses a flat plate concept of the aircraft panel and its peripheral slots. The periphery 
of each bay door and panel was considered to be a series of isolated individual slots, formed 
either by the spacing between fasteners or bolts, or by the corners of the panel or door 
involved. From aircraft drawings and physical measurements the bolt spacings were 
established for all the bays to be investigated. For each slot so formed its orientation to the 
local horizontal was noted and its cut-off frequency f calculated using: 
(c 
'2d 
where d = major dimension of slot and c = velocity of light, 3x10 8 ms'. The attenuation R 
offered to incident radiation was then calculated using: 
R = 20xlogio() 
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where X = wavelength of incident radiation. These predictions form Appendix A of [3-11] 
and are reproduced as Appendix D herein. Section D.4 of the Appendix gives the 
limitations of the predictions, explaining why it is thought that such a complex situation will 
be difficult to model by other than probabilistic methods. One aspect of this, cavity bay 
resonances, is exemplified by Fig. 3.1 which shows the complexity of the inside of the Front 
Avionics Bay of the aircraft investigated, noting that six avionics boxes are not fitted in this 
photograph. Although the model used represents a simple consideration of the problem, it 
was thought at the time to be adequate to achieve the primary goals of that phase of 
investigations, i.e. quantification of absolute values of airframe attenuation factor and an 
understanding of its dependency on angle of arrival and transmit antenna polarisation (which 
was limited to either horizontal or vertical only). 
Figure 3.1: Inside Of Front Avionics Bay With Test Measurement Antenna 
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3.3 PRACTICAL MEASUREMENTS 
3.3.1 	 EMC Demonstrator Aircraft 
The research reported here was conducted at BAe Warton on the metal-bodied Jaguar 
fly-By-Wire demonstrator aircraft in 1987/8 [3-12] to [3-14] and 1988/9 [3-15] to [3-18] 
and [3-11] and has provided a considerable measurement data set to support the study of 
microwave EM energy ingress and propagation in airframes. Before measuring fields in the 
aircraft, much effort was expended characterising the open field test site and establishing the 
2-18 GH.z test technique. Measurements were taken 1.5-2.5 m above ground, where the 
aircraft fUselage would be during the tests. Investigations were conducted to determine the 
possibility of multipath affecting subsequent measurements. In multipath both the 
transmitter's direct wave and reflected wave arrive at the aircraft, resulting in a constructive 
and destructive interference field pattern along all axes of the aircraft. The effect of this at 
any given field measurement point is that the field measured may be higher or lower than 
that due to the direct wave alone. The reflected wave in this case was that due to the test 
site floor (no obstacles or buildings existed within 300 m of the site in the sector relevant to 
the investigations). Specular reflections only were considered since a directional transmit 
waveguide horn antenna was used, the test site floor was rough (asphalt) and, since 
continuous wave signals were to be used, only strong specular signals would adversely 
affect the airframe shielding measurements to any degree. Thus, for the conditions 
prevailing, difibse multipath was not thought by this researcher and his co-worker Price 
[3-14] to have been important. This is supported by [3-19] where diffuse multipath effects 
are excluded as their contribution to the multipath effect seen at the receiving antenna due 
to these effects is insignificant compared to the effects due to specular scattering. 
In accordance with specular reflection theory, the frequency, grazing angle and ground 
roughness data are used to determine the presence and magnitude of the multipath 
reflection, with the final attenuation value then determined by path length difference as a 
fUnction of frequency. This value is then vectorially added to the received signal from the 
direct wave. Equations and methods of calculating multipath are given in [3-19]. During 
the investigation the following aspects were examined: alteration of transmit and receive 
antenna heights, alteration of the depression angle of the transmit antenna from the 
horizontal, and alteration of transmit-to-receive antenna distance. The first of these proved 
inconclusive due to instrumentation problems (difficulty of mounting and aligning antennas 
over a large height range). The depression angle test results, which were repeated over 
3-7 
grass where predominantly absorption and diffuse reflections would occur, showed no 
appreciable difference between the over-asphalt and over-grass cases, see Fig. 3.2. No peak 
occurs in the received signal, suggesting absence of strong specular reflections. To confirm 
these findings an investigation of variation in transmit-to-receive antenna was conducted to 
study the fluctuation of received signal with increasing distance. These tests were 
conducted over both a wet and dry test site to establish the effects of water. 
The results, see Fig. 3.3, show no appreciable difference between a damp and dry test site 
and no nulls are seen in the received signal level. The received signal can be seen to be 
inversely proportional to the separation of the antennas, i.e. ccr, confirming that the losses 
are free space, i.e. 201og 10(r) where r is the inter-distance, with negligible contribution from 
ground reflections. Thus, although predictions showed multipath was possible for the 
configuration tested, the results showed no significant specular multipath effect to be 
present over the 11 in distance between the transmitter and position of the aircraft. 
Figure 3.2: Received Signal vs. Transmit Antenna Depression Angle 
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Figure 3.3: Received Signal vs. Antenna Separation 
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In the initial phase of investigations aircraft internal field measurements were taken at five 
2-18 UI-h spot frequencies for the Front Avionic Bay and the Port Gun Bay, see Fig. 3.4. 
Two transmitting configurations were tested, the 'Arc' and 'Slide'. The former attempted to 
assess the variation of airframe attenuation as a transmitter was moved in a 12 m arc 
centred on the centre of the aircraft, a similar situation to an aircraft flying past a rotating 
ground transmitter. The latter involved the irradiation of a relatively small 'footprint' on the 
aircraft to examine whether microwave energy enters a bay from slots and apertures in the 
near vicinity of the bay, or whether it is transported internally from elsewhere within the 
airframe. The existence of this small 'footprint' was confirmed during the site calibration 
phase of the investigations, see Fig. 11 of [3-17]. Results showed that a frequency 
dependent airframe attenuation factor existed of the order of 20 dB between 2 and 12 GHz, 
see Fig. 3.5. At 18 GFIz insufficient transmitter power prevented any internal field 
measurements from being taken. The results as a whole showed that microwave energy 
penetrated the airframe across the band, with variations of aft enuation factor with aspect 
angle apparently illustrating the effects of shielding and scattering caused by the aircraft 
wing and inboard pylon. However the exact method of energy ingress was still unclear 
since (metallic) taping over the joints around the Port Gun Bay door did not affect the 
original results. 
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Figure 3.4: Location Of Bays Investigated 
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Following a proposal for further studies and improved measurement techniques [3-15], a 
test schedule covering the second phase of investigations was produced [3-16]. These 
investigations were different to the earlier work in three main areas: 
i) Pseudo-swept frequency measurements in the range 2-18 GHz were to be used, rather 
than the five spot frequencies used in the earlier work. Peudo-swept in this context 
means that a computer-controlled signal generation and measurement system, shown in 
Fig. 3.6, generated a series of RF emissions with frequency incrementing in 0.5 GHz 
steps or finer resolution as the research proceeded, with the measurements at each step 
taking 2-3 seconds (the variation due to test equipment response and settling times). 
ii) A higher power 12-18 GHz amplifier was to be used than the 0.2W one used before. 
iii) Detailed examinations of energy ingress through bay door/access panel peripheral slots 
were to be carried out. 
As for the earlier tests the value of airframe attenuation, AA  was calculated from the 
measured values as follows: 
AA (dB) = PrEx 	 (dBm) - Pr i (dBm) 
where PrE,R = power measured at measurement location with no aircraft present, i.e. 
at site calibration, and Pr g = power inside bay with door or panel closed. 
Figure 3.6: Test Equipment Arrangement For Aircraft Investigation 
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In each case the power measured was normalised to remove the variation in transmitter 
amplifier output with frequency and transmitter feeder and receiving antenna cable losses 
were accounted for, as were the gain vs. frequency characteristics of the transmit and 
receive antennas used. No noise breakthrough, i.e. test signal coupling to the 
instrumentation cabling and test equipment rather than to the receive antenna, was recorded 
during the investigations. Full sets of AA  statistical data and detailed discussions of all test 
results are given in [3-1 1],[3-17] for the Arc and Slide phases of the investigations for all 
four bays examined. Figs. 3.7 and 3.8 show the statistical data for the Slide tests on the 
Front Avionics Bay and Arc measurements on the Bay behind Panel 55, both for the 
horizontal transmit antenna polarisation case. The latter Figure also shows the associated 
2-12 0Hz AA  graph for each transmitter position, indicating the complexity of results 
interpretation. 
For each transmitter position investigated, the 2-12 0Hz measured AA  data sets were 
examined to establish the minimum, mean, maximum and standard deviation (lo). This 
enabled examination of angle of arrival dependency. The 12-18 0Hz range was examined 
later in the programme when a higher power (200 W) RF amplifier became available, since 
the initial work showed that the 200 mW amplifier used at first gave signals which could not 
be measured above the noise floor with the bay door or panel closed. In those later tests, 
where only a limited data set was possible due to aircraft availability, a three-point data 
smoothing algorithm was used instead of the statistical treatment of the much larger data 
sets from the 2-12 0Hz research, since only confirmation or otherwise of the attenuation 
trend with that for 2-12 0Hz was required. For the discussions which follow on AA  trends 
by bay type and transmit polarisation, and subsequent comparisons between them, it was 
necessary to arrive at some common attribute. Analysis of the complex profiles were 
attempted by the use of a 'Figure of Merit' (FoM) approach, described in Appendix E. This 
approach, in which the higher the FoM the higher the probability of encountering a higher 
value of AA,  is illustrated in Appendix E, Figs. 11 and 12. When compared to Figs. 3.7 and 
3.8 (noting that they are for different bays) the general trend with angle of arrival of the EM 
wave can be seen: higher AA  when either the transmit antenna is pointing away from the bay 
in question, or when obscuration of the bay by other parts of the airframe occurs, e.g. for 
nose-on irradiation of the aircraft. However, as noted in Appendix E, these values of FoM 
are not quantitative and therefore cannot be used directly to quantify AA  or compare values 
of AA  between different bays and test configurations. It was thus decided that the attribute 
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referred to above would be the mathematical average of the mean values of all data sets for 
each bay at each specific frequency. For the remainder of Section 3.3.1 this EMC 
demonstrator attribute will be referred to as the 'average' AA  value. 
The value of airframe attenuation factor (approximately 25 dB) found in the earlier tests 
was confirmed, but with appreciable variation which was seen to be chaotically dependent 
on frequency when fine resolution frequency steps were used. Less evidence of the 
shielding and scattering caused by changing the angle of arrival of the radiation was seen 
during the first block of tests The second set of tests covered 2-12 GHz internal field 
measurements in the Port Gun Bay, the bay behind the frilly bolted Panel 55, and in the bay 
behind bolted/hinged Panel 56, see Figs 3.4 and 3.9. 
Figure 3.7: Attenuation Factors: Front Avionics Bay (Slide Test) 
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Figure 38: Attenuation Factors: Panel 55 Bay (Arc Test) 
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Figure 3.9: Different Bay Types Investigated 
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The 2-12 0Hz results yielded average values of 22.4 and 13.0 dB respectively for the highly 
frequency dependent AA  for the shoot-bolt type bays (Front Avionic and Port Gun). For the 
bays behind bolted and bolted/hinged Panels 55 and 56 the average AA  were 19.8 and 19.2 
dB respectively. The range of the 'average attenuation factors for the bays lay between 
±3.0 and ±6.8 dB. For the latter two bays and for both transmitting antenna polarisations, 
the results also showed (see Fig. 3.10) that the attenuation decreased at 17 dB per decade 
of increasing frequency which compares favourably with the 20 dB per decade predicted. 
However the cut-off frequencies predicted for the bolted bays were not seen in the 
measured data, with extrapolations of the latter giving approximately 18 0Hz rather than 
the 6 0Hz predicted. This phenomenon appears to result from limitations of the prediction 
model. The results suggest that airframe attenuation may have to be derived by a 
probabilistic assessment based on panel/door type, size of peripheral slot, airframe material 
and finish, and aperture sizes. No dependence of attenuation factor was seen with angle of 
arrival of the impinging wavefront for any of the four bays investigated, despite the initial 
indications from the first phase of the investigations. 
The results of the 'Slide' measurements, with their small irradiation 'footprint' on the aircraft, 
strongly suggests that most 2-12 0Hz ingress occurred via the panel's peripheral slot. 
However two sets of measurements, one with the transmitter head-on, the other with it 
tail-on to the aircraft, both gave only approximately 20 dB attenuation, rather than the much 
higher figure (>60 dB) expected as the bay concerned was shielded from the transmitter. 
This remains to be explained, but suggests internal transportation of energy. 
The average attenuation factors were approximately 20 dB for the bays investigated, but 
there were a number of frequencies and aspect angles where values of 0-10 dB were 
measured, with some seen at a maximum of 59 dB. This agrees to an extent with initial 
measurements by Willis on a prototype helicopter and two (unspecified, but certainly 
military) aircraft in 1986 [3-20], Carter, Stevens and Watkins on a Puma helicopter in 1991 
[3-211, and measurements at BAe on a modern military aircraft in 1992. The prototype 
helicopter, illuminated from nose and tail gave attenuation of 21-36 dB for 2-18 0Hz; 
whilst port and starboard gave much lower values at 5-20 dB and 5-10 dB respectively for 
2-18 0Hz. The two aircraft were only illuminated from the port side and values of 
approximately 35 dB (Avionics bay) and 25 dB (just above cockpit floor) were obtained. 
The modern aircraft measurements are covered in more detail in Section 3.3.2.1. 
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Figure 310: Frequency Dependence Of Panels 55/56 Bays' Factors 
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To see whether any trends in AA  exist, either between the fixed wing aircraft investigated or 
between the fixed and rotary wing aircraft, the data sets from these trials were examined. 
Table 3.1 gives the key aspects of each of the trials and results of initial statistical treatment 
of each trial's data sets. 
Table 3.1: Key Aspects of Trials and Initial Statistics 
AIRCRAFT TYPE RESOLN. 
(M}Iz)* 
BAY TYPE AVG 
 (dB) 
MAX 
(dB) 
MEN 
(dB) 
DEVPT. HELICOPTER 500 PILOT SEAT 26 31 183 
500 CENTRE CONSOLE 20 54 0 
500 CENTRE CABIN 13.8 39 0 
500 AFT CABIN 19.8 31 0 
500 RADIO 34.7 50 10 
AIRCRAFT TYPE A 500 FRONT COCKPIT 0.3m OFF FLOOR 25 31 14 
500 PORT ELECTRICAL 32 39 28 
AIRCRAFT TYPE B 500 
500 
FRONT COCKPIT 0.5m OFF FLOOR 
PORT AVIONICS 
21 
28.1 
27 
35 
7 
12 
FLY-BY-WIRE JAGUAR 500 FRONT AVIONICS 22.4 43 23 
100 PORT GUN 13 44 -0.8 
100 PANEL 55 19.8 59 -3.2 
100 PANEL 56 19.2 59 -2.3 
PUMA HELICOPTER" 50 INSIDE MAIN CABIN DOOR - 
DIRECTIONAL SENSOR 
10.3 26.9 -1.6 
50 -ditto- ISOTROPIC SENSOR --- 24.6 -2.3 
MODERN FIGHTER 50 STBD. AVIONIC BAY 1 24 36.9 12 
50 STBD. BAY 2: FRONT 22 36.9 15.7 
50 STBD. BAY 2: REAR 21 35.8 143 
50 PORT AVIONIC BAY 1: 
3mOFF GROUND 
18 37.2 7.6 
50 PORT AVIONIC BAY 2: 
Im OFF GROUND 
25 43.4 17.6 
*The table gives the principal test resolution. For entries >50 MHz it is acknowledged that 
some individual tests were done with higher resolution. 
* *Data sets unavailable, so directional sensor measurements, taken with horizontally 
polarised transmit and receive antennas and without mode stirring, were digitised from 
Figs.9-1 1 of [3-21] for use in Table 3.1 and Fig.3. 11. Maximum and minimum isotropic 
sensor values for this table were scaled from all appropriate figures in [3-2 1]. 
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The table shows a wide range of AA  values for the different fixed wing aircraft types and 
helicopters: maxima (34.4 dB), minima (31.2 dB) and average (24.4 dB). From the data 
examined there appeared lift le correlation between the data sets but it was observed that the 
bulk of many of the data sets lay within ±3 dB of the set's median, particularly where 
measurements were taken with <100 M14z resolution. A further observation was that the 
median of the average values of A  was 21.0 dB with a Ia of 5.9 dE. Together these 
observations suggested the possibility of a generic trend of airframe attenuation and to 
examine this possibility the data sets were subjected to further statistical treatment. The 
technique used was to determine the cumulative distribution of each data set, i.e. the 
percentage of each data set vs. increasing AA.  Fig. 3.11 shows the resultant distributions by 
aircraft type examined, with the number of data samples given in parentheses. 
Figure 3.11: Comparison Of Airframe Attenuation Statistics 
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These distributions are more useful than the rapidly changing AA  values with frequency in 
determining the contribution of AA  to the overall ingress equation and the potential for 
avionic circuit upset. Slight variations in frequency, aspect angle, transmit polarisation and 
internal measurement location can each change the attenuations measured, whereas this 
statistical representation tends to remain unchanged. The comparison of the EMC 
demonstrator and other data sets, each with a significantly lower number of data samples, 
suggests that the distributions would be closer to that of the EMC demonstrator if a 
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matching number of samples were available from the other trials. With the exception of the 
Carter et aL helicopter line, where only one data set has been analysed (see Table 3.1) and 
thus is thought to be of lower importance, Fig. 3.11 suggests that a prediction of A A of 21±9 
dB can be made which may also be independent of air vehicle type. These are important 
findings as, if true, it offers the potential for supporting the microwave EMC design and 
clearance of military and civil aircraft without tests on aircraft. Appropriate confidence in 
safe and correct system operation could then be gained through equipment EMC 
qualification laboratory tests and consideration of the contents of a database of equipment 
EMC results for a given aircraft. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
Further research is required to explore this potential, which offers substantial time and cost 
savings to both the civil and military sectors of the aircraft industry. Initially all available 
measured data, including that from other sources (e.g SAAB are known to have taken 
measurements on the Gripen fighter), should be analysed by frequency sub-band to examine 
the validity of the A A  prediction, both by aircraft type and between individual aircraft of a 
given type. if the prediction is still deemed valid, further confidence should be attained by 
augmenting the existing data by selected measurements on BAe military aircraft types on 
which data does not yet exist. 
The key findings of these airframe attenuation investigations have been published in the 
lEE. Electronics Letters, Vol.32, No.18 (29 August 1996), see Appendix H 
The attenuation factor on the EMC demonstrator was seen to have a behaviour similar to a 
low Q resonant cavity, which was more pronounced when tests were repeated with finer 
frequency steps. The original investigations were performed in 0.5 0Hz steps, and a short 
investigation of the necessary resolution for adequate characterisation of the aircraft was 
carried out at 0.1 and 0.02 0Hz steps in the range 24 GHz, where the results were still 
found to exhibit this behaviour, see Fig. 3.12. The remaining tests, which as with all the 
aircraft tests involved free space transmissions, were carried out at 0.1 0Hz steps to 
minimise potential interference to other users of the band. Since there is believed to be 
significant analogy between the airframe, its avionic bays and the avionics boxes therein, 
this characteristic is expected to be apparent for each case. When the above work is taken 
into account, the average value of 2-12 GFIz attenuation on this aircraft remains 18.6 dB, 
independent of angle of arrival and transmitting antenna polarisation. 
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Figure 3.12: Test Frequency Resolution 
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During the second phase of investigations an examination of cavity resonances in aircraft 
bays was carried out. Comparison of the Bay 55 and Bay 56 results against the predictions 
of Appendix F, which are based on cavity theory applicable at microwave frequencies 
[3-22] to [3-24], strongly suggests that at least two-, if not three-axis cavity excitation is 
present in both since the minimum frequency spacing of the resonances measured for each 
bay are less than 100 MHz (the measurement resolution). This is well below the 320.5 
MHz (Bay 55) and 250 MHz (Bay 56) minimum values in Appendix F for single-axis 
excitation. The limited work done with 10 MHz measurement steps on the Front Avionics 
Bay showed resonances as close as 20 MHz with major excursions at approximately 200 
MHz intervals. These results suggest that three-axis mode excitation is also present for 
this type of large (six times the volume of Bay 55) and cluttered bay. Such multi-axis 
excitation probably results from the distributed source formed by the multiple slots formed 
around the periphery of the bay door by bolt pairs. These peripheral slots are complex in 
shape, often having horizontal and vertical components, e.g. the Port Gun Bay. In 
conjunction with the large number of bay types on a given aircraft type, production build 
tolerances between the same bay on identical aircraft, variability of air gaps and materials 
between the bay door and its landing, intra-slot resonances, and different bay contents, 
these factors combine to make the accurate modelling of such peripheral slots and the 
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cavity resonances in the bay impractical. It is feasible that the ingress prediction of 
Appendix D could be improved by treating each door or panel as a multiple source emitter, 
where each individual slot's effects are superimposed. This would enable a better 
comparison with measured resonance spacing data and warrants further study. 
The equations of Appendix F assume a totally closed, un-loaded and air-filled rectangular 
box with perfectly conducting inner surface, which behaves as a resonator with an infinite 
number of modes. At microwave frequencies the size of bays investigated (the smallest was 
0.468 in x 0.426 in x 0.175 in and the largest was 1.61 in x 1.39 in x 1.0 m) can be 
considered to be well 'over-moded'. The total possible number of modes N,(f) in such a 
cavity can be shown, see Crawford and Koepke [3-25], to be 
N(f) = 
	
- (a+b+d)+ 0.5 
where abd is the cavity volume, f is frequency and c the velocity of light. Fig. 3.13, using 
Eqn. 3.4, shows the number of modes vs. frequency for each of the four aircraft bays 
(Aluminium construction assumed). 
Figure 3.13: Total Number of Modes as a Function of Frequency 
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The avionics bays considered do not have perfectly conducting inner surfaces, have many 
items of differing permeability and permittivity in their volumes, and have apertures linking 
them to other bays within the airframe, each of which affect the resonant frequencies 
present. For example if the bay were totally filled with a material of relative permittivity 
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Cr and relative permeability PAr  then the resonant frequencies equation in Appendix F 
would be modified to: 
H
f=_2 2 O) +() 
+ n 2 
 1-lol-IrCoEr (3.5) 
where x, y, and z are the dimensions of the cavity; I, m and n are the integers providing the 
mode numbers for the field pattern inside the cavity, e.g. Th,, pi is the permeability and c 
the permittivity of free space (subscript o) and that of the medium relative to free space 
(subscript r). The amplitude of the resonances inside the cavity, of importance to the 
potential for avionic upset, is determined by the Q of the cavity, which in turn is optimised 
for an un-loaded, perfectly conducting, aperture-less cavity. Since, see Fig. 3.13, so many 
modes can exist in the un-loaded bays, each with its own Q value, it is not trivial to define a 
Q for each bay as a whole [3-25]. A composite Q can be obtained, see [3-25], from the 
following equation 
Q = 
where V is the bay's volume, S its internal surface area, a,b,d its internal dimensions and 8 
the skin depth of the bay wall at the frequencies concerned. Fig. 3.14 plots Eqn. 3.6 and 
shows the high values of Q attainable for the (unrealistic) completely closed bays. 
Figure 3.14: Composite Quality Factor For Bays Investigated 
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In practice microwave resonators can have a Q between 1000 and 30000, but this is 
severely degraded by either losses in the cavity wall, noting that the surface roughness is 
3-22 
often comparable with the skin depth at microwave frequencies (2 .xrn at 1 0Hz for 
copper); for a copper, air-filled cubic cavity resonant at 10 0Hz, the Q is about 10,730 
[3-24]. Avionic bays and boxes, being usually made of aluminium (of lower resistivity than 
copper), would be unable to attain such values of Q due to losses in the walls, even if 
un-loaded. Lossy material loading and the inclusion of apertures (which enable energy loss 
from the cavity), both of which exist for all practical bays and boxes, further degrades 
attainable Q. In practice the contents of avionics bays are complex, see Figs. 3.1 and 3.4, 
and have some components (e.g. cable looms) which can move a number of microwave 
wavelengths in all three axes with time and aircraft manoeuvres, and thus do not lend 
themselves to being analysed by mathematical modelling. 
By carefully lining the sides and rear of three of the bays with Radar Absorbent Material 
(RAM) it was shown that the substantial cavity resonances, present within them, could be 
considerably reduced in amplitude and modified in frequency content (as covered earlier in 
this section). This effect is demonstrated for the Panel 55 bay in Fig. 3.15, where 
measurements were taken with the receiving antenna deep in the bay, first without RAM 
and then with the RAM lining. Although both measured profiles have the wide amplitude 
variation with frequency previously seen during these investigations, the difference between 
them is 20 dB for much of the range 2-12 0Hz. Similar profiles were seen for the Front 
Avionics Bay and the Panel 56 Bay and 2-12 0Hz damping of 12 and 17 dB respectively 
was measured. Fig. 3.16 shows best fit line for the Panel 55 bay and those for the other two 
bays are similar, see [3-1 1], Figs 19 and 20. As for many of these aircraft investigations, 
little difference is seen between the transmit polarisations, and the Figure demonstrates the 
appreciable amount of damping achievable with a simple installation of RAM. It is 
probable that these figures could have been higher but for the fact that due to the many 
pipes, equipment trays and wiring looms within the bays, it was impossible to completely 
line the sides and rear of each bay. It was also impossible to completely cover the large 
aperture in the wall between the Panel 55 and Panel 56 bays. Failure to completely line all 
but the door of the bay prevents a categorical statement that bay resonances are only 
excited by the energy entering via the door/panel peripheral slots, although for the bays 
investigated the results show this to be the most probable conclusion. Further work is 
warranted as these results suggest that selective RAM placement within bays can 
considerably reduce the bay internal field amplitude, thus offering a potentially low cost 
safety margin against the risk of avionic upset. 
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Figure 3.15: Panel 55 Bay Cavity Resonances 
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Figure 3.16: Resonance Damping: Best Fit Line for Bays Investigated 
•.. BEST FIT LINE 
23456789 1 fl 2  
FREQUENCY (OHz) 
The final investigations conducted on the demonstrator aircraft covered airframe 
attenuation measurements in the 12-17 0Hz region [3-12] which had previously not been 
successfUl due to inadequate RF transmitter power. These were not fUll characterisation 
tests, but briefly examined whether the zero attenuation factor effect at 18 0Hz, indicated 
by the earlier 2-12 0Hz bolted bay results (see Fig. 3.10), in fact existed. The 
investigation, conducted with a test resolution of 0.1 0Hz, did not confirm this effect but, 
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in common with many of the 2-12 GFIz measurements, yielded an average A A  of 23.5 dB. 
Fig. 3.17 shows a decreasing profile with increasing frequency at approximately 13 dB per 
decade. No conclusion could be made with the small amount of data and the end of aircraft 
availability prevented further examination of the 2-12 and 12-17 GHz boundary between 
the two phases of tests. A possible reason for the effect not occurring is that, with 
increasing frequency, the impedance of the peripheral slots on the fully bolted panel 
investigated increases, thus reducing the joint leakage. This topic is covered in Chapter 4. 
Figure 3.17: 12-17 GHz Attenuation Factors 
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In conclusion, the BAe aircraft investigations provide a body of evidence to support the 
postulation that 2-17 GHz energy ingress is predominantly via apertures in the immediate 
vicinity of the bay of interest and is more usually via the peripheral slot of the door or panel 
fronting that bay. Due to the complexity of the airframe microwave energy ingress 
situation uncovered by the aircraft tests, it was recommended [3-4] that no further work be 
done on-aircraft until research work on simple models of bays and their front 
panels/peripheral slots and gasketting was carried out in a controlled RF environment. 
These recommendations were subsequently expanded into a proposed set of bolted panel 
shielding investigations in [3-26] which were conducted later, see Section 3.3.3. The results 
of the airframe attenuation research [3-27] were presented at the I.E.E. 7th International 
Conference on EMC, see Appendix F. Of additional note is that in the post-presentation 
discussion, one U.S. delegate at the conference noted that these findings were in line with 
U.S. and Israeli work. 
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3.3.2 Modern Aircraft 
3.3.2.1 Military Aircraft 
Most modem military aircraft just reaching in-service use or currently under development 
have substantially increased amounts of composite materials, e.g. CFC, used in the 
construction of the airframe skin compared to earlier generation metal-skinned aircraft. 
Table 3.2 shows this trend, in terms of percentage by skin area (rather than overall weight), 
whilst Fig. 3.18 depicts the distribution of materials in a modern aircraft and Fig. 3.19 
shows the typical construction of a CFC aircraft panel. 
Table 3.2: Use Of Composites In Military Aircraft 
AIRCRAFT FIRST FLIGHT COMPOSITES (%) 
McDonnell Douglas F/A 18 1974 10 
BAe Harrier II 1978 24 
Dassault Rafale 1986 50 
SAAB (Iripen 1987 30 
Lockheed YF-22 1990 28 
BAe Eurofighter 2000 1994 90 
Figure 3.18: Modem Airframe Materials 
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Figure 3.19: Typical CFC Panel Construction 
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The use of such materials, whether in sandwich or honeycomb construction aircraft skins, 
raised the possibility of additional RF energy ingress as their shielding performance is worse 
than the aluminium and other metals traditionally used in airframe manufacture. This is to 
be expected as ci for CFC is 0-20 kSm', some 1000 times lower than for aluminium (35-40 
MSnI'). Although this topic had been well researched in the HF band by the 
commencement of this research programme, the shielding performance of these materials at 
microwave frequencies had not been quantified. Following on from the aircraft research 
reported in Section 3.2 recommendations were made to investigate this topic in the BAe 
EMC Laboratory at Warton and the results are discussed in Section 3.3.3. 
Subsequent to the aircraft research conducted by the this researcher, microwave airframe 
attenuation measurements have been carried out on a modem BAe aircraft constructed with 
significant amounts of CFC. The basic test process utilised was as for the EMC 
demonstrator work, with measurements conducted on two avionics bays high up on the 
right hand side of the airframe and two on the left hand side, one at the same height as those 
on the right (2.59m above ground) and one close to the bottom of the fuselage (im above 
ground). The positions of the left hand side bays with respect to aircraft nose and wing root 
were similar to the Front Avionics Bay and Port Gun Bay tested earlier, see Fig. 3.4. The 
range 1-18 GHz was tested and, as for the earlier tests, both transmit antenna polarisations 
were examined. Two aspects were different to the metal-skinned aircraft tests: Firstly, 
illumination aspect angle was not investigated, rather for each bay the transmitting antenna 
was moved in a 90° arc off the nose of the aircraft with the spectrum analyser in 'peak hold' 
mode to determine the angle for the highest signal (i.e. minimum airframe attenuation) at 
the measurement antenna in the bay. Secondly, a relatively new technique for ensuring the 
maximum field in the bay's volume is measured wherever the measurement antenna is 
located. This technique, called Mode Stirringt, is essentially the same as used in domestic 
microwave ovens. It has been steadily gaining acceptance over the last three years, can be 
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used for equipment EMC qualification in screened rooms and is now included in [2-17]. 
Crawford and Koepke [3-25] describe the technique, its application and limitations. 
A mechanical paddle is located within the cavity (bay) and rotated by a motor at a rate 
dependent on the response time of the avionics within the bay; a typical rate is 1 revolution 
per second. This produces a field distribution which varies with time at each point in the 
bay for each position of the paddle. The 'stirred' field has a higher average value at any 
point than that which would exist without the paddle because the paddle changes the cavity 
boundary conditions, so a slightly different resonant frequency spectrum is excited at each 
paddle position, see Davenport ci al. [3-28] and its references. Hence a large number of 
modes contribute to the field at each point within the cavity's volume, producing a fairly 
uniform time-averaged field there. At frequencies much greater than fundamental cavity 
resonance, where many modes can be excited, equipment in the bay is subjected to 
uniformly distributed plane waves incident from all directions. For the bays investigated 
such a high number of modes is possible, see Fig. 3.13, and a fairly uniform modal density 
(another criterion suggested in [3-25] for technique validity) is assured. As described in 
[3-25] the technique is only valid for a minimum stirring effectiveness of 20 dli (i.e. the 
ratio of measured power without the stirrer moving to that with it in motion), for paddle 
minimum dimension of 1 at the lowest frequency (150mm at 1 GHz in this research), and a 
minimum of 30 modes [2-17]. To achieve these in cluttered, small bays is impossible. The 
substantial, though unpredictable reduction of the high Q possible (see Fig. 3.14) in these 
bays when loaded with avionics, in conjunction with the reality that bays are leaky cavities, 
make the use of this technique on an aircraft less than perfect, compared to its use in 
screened rooms which is fully justified in [3-25]. 
The results of the tests are given in Table 3.3 and subsequently discussed with respect to 
this researcher's investigations on the EMC demonstrator aircraft, see Section 3.3.1. The 
table contains geometric mean AA  values for the tests, which were conducted with 50 MHz 
test resolution. 
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Table 3.3: Airframe Attenuation Factors 
TRANSMIT ANTENNA POLARISATION 
VERTICAL HORIZONTAL 
BAY No. + SIDE FREQ. AVERAGE FREQ. AVERAGE 
(GHz) AYI'EN. (dB) (GHz) ATI'EN. (dB) 
1, RIGHT I-lAND 1-1.3 15 1-3 20 
1.3-8 22 3-14 27 
8-18 25 13-I8 25 
2, RIGHT HAND-FRONT 1-8 20 1-5 23 
8-18 25 5-13 26 
13-18 23 
2, RIGHT HAND-REAR 1-8 20 1-8 20 
8-13 22 8-12 23 
13-18 20 12-18 20 
I, LEVI' HAND 1-2.6 10 1-2.6 16 
2.6-8 15 2.6-18 >20 
8-18 20 
2,LEFTHAND 1-8 20 14.2 20 
8-18 >25 4.2-18 >30 
On examination of the ten 1-18 G}{z spectrum analyser plots supporting the data in Table 
3.2 it is observed that: 
1) Worst case AA of 10 dB for 1-8 0Hz and 20 dB for 8-18 GHz were established and the 
cumulative probability function of these measurements compare favourably with that for 
the EMC demonstrator measurements, see Section 3.3.1 and Fig. 3.11 therein. Initially 
this appears surprising as the modern aircraft has a CFC skin with metal mesh inner 
surface and all of the panels tested are also filled with conductive Plastic Rubber 
Compound (PRC) which, as will be seen in Chapter 4, can lead to a better EM shield for 
the inside of the bays than the un-gasketted shoot-bolt and bolted panels on the EMC 
demonstrator aircraft However, the PRC used is bonded only to the panel landing on 
the airframe, thus enabling ease of panel removal and re-fitment. Unfortunately this 
means the gasketting-to- panel interface is not necessarily low impedance at microwave 
frequencies and this is believed to be the reason that higher AA values were not seen. 
The comparison of EMC demonstrator and modem aircraft data in Section 3.3.1 suggests 
that this is the case. The frequency dependence of the data sets is difficult to establish 
for the limited data available. 
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The decreasing A A  with increasing frequency, seen in this researcher's investigations but 
not apparent in these data sets, is believed to result from the test technique used: that of 
spectrum analyser 'peak search/hold' whilst moving the transmitting antenna in an arc 
about the bay under test. 
2) Most of the data samples in the ten attenuation graphs lies between 20-3 5 dB, which 
agrees with the earlier work. The maximum, seen only for one bay at approximately 
10.2 GHz, is 43.6 dB and the minimum, again seen on only one (but a different) bay at 
approximately 1.7 GI{z, is 7.9 dB [the case is Bay 1, Left Hand Side, Vertical 
Polarisation]. The A. trend is similar to the EMC demonstrator investigations, see Fig. 
3.1 1, with the bulk of the measurements showing appreciable attenuation in line with the 
estimate of 6-20 dB used by military aircraft designers since the early 1970's, with only a 
few values seen below 10 dB and a few above 40 dB. 
3) The maximum peak-to-peak excursion of any of the profiles is only 16.4 dB and most of 
the profiles lie within ±5 dB of the average, compared with up to 55 dB between 
adjacent samples and profiles of ±10 to ±15 dB seen during the EMC demonstrator 
investigations. The reason for this is that the mode stirring technique, due to its 
averaging ability [3-25], removes most of the peaks in the received power profile seen in 
the un-stirred case, in effect yielding the worst case (i.e. minimum) AA  profile for the 
bay in question. This effect was investigated by Carter ci aL and is shown in Figs. 9 and 
10 of [3-21]. These figures also demonstrate that imperfect mode stirring is present (in 
the helicopter tests reported) as proposed earlier in this section, in that not all of the 
frequency dependent peaks and troughs are removed as suggested in [3-25] might be the 
case for perfect mode stirring. 
From examination of the results of these more recent tests in conjunction with those of the 
earlier investigations, it would appear that the concept of probabilistic modelling of 
airframe attenuation, based on tests on multiple aircraft/bay types and numbers, has merit 
and is likely to offer the best and most cost-effective solution until maturation of the 
rigorous computational EM modelling tools and techniques discussed in Section 3.2. 
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3.3.2.2 Airframe Attenuation on Modem Civil Aircraft 
The EUROCAE User's Guide [2-17] addresses airframe attenuation in two ways. Firstly as 
a set of values which attempt to establish a relatively conservative upper bound on the 
transfer fi.znction of aircraft EM energy penetration (in terms of internal field strengths), and 
secondly by use of the all-encompassing statement: 'If the precise attenuation in any specific 
circumstances is doubtful then the attenuation must be measured.' More realistically the 
draft also allows for modelling and/or measurements to support estimates for a specific 
aircraft, noting (as discussed in Section 3.2) that modelling techniques are currently 'limited 
in effectiveness by the ability to model significant details of aircraft structure, pertinent 
points of entry, and internal zone cabling and configuration.' The User's Guide concludes, 
in accord with this research, that 'The most accurate approach to determine internal 
environments is to apply a blend of test and analysis using the results from the testing to 
"calibrate" the model.' The generic values contained in the User's Guide for 0.1-18 GHz are 
dependent on avionic equipment location and are given in Table 3.4: 
Table 3.4: Attenuation vs. Civil Avionics Location 
LOCATION EM ENVIRONMENT AT AVIONICS ATTN. 
CATEGORY LOCATION IN AIRFRAME (dB) 
T Well protected, e.g. enclosed bay in all-metallic aircraft. 32 
U Partially protected, e.g. avionics bay in an all metallic aircraft. 20 
V Moderate, e.g. that found in the more EM open areas of an 
aircraft composed principally of metal. 
12 
W Severe, e.g. that may be found in non-metallic aircraft or 
exposed areas in metallic aircraft. 
6 
Y ---ditto--- 0 
Such guidance, as will soon be applicable to civil aircraft when the User's Guide is formally 
agreed amongst the participating nations, is believed to be a sensible improvement to be 
adopted for the EMC design of military aircraft, although the exact values to be used and 
their frequency dependence requires further study. This study, as for the RF environment 
case discussed in Chapter 2, is likely to show that frequency independent values in the 
microwave band are unnecessarily severe for both military and civil aircraft. 
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3.3.3 Discussion Of Panel Tests In EMC Laboratory 
In Section 3.3.1, it was noted that an investigation of bolted panel microwave shielding in 
the controlled EM environment of the BAe EMC Laboratory at Warton was proposed. 
This aimed to increase the then limited knowledge of the microwave attenuation properties 
of aircraft panel materials and the joints associated with them. The investigations covered: 
attenuation of panel materials used in modern aircraft, including CFC 'honeycomb', where 
two outer skins of CFC are spaced by a lightweight honeycomb CFC structure. Literature 
and other searching had also identified the need to examine the potential for microwave 
energy 'leakage' through composite material panels on three counts. Firstly un-ratified 
information suggested that researchers in the U.S. had measured microwave leakage 
through CFC material. Secondly such leakage (in the form of surface transfer impedance 
values at 2 GHz similar to those at 1 MHz) had been reported by Walker and Heintz 
[3-29]. Thirdly CFC, unlike metal, is not homogeneous and, because of manufacturing 
techniques, can have small regions of non-conducting material through which microwave 
energy ingress could occur. Two samples were examined, one with fine copper mesh, 
used for lightning strike protection, bonded to one face. 
potential benefits on shielding effectiveness of using high and low conductivity conductive 
gaskets in, or conductive tape across joints, including an initial examination of the effects 
of paint in the joint. 
the effects of bolt spacing via comparison of two panels, one with twice the number of 
bolts of the other, to also explore the reason why some of the EMC demonstrator aircraft 
measurements did not agree with predictions of cut-off frequency. 
The test methodology used and results obtained are thily reported in [3-30] by the 
researcher, Wellington. Shielding Effectiveness (SE) in dB was ascertained using the 
standard 'hole in the wall' technique, detailed in MIL-STD-285 [3-31] and shown 
schematically in Fig. 3.20, where 
SE= 101ogjo[91) 
and Ph = received power with no panel fitted 
P, = received power with panel/gasket fined. 
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Figure 3.20: Test Arrangement For 'Hole In Wall' Shielding Measurements 
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All panels were approximately 491 mm x 217 mm to match the aperture in the door 
between rooms of the EMC Laboratory and Table 3.5 gives the panel configurations tested. 
Measurements were taken for 1-4 and 8-18 0Hz (4-8 0Hz was not tested due to amplifier 
unavailability). Unless stated 50 MHz measurement resolution was used, as suggested in 
Section 3.3.1 to be an appropriate balance of adequate characterisation vs. test time. A 
summary of the findings of these investigations is presented below: 
Table 3.5: Panel Type And Configurations Measured 
MATERIAL DEPTH OTHER DATA 
ALUMINIUM 3 mm 
CFC 3 mm SIMILAR TO ABOVE 
CFC 28 mm HONEYCOMB WITH 1mm SKINS 
CFC 28 mm AS PREVIOUS + COPPER MESH ON ONE SKIN 
ALUMINIUM 3 mm FULL SET OF 48 BOLTS TO MATCH THE 'HOLE IN WALL' LANDING 
ALUMINIUM 3 mm 24 EQUI-SPACED BOLTS 
ALUIMINTUM 3 mm PREVIOUS PANEL: TWO SAMPLES OF CONDUCTIVE GASKETFING 
AND CONDUCTIVE ADHESIVE TAPE 
ALUMINIUM 3 mm PREVIOUS PANEL: GASKETS AND TAPE ISOLATED FROM PANEL 
Aluminium to CFC Comparison for 3 mm thick panels: The range of levels of SE seen was 
28-90 dB. Results for 1-1.4 0Hz for aluminium show a 15-20 dB improvement in SE over 
the CFC panel. SE >2 0Hz for both panels follow similar trends and levels. However, >8 
0Hz CFC gave higher SE than aluminium by up to 20 dB over certain frequency sub-bands 
and this was found to be the case for both transmit antenna polarisations. The researcher 
noted that all values of SE measured for both panels were much lower than predicted and 
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attributed this difference to the effects ofjoint leakage around the periphery of the panel, a 
conclusion supported in Chapter 4. It is thought that the case where CFC apparently offers 
better shielding performance than aluminium is erroneous, with the different materials at the 
peripheral slot interface resulting in different frequency-dependent performance of the joints 
which dominates the SE values measured. 
CFC Honeycomb Panels With/Without Copper Mesh: Values of SE seen were 25-70 dB 
and both panels showed similar transmit antenna polarisation trends. Conducted with 20 
MHz test resolution, both panels showed very similar levels of SE (within 5 dB) with 
isolated peaks seen in both panels' results up to 4 0Hz. Above 8 0Hz the protected panel 
has higher SE by up to 10 dB with more isolated peaks than the plain panel. However, over 
certain frequency ranges, the plain panel SE is up to 8 dB higher than the protected one. 
The extra SE predicted by the researcher for the copper mesh was not seen and this was 
attributed to the mesh behaving as poorly connected individual strands, rather than a 
homogenous sheet of copper at these frequencies, where the mesh size is <C  wavelength. 
For the test configuration used, with the mesh isolated from the jig landing, any additional 
shielding would result from increased reflection and increased attenuation loss in the mesh. 
It is thought that, as for the previous tests, peripheral slot leakage is dominating the SE 
values measured and that for the extra shielding to have been seen, the mesh would have 
had to been well bonded to the jig landing. Some additional confidence in the results of the 
BAe tests arises from the similar SE levels resulting from tests performed on various 
composite panels by Chromerics Inc. [3-32],[3-33]. 
Fully (48) and Hall (24)-Bolted 3mm Aluminium Panels: As the prime aim of this test 
was to investigate the frequency dependence of the bolt spacings difference between the 
two panels, 1 MHz test resolution was used. Predictions of cut-off frequency of 3.13 and 
7.89 0Hz were made for the 24 and 48 bolt panels respectively. For 1-3 0Hz the resulting 
profiles were almost indistinguishable as predicted and were, at maximum, within 3 dB of 
each other. The range of SE values seen was 32-91 dB, with the maximum values for both 
panels seen at 1.1 0Hz, for vertical polarisation only. Although the raw data presented in 
[3-30] is difficult to analyse due to the substantial variation between samples, e.g. up to 20 
dB between 1 MHz samples, some general trends can be observed. The range of SE values 
seen was 24-90 dB. For 8-10 0Hz the frilly bolted panel is 10-15 dB higher, for 10-12 OFlz 
up to 10 dB higher, and for 12-18 0Hz is 5-15 dB higher than the half-bolted panel. These 
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results, of which Fig. 3.21 is an example, agree with predictions, which give a 10 dB 
difference between the panels for frequencies higher than 7.89 (3Hz. So, even though the 
SE benefit of closer bolt spacing can be seen in the results, further analysis of the data 
(presented in graphical form in [3-30]), including low pass filtering, is required if more 
information is to be gleaned. 
Figure 3.21: Shielding Effectiveness of Full- vs. Half-Bolted Panels 
Effects of Low and High Conductivity Gasketting and Conductive Tape: A test resolution 
of 20 MIHIz was used for these tests, which were conducted with the 24 bolt aluminium 
panel only and compared gasketted and taped panel performance with that of a bare panel. 
From 1-1.3 GFlz, for horizontal polarisation only, the low conductivity gasket gave an 
improvement of 10 dB, whilst the high conductivity one gave at most 5 dB improvement.' 
As before, the substantial inter-sample SE variation prevents definitive analysis of the 
results, see Fig. 3.22 which shows the vertical polarisation data and is typical of the results 
of this phase of the investigations. For 1.34 (3Hz no improvement was seen with either 
gasket for either transmit antenna polarisation, within the 3 dB measurement error budget. 
There was also no significant difference in the performance of the two gaskets for 8-18 
(3Hz, where a polarisation itidependent general improvement of 10 dB was measured, with 
a maximum of 20 dB at some frequencies. Although the range of SE seen was 28-100 dB, 
the bulk of the SE values did not achieve the 80 dB claimed by the gasket samples' 
manufacturer. This was thought by Wellington to be due to differences in test methods 
employed, a point with which this researcher agrees, but was not possible to prove due to 
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lack of data from the manufacturer. Use of conductive tape (with its conductive adhesive) 
gave a general improvement of 20dB for 24 and 8-18 0Hz. 
Figure 3.22: Shielding Effectiveness with High/Low Conductivity Gaskets 
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With the aluminium panel electrically isolated from the door aperture using Sellotape as a 
simulation of paint (as would be the case in reality on an aircraft), the improvements seen 
with the gaskets in place were greater than those above, with both gasket types yielding 
improvements of up to 20 dB for 1-2 0Hz and by 10 dB for most of 2-4 and 8-18 0Hz. 
This increase at lower microwave frequencies probably results from further capacitive 
loading of the peripheral slot which then becomes lower impedance at these frequencies. 
The observed range of SE was 3 0-70 dB. 
The overall conclusions to be made from this research phase in terms of its impact on the 
ingress of microwave energy into airframes are that: 
1) CFC panels, particularly those with lightning strike protection in the form of copper 
mesh on the inside skin of a honeycomb construction, provide essentially the same SE 
levels >1 0Hz as their traditionally used 3 mm aluminium counterparts. 
2) Commercially available conductivity gasketting of panels can offer microwave SE 
improvements of typically 10 dB and up to 20 dB. It is thought that higher SE could be 
achieved for an aircraft panel or bay door, where optimised installation of the gasketting 
would be possible, compared with the Laboratory situation. 
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3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Two of the major findings of the aircraft investigations have particular relevance to this 
research programme. Firstly there are very few occasions where the attenuation values 
measured on in-service aircraft arrangements approach the minimum required attenuation 
values to prevent 1970's and 1980's avionics from being subjected to levels of power density 
approaching their qualified level. Secondly, the DEF. STAN. 59-4 1 military microwave 
EMC qualification levels are at least 52 dB lower than predictions of the current mean flY 
environment and this is exacerbated by the necessary addition of safety margins. Despite 
the apparent bleakness of the above, a problem is not thought to exist at this time because: 
a) very few avionics problems have actually been seen world-wide in the microwave band 
on either military or civil aircraft, see Chapter 7. flying restrictions applied to U.K. fixed 
and rotary wing military aircraft also ensures that they are not subjected to these very 
high power densities, 
b) for the fbture, the latest military EMC Specification has levels which are considerably 
higher than earlier microwave test specifications, thus ensuring that equipment is cleared 
to the external environment. 
c) the EUROCAE User's Guide encompasses the best practices concerning civil aircraft 
equipment design and qualification, appropriate RE environments and aircraft 
certification techniques and levels. 
However it should be noted that future avionic circuit technologies are likely to be more 
susceptible to the RE environment than those of the 1970's, which are currently in use in 
present day in-service aircraft. This topic is covered in Chapter 7. 
Another conclusion is that the frequency-independent values of airframe attenuation 
assumed in the aircraft and avionic equipment design process are unnecessarily severe >1 
0Hz. The research has shown that a significant spread of 1-18 0Hz attenuation factors 
(-3.2 to 59 dB) can occur, although a possible vehicle-independent correlation has been 
demonstrated between the cumulative probability fi.inctions for the aircraft types examined. 
This represents a step improvement in the ability to estimate microwave airframe 
attenuation for a given aircraft type and offers the potential for supporting EMC design and 
qualification without the need for aircraft tests. Further study is recommended, 
commencing with a wider statistical survey of such data from other aircraft types. 
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Chapter 4 
MICROWAVE ENERGY INGRESS 
INTO AVIONICS EQUIPMENT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Microwave energy entry into an avionics equipment box may occur through three routes: 
cables (including connectors), apertures (comprising holes, slots and joints), and through 
the box material itself In assessing the potential upset of circuitry within the avionics box 
three questions need to be answered: 
a) What is the maximum relative energy ingress by each route? 
b) At what frequency or over what frequency range does the dominant mechanism of 
ingress change from cables/connectors to apertures? 
c) Is the assumption that there is minimal ingress through avionic box material true for 
typical avionics boxes? 
This chapter attempts to answer these questions through the development of an overall 
energy ingress equation and investigation of the attributes of the three potential energy 
ingress routes before proceeding, in Chapters 5 and 6, to a detailed investigation of the 
ingress route comprising cables and connectors. 
4.2 OVERALL ENERGY INGRESS EQUATION 
In conducting this assessment of the microwave threat to avionic circuitry, an equation for 
upset must be developed. A top level equation, describing the voltage presented to a circuit 
element in an avionic box as a result of EM irradiation of an aircraft, is in Birken et aL 
[4-1]. Eqn. 4.1 gives a modified form of this, which is applicable across the EM spectrum. 
It is also given pictorially in Fig. 4.1: 
EM - MATERIAL - AIRFRAME - JOINT + CABLE + AVIONIC EM 
THREAT SHIELDING 	 SHAPE 	 LEAKAGE SHIELDING SUSCEPTIBILITY 
= AVIONICS + EM 
VOLTAGE PROTECTION 
Eqn. 4.1 can be represented more analytically as Eqn. 4.2, with each term having frequency 
dependency, denoted by (fl 
,,() = (P pp(f) - FSL(fl) - A,0(f) - 'sox(t) + G 1 (fl 	 . . (4.2) 
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Figure 4.1: Original Ingress Equation 
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In this equation the first two terms have units of power in dBm and the others are gains or 
losses with units of dB. The definition of each term, with comments, is given below. 
Pca(f) is the power delivered to the circuit or component whose susceptibility is in 
question. Modelling is thought by this researcher to be possible and is certain to be 
dependent on circuit technology. This is discussed in Chapter 7. Whether P ca(f) has 
sufficient magnitude to cause upset is dependent upon the susceptibility of the avionics. 
Minimum susceptibility levels are given by the relevant EMC Qualification specification. 
Appendix B provides details of the EMC qualification specifications and test methods 
used on avionic equipment and aircraft to ensure safe and correct operation when they are 
exposed to power densities below the specified levels. P(f) is the Effective Radiated 
Power of the source of the microwave radiation, usually expressed as the product of the 
transmitter power and the antenna gain, either in dBm or Watts. This can be calculated 
and a prediction vs. frequency is given in Chapter 2. FSLQ) is the Free Space Loss of the 
radiation with distance from the antenna, see discussion in Chapter 2. It should be noted 
that for the purposes of this research the air is assumed to be dry, at standard atmospheric 
pressure and conditions, i.e. the worst case is assumed. 
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(P.(f) - FSL(Q) is the power density incident at the airframe, see Section 2.3. 
AA,fl(Q, hereafter referred to as AA, is the airframe microwave attenuation factor and 
replaces Material Shielding and Joint Leakage (for the airframe) in Eqn. 4.1. It is the 
transfer function between external irradiation incident on the aircraft's outer skin, 
PEXItRNAL, and power density measured in an equipment bay within the airframe, 
PINThRNAL, see Section 3.2 and is the ratio of two power densities: 
1 Ex1tRNAL ' AA 2Olog 10 ) 
 PWMM~ 
If resonances within an aircraft bay are present, the magnitude of PwmRNAL can lead to a 
negative AA, i.e. a 'gain' factor, see Section 3.3.1. In the aircraft investigations there were 
four cases of apparent negative AA, but these were initially believed to have been a 
measurement problem. Subsequent to examination of both King et al. on cavity- backed 
slot irradiation [4-2], [4-3] and Carter ci al. [3-21], the four data samples were 
re-examined and found to be valid negative values, the minima of which appear in Table 
3.1. The largest value of this 'gain' from this researcher's work and in [3-21] is 3.2 dB and 
thus it is reasonable to estimate that this may be between 0-4 dB for a metal-skinned 
fighter aircraft. The contribution of bay resonances to AA is unlikely ever to be fully 
analysed since there is substantial variation in the size, shape and internal content of 
equipment bays, including coupling effects to adjacent bays. It was suggested in Section 
3.3.1, that AA may have to be derived by a probabilistic determination and that such a 
determination would need to be based on panel or door type, size of peripheral slot, 
airframe material, aperture sizes, etc. Some modelling aspects of these resonances may be 
identical to those in avionic boxes, see below, since there is considerable analogy between 
a lossy Faraday (shielded) cage and both airframe and avionics box. 
The Airframe Shape factor in Eqn. 4.1 represents a relationship between the vehicle's 
volume to surface area ratio (V/S) and its shielding effectiveness. The factor determines 
surface currents on the airframe and whether any enhancements occur, e.g. due to the 
resonant effects of a long thin cylinder vs. the lesser value for a sphere. Electric and 
magnetic shielding values at microwave frequencies are very high for typical aircraft 
construction: 5029-21241 dB has been calculated for 1-18 GFIz using Eqns. 4.36 and 4.37 
of Carter [3-23]. Examination of Birken's Shape factor graphs, Figs. 4 and 5 of [4-1], 
shows that the difference between spherical and cylindrical shape is only 2 dB, and that 
* During this work an incorrect calculation was discovered resulting in the whole of Table 
4.1 of [3-23] being in error. This has been pointed out to the author. 
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magnetic shielding effectiveness varies by 8 dB for V/S of 0.5-1.0, the range of all BAe 
fighter-sized aircraft. Both of these values are negligible when compared to the >5029 dB 
values above and thus the Airframe Shape factor is considered insignificant at microwave 
frequencies and can be discounted. A(f) is the avionic box microwave attenuation 
factor, as for AA  above. This is a function of energy coupling through cables and 
connector combinations, apertures (including joints and slots, e.g. for cooling) and case 
material. These are discussed in subsequent sections of this Chapter. The potential for 
'gain' caused by resonances within the box is postulated by analogy to avionic bay 
resonances. No figure is available but an initial estimate of the maximum gain is 4 dB via 
this analogy. A(f) will be dependent on shape, size, and the avionic circuitry contained 
therein and is discussed in Section 4.4 and circuitry aspects considered in Chapter 7. 
Gca(f) is the gain of the effective antenna coupling the microwave energy within the 
avionic box to the circuit device in question. At the frequencies under consideration it is 
likely that this will be a combination of radiation impinging directly on the circuit device, 
and energy pick-up on both circuit board tracks close to the device and the device's own 
pins and leads. The value of this factor is believed to be heavily dependent on the circuit 
technology used and this topic is covered in Chapter 7. 
Having established the above equation it is necessary to consider further the subject of 
microwave energy ingress into avionics equipment. Any avionics box may be considered 
as a imperfect RF shield to incident microwave and other frequency energy. The overall 
shielding effectiveness of such a box is made up of five components. These may be best 
considered in three groups: a) case material, b) apertures (holes, slots and joints) and c) the 
combination of connector and cables. The following sections consider each of these 
potential sources of ingress, thereby deriving an equation for Ap ox, and identifying the 
dominant factor in microwave energy entry into an avionic equipment box. 
EM 
4.3 ENERGY PENETRATION THROUGH CASE MATERIAL 
Transmission of EM energy through a thin sheet of conducting, though not lossless 
material can be appreciable dependent on the sheet's thickness, t, its material, and the 
frequency of the RF energy. 'Thin' in this context is when t is comparable to 5, the skin 
depth of the energy in the material. S is that depth into the sheet where the current density 
has decayed to lie of the value at the surface of the material. The derivation of 5 is 
covered in Chapter 5. Fig. 4.2 shows the general case in consideration: 
Figure 4.2: Transmission Through A Conducting Sheet Of Finite Thickness 
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In Fig. 4.2, Z 1 is the impedance of free space, 377 C), approximating to the air on either 
side of the avionic box wall A-B, and Z 2 is the impedance of the case material. E 11 is the 
incident wave, E the forward wave transmitted through the material, and E3 represents 
the wave transmitted into the air beyond the case material. E is the backward wave 
reflected from the air-wall boundary at A and E is the backward wave reflected from the 
internal boundary at B. For the case where t is larger than 5, and overall transmission loss 
is > 15 dB, an approximation can be made that multiple reflections within the sheet can be 
neglected. From [3-23] the total loss through such a sheet can be then shown to be: 
LOSSTOTAL 
 = LOSSA +LO5S + LOSSB 
where LOSSA = . 10109 10() 	 dB 
LOSS 	 = -ioiog io[exp-(f)] dB 
LOSSB = - 10109 10() 	 dB Z i 
and where R5 , the surface resistance (sheet resistivity) of the case material, is given by: 
Q/square 
where a is the material's conductivity, in Siemens per metre, and 
L Ap,] 
metres 
see Chapter 5, and i=J.141- with the former being the permeability of free space, 47E*10 7 
Thn', and the latter being the relative permeability of the material. 
A typical avionic box is made of primed and painted aluminium or aluminium alloys. 
Often it has been cast (to minimise joints, for EMC and other mechanical reasons) and has 
typical side or panel thickness which is a minimum of 1.5 mm. For aluminium, the values 
a35 to 40 x 106 
 Sm' and jt1 can be used to evaluate the minimum attenuation for 
1-18 UI-fr. If the lower value of a is used for conservatism, a skin depth for 1-18 GH.z can 
be calculated using Eqn. 4.8 to be 2.69 gm at 1 GHz, reducing to 0.634 rim at 18 UHz. 
Thus, for the minimum t value of 1.5 mm, the case material is between 556 and 2366 times 
6 in thickness, justifying the earlier approximation that no multiple reflections occur 
within such thicknesses of aluminium sheet at these frequencies. Substituting these values 
of a and 6 into Eqn. 4.7 and then for R. into Eqns. 4.4 to 4.6 enables the transmission 
losses in Fig. 4.3 to be calculated. 
Figure 4.3: Transmission Losses Through Aluminium 
This total transmission loss, 4919-20614 dB for 1-18 GHz, is so high that this ingress route 
is negligible >1 GHz and a term is not required for this aspect of the A 804f) element of the 
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ingress equation. This is supported by Weekley [4-4], where a 1.016 mm aluminium 
barrier shielding value of >100 dB was calculated across the range 10 kHz to 18 0Hz. 
This barrier, in conjunction with special aperture treatments, enabled total box shielding 
values of 47-76 dB. This resulted in the reduction of 1-18 0Hz external fields from 4-17 
kVni' (i.e. similar to the 'Current Microwave Environment' in Fig. 2.2) to calculated 
internal fields between 0.7-27 Vnf'. These equate to a minimum 37-5 dB safety margin 
above the measured susceptibility of the circuitry in that particular box. The findings of 
this section also suggest that screening avionic circuitry should not be a problem even with 
the thinnest case material typically used. In fact, this is not so as two key assumptions 
have been implicitly made in the above calculations: that the box is: 
1) a perfect enclosure with no apertures, a completely unreal situation. In Section 4.4 it 
will be shown that dramatic reductions in shielding effectiveness can occur with the 
smallest of apertures for 1-18 0I{z. 
2) not resonant at any frequency in the range 1-18 0Hz, a real possibility based upon the 
analogy argument with aircraft avionic bays, postulated in the discussion of the bay 
resonance 'gain' factor in Section 4.2. Taking a typically large avionic box as 0.3m x 
0.3m x 0.2m then, using the equation in Appendix E for the resonant frequency of an 
empty rectangular cavity, the resonant frequency is calculated at 1.03 0Hz. Other 
resonances will occur above this frequency and, for boxes with smaller volumes, cavity 
resonances in the 1-18 0Hz band are suggested by cavity theory (see Appendix E). 
This aspect is discussed in Section 4.4. 
This also shows that, when considered with the results in Section 3.3.3, the Material 
Shielding part of the AA  factor can also be considered to be so high as to be negligible for 
metallic airframes (where aluminium skin thickness of 1.6 mm is common), or have a 
minimum value of only 30 dB lower than aluminium, i.e. still negligible, if it is made of 
modem composites. The resulting conclusion of this section is that the material shielding 
components of the both avionic box and airframe attenuation factors, A X(f) and AA, are 
negligible. Thus these factors equate to the Joint Leakage term of Eqn. 4.1, or more 
generally to terms covering the degradation of each shield by apertures, of which joints are 
but one type. This aspect is covered in the next Section. 
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4.4 ENERGY PENETRAI1ON THROUGH APERTURES 
There is considerable analogy between airframes and avionic boxes. Both offer protection 
to the avionic circuitry, in the form of shielding, and may be viewed as lossy Faraday 
cages, with energy ingress resulting from various shield wall imperfections. Evidence 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4 strongly suggests that for 1-18 GHz these imperfections, in 
the form of slots, holes and joints, represent the dominant energy ingress route for both 
airframe and avionic boxes. Other imperfections include lamps, potentiometers and Visual 
Display Unit screens. However the shield degradation of a number of these is difficult to 
quantify by prediction or measurement and this is discussed ftirther in this Section. 
4.4.1 The Effects Of Apertures On Attenuation Of Incident Energy 
Avionic boxes fall into two main categories with regard to apertures: 
- those which are installed within avionics bays, e.g. computers and navigation sensors. 
These are typified by construction of screwed and/or bolted panel, or cast variety; front 
and/or rear connectors fixed to the case; ventilation holes (most often) in bottom and 
front panels; and sides and top panel usually without holes; removable for maintenance. 
- those which are cockpit-mounted. There are two types, visual display units (e.g. 
head-up display and radar displays) and control panels. In the former the primary 
difference to the bay-mounted box is optical apertures, which are discussed in Section 
4.4.3. The latter differs in that rarely do they have need for ventilation holes and thus 
the box construction is usually cast, with the front panel bolted to the box. In addition, 
connectors are only rear-mounted and multiple knobs, switches and indicators (bulbs 
and displays) penetrate the front panel. 
Formulas for field penetration through circular and elliptical holes in the idealised case of 
a wall with zero thickness were developed by Bethe [4-5], [4-6] and have become 
accepted. Predictive work in the area of apertures in walls with finite thickness has been 
conducted over the last twenty years [4-7] and Butler ci aL produced a bibliography of 
apertures in a thick screen [4-8] in 1978 covering much of this earlier work. Many 
researchers, including Vance [4-9], Harrison [4-101 and Schelkunkoff [4-11] have also 
analysed the mechanisms by which EM fields at the surface of conducting shield can 
penetrate and appear on the other side. More recently (1990), and building on this earlier 
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work, Gluckstern and Diamond [4-7] derived integral equations for the potential and field 
distribution within a circular hole in a plane conducting wall of finite thickness induced by 
uniform far fields. These were then used to obtain the electric and magnetic dipole 
moments induced on the opposite side of the wall from the incident field. Although the 
topic has been well researched, the detailed application of these equations to practical 
avionics boxes is not well understood [2-17]. The key difficulties are that: 
- avionics boxes are not identical in size, shape and case construction. 
- apertures vary substantially in number, shape and size between boxes. 
- non-linear contact resistances and geometrical complications are common, e.g gap 
shapes, bolt spacings and gasket compression. 
Thus, each box represents a computationally intensive task at these frequencies and, as for 
the airframe case, modelling does not currently provide a practical solution to the problem 
of aperture ingress. However, through a combination of less complex analysis of aperture 
ingress and many years of practical experience by avionics manufacturers, various design 
rules have now evolved. Whilst the consideration of the detailed equations in [4-5] to 
[4-11] are outside the scope of this thesis, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms 
involved to determine appropriate values for shielding effectiveness degradation caused by 
apertures. An examination of current avionic box screening techniques was thus 
conducted and a number of equations, especially those by Grant [4-12], were identified as 
relevant to the design of avionic box apertures at microwave frequencies. 
Field penetration occurs through three mechanisms: diffusion through the case material 
(see Section 4.3) and EM coupling through apertures and mechanical joints. In the 
magnetic coupling case, a magnetic field causes a current to flow on the surface of a 
conductor. This current develops a voltage drop across the contact resistance of a joint or 
gasket which exists on the outer and inner sides of the joint as indicated in Fig. 4.4. If this 
current flows through an inductance which is common to both inner and outer surface of 
the shield then the voltage drop will exist on both sides also. Slots, holes, spaces between 
bolts or other fasteners, gaps between braided wires are all associated with common or 
mutual inductances in this context. Likewise, shunt capacitance is associated with joints, 
gaskets and slots and typically a joint may be represented by this capacitance in parallel 
with a series combination of resistance and inductance. 
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Figure 4.4: Magnetic Field Induced Coupling 
UNIFORM CURRENT 
Note: The gap voltage V. close to a bolt is due to the inductance of the bolt and contact 
resistance of plates. V0 between bolts is affected by inductance of adjacent bolts and 
capacitance of gap between plates. 
Madle [4-13] states that the transfer impedance of any aperture or joint can be reduced to 
the general form of: 
Z= [R(f)+jcoL +jaM i2J in parallel with [r-1 ] ohm 
	
where R(f) = 	 frequency dependent resistance (LI) 
L 	 = 	 Inductance common to both plates of shield (H) 
	
M 12 = 	 Mutual inductance between the two plates (H) 
C 	 = 	 Shunt capacitance (F) 
 27E *  frequency (Rad.s') 
Coupling of an electric field, which is normal to the shield, through apertures and/or joints 
can induce a current in a wire within, in effect making part of the wire behind the aperture 
behave like a plate of a capacitor, with the other plate outside the shield. In this case the 
Transfer impedance can be expressed as 
Z r J___ m—j. 
LC12 
where C12 = mutual capacitance between wire and exterior of shield (F). 
..(4.1O) 
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With reference to [4-12], EM leakage through an aperture depends upon the longest 
dimension of the aperture, d, and the wavelength, ?., of the radiation field. When ? <2d, 
the EM energy passes freely through the aperture. When?. = 2d, the shielding effectiveness 
is zero and this occurs at the cut-off frequency, f where f. = c/2d and c = propagation 
velocity of the wave (the speed of light for air-spaced apertures). When?. > 2d, the signal 
is attenuated by an amount R, where 
R=2Olog() '2olog 	 dB 	 ...(4. 11) 
for X/2 > d > t and where t is the thickness of the case material. R for a number of 
aperture major dimensions is shown in Fig. 4.5 
Figure 4.5: Shielding Effectiveness vs. Aperture Major Dimension 
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This figure demonstrates the importance of minimising apertures of any type at microwave 
frequencies. The reduction of shielding of 20 dE per decade of increasing frequency 
agrees with [2-17] and was also discussed in Section 3.3.1. Indeed, in the frequency range 
of interest, 1-18 GHz, the hole's major dimension at which shield attenuation is 55 dB can 
be calculated from re-arranging Eqn. 4.11 as 0.26 mm decreasing to 14.8 gm with 
increasing frequency. Ref [2-17] states 55 dB as the box attenuation typically required in 
the region 0.4-2 GHz for civil aircraft to protect avionics 'if highly susceptible 
components' are used in and is in line with [44] which achieved attenuation of between 76 
dB (1 GHz) reducing to 47 dB (18 GHz). Ref. [2-17] suggests that 55 dB is applicable up 
to 8 GHz but, interestingly, also suggests that the attenuation requirement can be reduced 
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by some 40 dB between 1-10 GHz as .a result of the combination of reducing wire 
coupling, which is stated as being 20 dB per increasing decade frequency, and decreasing 
component susceptibility which in [2-17] is stated as 'typically improves by 20 dB per 
decade, expressed in power terms...' Above 8 GHz no avionic testing and analysis is 
required by [2-17] unless a specific component or circuit susceptibility exists. These 
aspects of [2-17] are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. The figures calculated above lead to 
the conclusion that with any box holes, joints or other discontinuities it is very difficult to 
provide any significant level of shielding, particularly in the upper part of the 1-18 GHz 
range. This has been seen during BAe EMC Laboratory tests on two avionics boxes from 
the 1980's, one with a cast case but many apertures and one which, to microwave radiation, 
was essentially a collection of eight flat panels loosely bolted together with no gasketting. 
Neither was particularly resilient to microwave energy ingress but the latter was shown to 
provide very little shield attenuation between 1-18 GHz. 
These actions can be taken to maximise protection offered to the circuitry: 
- Cast avionic box construction has an inherent reduced number of joints. 
- Ventilation apertures of significant overall area are often required. Attenuation levels 
may be appreciably enhanced compared to a single large hole by sub-dividing the hole 
into groups of smaller holes, L e. with higher f. The spacing of these holes must be at 
least the largest dimension of the hole to prevent adjacent holes appearing as one larger 
hole, with a halving of f, and accompanying 6 dB reduction in shielding. Eqn. (11) of 
[4-12] describes the attenuation for multiple holes in a shield where the spacing factor 
is not taken into account. Wire mesh with appropriate aperture size and depth can also 
be used in this respect. 
Small spacings between bolts or screws around the whole periphery of any panels, 
ensuring that each corner is bolted, maximises A BOx. Many bolts with short spacings 
give much higher attenuation than few bolts with large spacings as the slots formed in 
the former case have much higher f than the latter. 
- Where regular panel access is required, precision machined matching faces with 
stepped, corrugated or flat profiles should be considered. An alternative is the screened 
room door peripheral 'finger stock' method. 
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- When a hole in the shield has a cross Section less than or equal to the thickness of the 
shield it acts as a waveguide below f. By taking advantage of the waveguide 
absorption characteristic, the use of holes in thicker material than the rest of the box can 
be used to achieve significant attenuation compared with a similar hole in the usual 1.5 
mm aluminium case material. The amount of attenuation is a function of material 
thickness (t) to the width of the hole (w) and, for ratios of about 4:1, is above 100 dB 
[4-12]. Multiple waveguides, commonly arranged as a 'honeycomb', suffer a slight 
reduction in shielding as for plain holes but can still achieve >55 dB attenuation. Fig. 
4.6 shows the significant increase in shielding with increasing tlw ratio for an 
individual waveguide below f,, demonstrating the appreciable attenuation improvement 
over standard holes, whilst Table 4.1 shows typically available honeycomb waveguide 
cell data. 
Figure 4.6: Waveguide Shielding Characteristics 
(From [4-12]) 
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Table 4.1: Honeycomb Waveguide Cell Data 
(Extracted from [4-12]) 
CELL SIZE 
(w) in mm 
CELL DEPTH 
(t) in mm 
RATIO 
(tlw) 
f,, 
(GHz) 
ABSORPTION 
(dB) 
3.2 6.4 4 47 109 
4.8 19.1 6 47 164 
6.4 25.4 4 31 109 
25.4 5+ 31 146 
4 24 109 
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- Gasketting should be used on panels as covered in Section 4.4.2. Ensure any joints, 
which form a capacitor whose magnitude is a function of joint area, are welded or 
sealed with high conductivity sealant or, as a last resort at these frequencies, a high 
overlap area can be used. 
4.4.2 The Role Of Conductive Gasketting At Microwave Frequencies 
As discussed in Section 4.4.1, any slot or joint in the shield forming the avionic box results 
in substantial energy ingress compared to diffusion through the case material itself. In 
order to obviate or reduce this ingress path to acceptable levels a number of techniques can 
be utilised, falling into two major categories: panel and landing profile machining (e.g. 
stepped, lipped or corrugated) and conductive gasketting. A number of gasket types now 
exist, e.g. wire mesh, spiralled tinned beryllium-copper [44], vinyl or silicone polymers 
with silver, silver and nickel, or carbon fillers [4-13], [4-14], and conductive Plastic 
Rubber Compound (PRC). PRC is particularly useful in joints and for panels (both 
avionic box and airframe), though due to its glue-like consistency, is unsuitable for panels 
where regular removal is required. Gasketting is required where enclosures require 
apertures with major dimension> , where the EM threat is above 0.1 GHz and the total 
shielding required is > 30 dB [4-12]. It is also required where dissimilar mating materials 
are used at the joint or lid edge, and where environmental seals are needed. Gaskets are 
thus invariably required for the range 1-18 GH.z to enable overall screening above 30dB to 
be achieved for avionic boxes. More usually a combination of lipping and gasketting is 
required to achieve the highest levels of protection, i.e. above 80 dB, generally needed to 
protect avionics against the current microwave environment, [4-4], [4-14] and see Chapter 
2. 
A typical military avionic gasket arrangement is shown in Fig. 4.7, demonstrating the 
combination of machining, and gasket. In this way continuous electrical contact around 
and between fasteners can be ensured. The gasket can be represented as a lumped 
parameter circuit comprising a parallel RLC network as in Fig. 4.8. Usually the values of 
resistance and inductance are small but, as in the case of corrosion, the value of inductance 
can become appreciable and contribute to degradation of shielding. To enable maximum 
contact area and minimum resistance between the gasket and the mating surfaces, the 
gasket is compressed using the closing action of the panel's fasteners and conductive paint 
may be used on the mating surfaces. Typical pressures required are 345-690 kPA (50-100 
4-15 
psi) for solid silicone and 172-345 kPA (25-50 psi) for the soft sponge silicone material 
with internal wires [4-13]. 
Figure 4.7: Typical Military Gasket Arrangement 
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Figure 4.8: Equivalent Circuit Of Gasket 
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In order to obviate ingress via the panel periphery or joint path the conductivity of the 
gasket material must approach that of the case material to enable shielding attenuation 
values of the same order as an aperture-less box of that material. Whilst this is impractical 
in the range 1-18 GHz, high values of attenuation can be achieved, with modem 
conductive silicone-based gasket materials capable of a minimum of 100dB over the range 
29 MHz to 10 GHz [4-13]. Bates et aL [4-15] gave test data on a then new expanded 
PTFE polymer gasket loaded with carbon which showed better shielding effectiveness 
(110±10 dB for 1-18 GHz) than a 'Corrosion resistant' silver-plated aluminium filled 
silicone (90±25 dB for 1-18 GHz). 
When gasketting is applied to all joints, panels and connector entry points, and appropriate 
ventilation aperture screening measures (see Section 4.4.1) are incorporated, 90-110 dB of 
gasket screening effectiveness is seen to be capable of enabling adequate protection against 
the current environment [4-4] and [4-14]. Thus the contribution of gasketting to the A iox 
term in the overall ingress equation is highly box construction dependent but can, where 
good protection measures as outlined above are adopted, be high enough for this ingress 
route to be discounted in determining the potential for avionics upset. 
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4.4.3 Optical Apertures 
The two main optical apertures on modem military aircraft are the canopy, often a perspex 
or glass and plastic combination, and Visual Display Units (VDU), e.g. head-up display 
and cockpit-mounted navigation and weapon aiming displays. The canopy often offers 
zero shielding, see [2-17], other than in the case where windscreen heater elements form a 
simple filter. The combination of unscreened canopy and low shielding of YDUs has, in 
the past, led to upset of cockpit displays by radars, a topic which is covered in Chapter 7. 
Unlike other apertures allowing microwave energy ingress into the interior of an avionic 
box, optical apertures ('windows') must have acceptable optical transmission characteristics 
at all times. Two methods of shielding are currently used for this application, fine mesh 
metal and thin film coatings on the VDU. Mesh screens are commonly used for screening 
at frequencies below 1 0Hz and comprise a knitted wire mesh made from Monel, 
tin-plated copper-clad iron, tungsten, copper or copper alloys. They are typically 1-5 mm 
thick and have optical transmission of> 60% over the visible light spectrum. For the very 
fine mesh density (100 per inch) required for shielding 1-18 0Hz effectiveness of >50 dB, 
very small (0.001 inch [25 pm]) wire diameter must be used and silver-plated stainless 
steel is required to survive the weaving process, but this mesh type is more expensive than 
the others by a factor of approximately five. Methods of calculating the attenuation of 
mesh shields and the trade-off of vs. optical transmission efficiency is given in [4-16] and 
[4-12]. There are three current techniques for the peripheral termination of such screens at 
the edges of the window aperture and these are shown in Fig. 4.9. 
The other class of window shielding is thin film coatings. These can be used to coat 
VDUs, luminescent crystal displays, light emitting diodes or other types of display 
surfaces. The more common application is to VDU surfaces where thin films of silver or 
gold are vacuum spluttered onto the glass or polycarbonate window surface. To maintain 
adequate optical transparency a trade-off vs. surface resistivity has to be made, the result of 
which is an optimum of 72% optical transmission where surface resistivity is 10-14 Q 
/square [4-12], equating to a frequency dependent shielding value of 38 dB at 1 0Hz, 
reducing to 18dB at 18 0Hz. Fig. 4.10, from [4-12], shows this trade-off of transparency 
vs. resistivity. 
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Figure 4.9: Shielded Window Mesh Termination 
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Figure 4.10: Transparency vs. Surface Resistivity 
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Films are currently available in the range 76 pm -1 mm in thickness, with surface 
resistivities in the range 5-20 0/square and with optical transmission of 70-80% [4-17]-
[4-19]. This shows that, although 50 dB of shielding can be achieved through the use of 
silver-plated stainless steel mesh screens, such apertures form the highest microwave 
ingress routes in avionic boxes whose other apertures are suitably screened as described 
in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. To achieve the 80 dB levels required to protect internal 
circuitry, further internal shielding of the optical element of the avionics is required. 
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4.4.4 Discussion Of U.S. Research On Phenomenology Of Coupling 
King et al. in the U.S. have researched the phenomenology of 0.1-18 GHz EM coupling 
[4-2] and have conducted a number of experiments of microwave EM energy coupling 
through slots over the same frequency range [4-3]. A number of their findings, most of 
which are in agreement with work by Cabayan [2-251, are relevant to this research 
programme in the areas of determining airframe and avionic box attenuation and cavity 
resonance gains. These findings are discussed below: 
- The average field coupled to a probe behind a cavity-backed slot is up to 20.8 dB 
greater when the cavity is present, although the energy coupled is the same with or 
without the cavity. These findings are in line with the negative A A  values discovered in 
the avionic bay cavity investigations discussed in Section 4.2. Those values, 04 dB, 
are smaller than those seen by King and are consistent with the damping of bay cavity 
resonances by increasing insertion of materials within the cavity, a conclusion which is 
also supported by the lack of negative A A  values seen in the data sets from the modern 
aircraft measurements (see Table 3.1). For the King work only a single wire and 
miniature probe existed in the cavity tested, for the EMC demonstrator research the bay 
had approximately 40% loading by volume with box mounting and cooling trays, 
connectors and cabling, and air and fuel pipes, but with some six avionics boxes 
missing, see Fig. 3.1. The bays in the modem aircraft were likewise unpopulated with 
avionics boxes, but with a loading by volume of approximately 50%. It is thought that 
a similar damping of cavity resonances will apply to the avionic box case, i.e. the 
maximum 'gain' can be initially assumed to have a value of 3 dB, since avionics boxes 
tend to have loading by volume t90 1/o. 
- King reported coupling to a field probe inside a cavity-backed slot as insensitive to the 
position of the probe with respect to the slot. This would suggest that mode stirring 
during aircraft bay shielding measurements is not actually required. This does not 
agree with other work on mode stirring. King also noted that inside the cavity there 
appeared to be no radiation zone, and the whole volume is in the near field, but that 
with the slot only, Le. without the cavity, the pick-up decreased characteristically with 
the reciprocal of distance from the slot. This latter aspect is to be expected as the 
arrangement is behaving like a slot antenna. 
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- Placing a large cavity behind an ingress path, such as a slot, creates multitudes of 
sharply peaked cavity resonances resembling spectral noise. King also noted that when 
the aspect ratio of aperture (height/width) > 10:1, pronounced peaking (Q) occurs at 
resonance. This is seen to an extent in the aircraft bay investigations of Chapter 3, 
where the peripheral slots on every bay tested had ratios well above 10:1. 
- A wire in a cavity behaves like a long-wire antenna, with energy coupling response 
(antenna gain) decreasing as the reciprocal of frequency above first wire resonance, 
with cavity resonances adding a highly resonant structure to the measured load voltage. 
This will be seen in Chapter 5 to be consistent with the observations of this researcher 
and his former colleague, Price, on energy coupling to a wire entering a dummy 
avionics box. The exact frequency dependence is the subject of the modelling and 
empirical work of Chapters 5 and 6. 
- 15% lossy fill in a cavity backing a slot leads to a reduction of coupling, though not 
dramatic, La 5±3 dB above 1 0Hz. and 8±3 dB above 8 GHz. This is consistent with 
the RAM lining of bays investigation of Chapter 3, although in that research all internal 
walls but the face of the bay were lined, whereas for King's work only one piece of 
RAM was inserted, at the top of the cavity. Worthy of note also from King's work is 
that addition of a small piece of ferrite absorber on the wire in the cavity (with no RAM 
inserted) caused some change in the attenuation response shape, but little change to its 
overall amplitude: minimal <9 0Hz and C 5 dB for 9-18 (1Hz. Only by fully covering 
the wire with a ferrite sleeve could this be improved and then only increasing (with 
frequency) to 8 dB maximum at 18 (1Hz. This suggests that protection of circuitry 
within a box needs to be achieved by minimising the fields and currents reaching the 
inside of that box, rather than attempting to filter wires inside. 
Aperture shape and size determine shielding effectiveness, This is seen in the Chapter 3 
experimental work and is suggested by Grant's equations, see Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 
In supporting the comments in Section 4.2 on bay and box resonance 'gains', these results 
suggest that not only are these factors positive and potentially large (5-20 dB), but also that 
circuit elements within an avionics box may be subject to an average field independent of 
component location. This consequently suggests that the margin of safety for avionic 
upset at microwave frequencies may be lower than previously thought. 
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4.5 INGRESS VIA CABLES/CONNECTOR COMBINATIONS 
All conductors in an airframe act as receiving antennas, although due to position, 
orientation, length, and source and load impedances their efficiency can vary substantially 
with frequency and polarisation of incident fields. Most conductors concerned with 
avionics have extremely low efficiencies [2-17] and thus are unimportant as ingress paths. 
Those which have high efficiencies and/or resonate with the incident field can pose a 
significant upset risk to the avionic circuitry via wire-borne injection of microwave 
currents into circuitry and re-radiation of energy from the wires once inside avionic boxes. 
EM energy coupling from external fields to the airframe and cables within is at a 
maximum due to resonances for the cases where the lengths of either or both are multiples 
of 1 or of the RF energy. The maximum of these resonances usually occurs when 
airframe and/or cable length equals or ; which equate to length ranges of 75-150 mm at 
I GHz and 4.2-8.3 mm at 18 GHz. At these higher frequencies transmission losses in 
cables become more important, a topic which is covered in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Thus, as outlined in [2-17] (which represents current thinking in the U.K., U.S. and 
Europe), this means that significant coupling of energy occurs close to the box. For a 
given length of wire s when the frequency is increasing [2-17] states that the coupling is 
low when X 4s, maximum for X = 4s and at higher frequencies decreasing proportionally 
with X (i.e. with the reciprocal of frequency). This is reflected in the laboratory layout of 
box and transmitting antenna for the radiated susceptibility EMC qualification tests in the 
various specifications within Appendix B. U.S. and U.K. research [4-20], [4-21], [3-14], 
[3-20] and including that during this programme has, however, shown measurable pick-up 
at up to 3.05 in away from the load in a simulated avionics box. These data, which are 
more than the highest estimate of significant wire coupling of 2A [4-22] and equate in 
extremis to approximately 20X, questions the validity of using the 'rule of thumb' within 
the international EMC community that 1 is the maximum distance that significant 
coupling of concern to the potential upset of circuitry can occur. 
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4.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
From consideration of the elements of an overall equation developed to describe energy 
ingress to circuit device level, it is concluded that the aperture ingress route is dominant 
for both airframe and avionic boxes at microwave frequencies. It is also concluded that 
ingress through the case material of avionic boxes is negligible at these frequencies, but 
that cable pick-up may not be as relatively insignificant at microwave frequencies as 
previously thought by the international EMC community. Of the five factors in the 
equation developed there are two, airframe and box attenuation (which include the 
effective 'gains' caused by internal resonances excited by aperture ingress), which pose 
complex and time consuming modelling problems on even the most powerful computers 
available. These may thus lend themselves only to probabilistic determination. 
Equations exist to adequately handle aperture ingress where the shape of the aperture is 
regular, e.g. circular or slot. These do not suffice for complex shapes such as the 
peripheral slots of panels of which an avionic box may be manufactured, although energy 
ingress may be minimised in this case via the use of adequate gasketting material. Where 
gasketting is used, in conjunction with a cast or welded joint box and appropriately 
screened ventilation apertures, the primary ingress path is via the cable and connector 
route. 
It has been shown that the box material ingress route is minimal for avionic boxes that 
aperture ingress can be reasonably well predicted for most cases. Since no adequate 
models existed to describe energy coupling to cables at microwave frequencies, it was 
decided that this topic of cable and connector combination ingress should be critically 
examined to establish the true situation in this area. The outcome of this examination, 
covered in Chapters 5 and 6, enables quantification of its contribution to the A Box(f) term 
in the overall ingress equation described in Section 4.2. Examinations of possible ingress 
prevention techniques suggest that with adequate application of existing EMC shielding 
techniques, a significant amount of protection can be afforded to avionic circuitry at the 
avionic box, rather than airframe level. Techniques include the use of gasketting, 
including conductive plastic rubber compound and silicone-based conductive gaskets; 
depth, shape and size of waveguide ventilation slots; and finger seals or machined lipping 
or corrugations on box panel edges. 
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Chapter 5 
INGRESS VIA 
CABLES/CONNECTORS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
To assess the potential upset of normal operation of electronic circuitry contained within a 
conducting equipment case, two mechanisms must be considered: 
a) The dominant ingress mechanism; diffusion through the case material, aperture leakage 
or conducting penetrations. 
b) The susceptibility of the internal circuitry to conducted and radiated interference energy. 
To answer these questions it is necessary to quantif' energy ingress by the three routes, 
examine their frequency dependency, and draw a comparison. It was decided that cables 
and connector combination ingress would be examined in some detail first, since it is 
generally thought by the international EMC community, e.g. [2-17] that, due to the 
wavelengths (0.01-Im) and transmission modes involved, little energy will enter an avionics 
box via its cables, other than that coupled to those cables within 1 (0.5m maximum) of the 
box under consideration. As noted in Chapter 4 some U.S. and U.K. research [4-20], 
[4-21], [3-14], [3-20] and that during this programme has, however, shown measurable 
pick-up at up to 3.05m away from the load. To better understand the mechanism involved 
in this ingress theoretical models are needed. The first stage of this research was the 
development of a model for worst case coupling to an unscreened wire, based on equations 
derived by A.A. Smith Jr. [5-1] for coupling of EM energy to transmission lines below I 
GHz, and comparison with U.S., U.K. and BAe test results to examine the validity of its use 
above I Gllz. The second stage, reported in Chapter 6, covers investigations arising from 
the results of the first stage, involving 2-18 GHz experimentation using aircraft cable 
entering an avionic box and refinement of the model in the light of the measured data. 
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5.2 TRANSMISSION LINES AND THE 'TELEGRAPHIST'S EQUATIONS' 
With reference to transmission line theory, the following section covers the conversion of 
EM energy incident on a single wire above a ground plane into wire currents and thence 
into the terminal load voltage, VL.  Fig. 5.1 shows the equivalent circuit of a short section, of 
length dz, of a general, infinitely long two-wire transmission line. The line has distributed 
series impedance Z C] and shunt admittance Y Siemens per unit length. For steady state 
conditions, using complex notation, the general differential equations for voltage and 
current against distance are (for sufficiently small dz): 
dl 
For the lossless line case, as depicted with its equivalent circuit in Fig. 5.2, Z and Y in 
Eqns. 5.1 and 5.2 are replaced by L and C, the line distributed inductance and capacitance 
per unit length. Thus the differential length dz has an inductance Ldz and capacitance Cdz. 
By taking the partial derivatives of Eqns. 5.1 and 5.2 with respect to the elemental length dz 
and then cancelling the term dz, the voltage and current change along the line at any instant 
is given by Eqns.5.3 and 5.4, which are known as the 'Telegraphist's Equations'. 
av_ ,ar 
	 53 ii~
az_ 	 aV 
By differentiating Eqn. 5.1 and substituting in Eqn. 5.2 gives: 
d V y2 v 
where 
Figure 5.1: General Transmission Line 
I 	 Zdz 	 I+di 
It' V + dv 
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Figure 5.2: Loss-Less Transmission Line 
z 
The solution to Eqn. 5.5, which is a second order differential equation, is of the form 
V=V+e +V e z 
Then, from Eqn. 5], the corresponding solution for current is 
where 	
= = 	 = 	 iføC) 
The characteristic impedance, Z. , is in general complex, indicating that the voltage and 
current for a single travelling wave are not in phase. y is known as the propagation 
constant and is also generally complex: 
7=a+j3= fi5T 
 
so that if Eqn. 5.7 is re-written using a and f3 we have: 
V=V4er+Ve02eJfr 	
...(5.11) 
In this last equation a is the exponential attenuation (in nepers per metre) of the wave and 
is called the attenuation constant. The constant 0 is the amount of phase shift per unit 
length (in radians per metre) of the wave and is called the phase change constant. 
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5.3 CABLE/CONNECTOR INGRESS MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
5.3.1 Initial Model Development 
The bulk of practical data on avionic and electronic equipment upset between 1 MHz and 
some tens of GHz supports the premise that the higher the RF energy coupled to an 
electronic system, the more likely it is to be upset. Indeed, from other BAe work by this 
researcher, there appear few cases where this premise has been incorrect. Thus it is the 
maximum (i.e. worst case) voltage generated in the load inside the avionic box which is of 
most interest and which is to be modelled. To quantify this maximum VL  the specific case 
considered is where a plane wave is incident, perpendicular to the ground plane, with the 
electric field E parallel to the wire, thus providing maximum energy coupling to it from an 
incident plane EM wave. The circuit assessed is given in Fig. 5.3, where a wire of diameter 
a and length 's', is suspended at a height h' above the ground plane. The left hand 
termination impedance ZA is represented by a resistance, RA , in parallel with a capacitance, 
CA . Likewise the right hand termination impedance ZB, across which the RE-induced 
voltage VL  appears, is represented by a resistance, RB, in parallel with a capacitance CB 
This initial model does not consider the specific effects of parasitic capacitance of the 
connector interface, but takes them into account as part of the load impedance. The axes 
definition for this assessment is: x - perpendicular to the ground plane, y - perpendicular to 
wire, in the plane of the ground plane, and z - along the wire. From this definition and the 
statement above concerning the incidence of the wave front on the wire, it can be seen that 
/ the electric field is independent of y and z. 
Figure 5.3: Cable Coupling Model 
boxfcoimector 
single, unscreened cable 
Zlwd 
E(iocidenl) 
H 	 diameter,a 
Rn 	 I 	 Ca 	 : btht 	 Cb ± I IRb 	 I Load Voltage 
ground plane 
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The source and load impedances respectively are given by 
	
ZA
_______ 	 RBRA 
	
= I+J&?ACA 	 and ZR = I+JmRBCB 	 ...(5.12) 
where w = 2itf and f = frequency in Hertz. 
This configuration can be analysed, as detailed in Section 1.4 of [5-1], by considering the 
ground plane replaced by an image of the cable, its terminating impedances and the incident 
field, thus making it equivalent to an isolated, air-spaced twin wire line. For equivalence the 
isolated line spacing b = 2h and its terminations Z 1 and Z2 are equal to twice ZA and ZR 
respectively. The characteristic impedance of the wire above the ground plane (i.e. the wire 
and its image) is equivalent to the two wire, air spaced case as in Eqn. 5.9: 
!( JR 
- /R+jwL)  Z. - 
	
- 
...(5.13) 
where R, U, L and C are the resistance, conductance, inductance and capacitance per unit 
length of the line respectively. So, for the loss-less, air-spaced line Eqn. 5.13 reduces to 
z0 =J 	 ...(5.14) 
which, for the two wire, air spaced wire above a ground plane, results in 
Z0 = 120 ln(I) =276logt) 	 ...(5.15) 
where a = wire radius (m) and h = height above ground plane (m) 
The propagation constant, y, of a uniform transmission line is given in Eqn. 5.10, which can 
be expanded to: 
7 = T0)2 	 j(i +;&) (1 
 +) 
	
...(5.16) 
For higher frequencies, where coL >> R and wC>> G, y can be evaluated by using the first 
two terms only of the binomial expansion (1 +A)" = I +nX+ 
a 
jiz[ fG&)] 
= f(R J +GJi) Jw]Zë 	 ...(5.17) 
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So, equating real and imaginary parts, a and 0 are given by 
O FL 	 ) = Ry---1-- 	 nepers/metre 	 ...(5.18) 
3=Ji2Y = 22 radians/metre 	 ...(5.19) 
where X = and c = 2.997925 x JØS  ms'. On most lines, especially air-spaced ones, losses 
in the line due to the shunt conductance G are negligible compared with the conductor skin 
losses. Hence a can be simplified to 
a = fr nepers/metre 	 ...(5.20) 
To evaluate a, which is considered to be an important factor in the microwave band 
assessment, it is necessary to find the resistance per unit length of the line. This is found by 
examining the internal impedance of a plane conductor then applying this to the special case 
of a round conductor. This impedance value, for a single wire conductor, comprises a 
resistive term and an internal inductance. The wire materials under consideration are all 
conductors which satisf' Ohm's Law, 
J=cyE 	 ...(5.21) 
where 	 J = current density, Ani' 
a = conductivity, Sm' 
E = applied electric field, VmS' 
Substituting Eqn. 5.21 into the complex form of Maxwell's equation 
VxH =J+jcoD 
gives, since the electric flux density D = cE: 
VxH = (Cr +j(oc)E 	 ...(5.22) 
Since the divergence of the curl of any vector is zero, 
V.Vxll = (a -1-f(oc)V.E = 0 
Thus 	 V.D=p=O 	 ...(5.23) 
To derive the differential equation which determines field penetration into the wire, we take 
the curl of the Maxwell curl equation for electric field: 
VxErjwB 
and using the definition of permeability 	 B = ill = 
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where B = magnetic flux density, Tesla 
11= magnetic field, Am4 
V. = vacuum permeability, 4Ex 1 0 Hm1 
Jlr = relative permeability 
we have, using Vector Identity 7 of Lorraine and Corson [5-2], 
V x VxE = V(V.E) - V2 E =jco.tVxH 	 ...(5.24) 
Then by using Eqn. 5.23 and substituting Eqn. 5.22 in Eqn. 5.24 and neglecting 
displacement current, we have 
V2 E =jcoj.wE 	 ...(5.25) 
and likewise for current density 
V2 J jwPlaJ 	 .. (5.26) 
We now consider an infinitely deep conductor with a uniform field parallel to the 
conductor's surface. With the electric field vector in the z direction and assuming no 
variations with y or z, then Eqn. 5.25 becomes, 
2 r =J(U.LGE = t E 
where 	 t 2 =jwj.xo 
Since jj = 	 (taking the root with the positive sign), then 
- a 
...(5.27) 
(5.28) 
where 	
= 
	
...(5.29) 
and 8 = the Skin Depth, the depth at which the current has decreased exponentially to lie 
(36.8%) of its value at the conductor's surface. A complete solution of Eqn. 5.27 in terms 
ofö is 
-x 
E =E 0eTeT 
	 (5.30) 
where E. is the electric field at the conductor's surface and x is the distance into the 
material. Likewise the current density at a depth x in the material is given by 
-x -ft J2 =J0ee (5.31) 
where J. is the surface current density. This decay of current density with increasing depth 
into a conductor is depicted in Fig. 5.4. 
Figure 5.4: Current Decay in a Plane Solid Conductor 
The total current flowing in the plane conductor is found by integrating the current density, 
as in Eqn. 5.31, from the surface to an infinite depth. For a unit width 
Joo 	
...(5.32) = f'J2cfr = J cc0 J 0e (1 +j) 
The surface electric field is given by surface current density as 
J. 
...(5.33) 
Now, internal impedance for unit length and width is defined as 
...(5.34) 
By defining 	 Z, = R 3 +jcoL, then equating real and imaginary parts: 
...(5.35) 
and 	 uL,= 	 ...(5.36) 
Having examined the plane conductor case we now proceed to consider the round wire 
case, a conductor of circular cross section. Eqn. 5.26, the differential equation for current 
density, can be expressed in cylindrical co-ordinates as: 
d2J, 	 I 
...(5.37) 
_ 	 UI 
where t2 = 
—jcoxa or 	 t = Jwj._w =j--- 	 ...(5.38) 
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The differential Eqn. 5.37 is in the form of a Bessel equation and it can be shown, see p.179 
of [3-24], that 
Ber( .Ji r/s)+jBei( F2 rib) 
...(5.39) 
Bei( Ji roio)+jBei( .71 rom) 
where r0 = radius of wire and r = radius at which J. is calculated and 
Ber(JirIo) realpartof Jo&[,/rio]) 
Bei(Jir/o) imaginary part of j0fr4[ ikr/o]) 
These real and imaginary parts of the complex Bessel flrnction are tabulated in many 
references, e.g. [3-24]. A comparison of J. within the wire by the exact Eqn. 5.39 and that 
for a planar conductor, Eqn. 5.31, shows that, for high ratios of wire radius to ö, there is 
little error in analysing a wire using the latter equation. The actual and infinite parallel plane 
values of J. against wire radius are shown in Fig. 5.5, which shows that for high values of 
(wire radiusIslth depth) the difference between the Bessel fbnction solution and that 
using the infinite plane one is minimal for values of >7.55 (i.e. >1 MHz for 1mm copper 
wire). Ramo et al. note 'Thus, if ratio of wire radius to delta is large, it seems that there 
should be little error in analyzing the wire from the results developed for plane solids.' 
Calculations of 	 for 1 mm diameter copper wire 2 and 18 GHz yield 460.8 and 1382.3 
respectively, which are >>7.55 and adequately justify the use of the infinite plane equation 
for S in the model. 
Figure 5.5: Exact vs. Parallel Plane Comparison of Current Density 
0  
—FtAItI Mt —R.A€0.l Mt 
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The impedance of a round wire is found from the total current in the wire and the electric 
field at the surface. Now the current I is given by the line integral of magnetic field 
around the wire periphery: 
fu.dll=I or2mr0H+I01  =1 	 ...(5.40) 
Magnetic field is obtained from the surface electric field by Maxwells equation: 
VxE= —jcoi.LH 	 (5.41) 
The fields E. and 11+  alone are present in a round conductor with no variations in z or 4), 
and only r derivatives remain, so Eqn. 5.41 becomes 
H4 =j;;j! 	
...(5.42) 
It can be shown from the solution of Eqn. 5.37 that J. in a circular conductor is 
Jz = 
Using E = 	 we then have 	 E =EoJ
.J0(tr)  
(V) 	 .. (5.43) 
By substituting in Eqn. 5.42 and remembering from Eqn. 5.38 that r2 = —jcopn, 
114— 
- 
12 J,(tr) - aE 0  jo(tr) 	
...(5.44) jell J0(tr0) - - 
where J,(tr) represents [4j]Jo€rr) 
From Eqn. 5.40 	 I = - 2,tr0oE0 J0(tr0) 
 J0(tr0) 	 ...(5.45) 
and thus the internal impedance per unit length is 
'7. - EzIrroI - tJ0(v0) 	
...(5.46) 
- 	 I 	
- 2nr0aJ.,(v0) 
Solution for arbitrary frequency 
To solve Eqn. 5.46 for arbitrary frequencies we have 
jR, [Berq+jfieiq 1 
Z1 = R +JwL, = 
Ji0[Ber'q+serqj 
where 	 Ber' and Be!' are derivatives of Ber and Be! and 
Rs=g=J# andq=4 
5-11 
R = R, 
FBerqBei'q—BeiqBer'ql 	 Qm' 	 ...(5.47) or 	 L (Ber'q) 2-J-(Bei'q)2  J 
	
It, rBerqBea'q-iBeaqBer'ql 	
... (5.48) and 	 wL 1 = 	
(Ber'q)2-+(Bei'q)2 j 
High frequency solution 
At high frequencies, the complex argument tr0 is large. It may be shown that 	 0) 3 0(vo) 
approaches 
-j and the high frequency approximation to Eqn. 5.46 is 
- ______ - (l-) 	 (5 49 
- Jinro& - 2ur0ab 
or 	 R=wLa= 2 1 us 	 Qm' 	 ...(5.50) 
For the model under consideration r0 = 1 and a = i so Eqn. 5.50 becomes: 
The resistance of a wire above a ground plane, being the equivalent of a twin wire line, is 
thus given by 
MIL 
...(5.52) 
since, as shown earlier in this section, 
5= 1 =metres. 
Thence 	 can be expressed in terms of relative permeability and resistivity as 
R=1.66x1O 7 a 	 ...(5.53) 
where 	 PPrPc 
Pc = resistivity of Copper, Q-metre 
Pr = resistivity, relative to Copper 
= Ltol-tr 
= air permeability, 4,tx10 7 Hn11 
By substituting Eqn. 5.53 into Eqn. 5.20, we have 
a=8.3 x10 aZ0 	 nepers/metre 
5-12 
and by substituting for Z. , this gives 
a=3xlO ° 
alog10hJa nepers/metre = 2.6 x io a l 	 dBmS' 	 (554) og 10Wa 
Common and differential mode currents flow in a twin-wire and method of images 
consideration of a single wire over a ground plane, but only the differential mode current 
flows in the latter case. This is the only current which gives rise to a voltage in the load 
and is thus the only one considered here. The line can thus be considered to be excited by 
an infinite number of distributed small voltage generators along its length. If K(z) is the 
distribution then the elemental voltage across a given length of line, dz, is given by 
dV(z)=K(z)dz 	 ...(5.55) 
By reference to transmission line theory as expounded in Appendix E, Sections 4 and 5 of 
[5-11, the summation of the contributions from all the dV(z) voltage generators (i.e. 
integrating over the line length s) gives a current of 
Z0coshy(s-z)tZ2sinhi(s—z) 
10D 	 x J K(z)[Z 0cosh yz + Z 1 sinh yz]dz 
Z0cos1ryz+Z1sinh 
+ 	 z0D 	 xJK(z)[Z ocoshy(s—z)+Z 2 sinhy(s—z)]dz 	 ...(5.56) 
where 	 D=(Z 0Z 1 +Z0Z 2)coshys+ (z +z iz 2)sinhys 	 ...(5.57) 
and, resulting from the method of images, Z1 =2Z, ; Z2 =2Zn . The load current as a 
function of U) is then found by substituting z = s in Eqn. 5.56, giving 
I(s,(o)= JK(s,(o)[Z 0coshys+Z i sinhys]dc 	 ...(5.58) 
noting that, from the method of images, the differential current in a wire above a ground 
plane is twice that in an isolated, twin-wire case. This equation for the load current then 
becomes, by performing the integration: 
I(s,u) = [K(()[Z 0 sinhys+Z i (coshys— I)]] yD ...(5.59) 
Now K(z, @), which is the total electric field at a height h above the ground plane, is given 
by 
K(z, w) =E(h, z, o)—E(O, z, (o) 	 ...(5.60) 
where the first term is the incident field in the z direction at x = h, and the second term is 
that for x = 0. 
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Thus, at the ground plane (x = 0) E =0, and K(z, (o) becomes 
K((o) =Ewt a =Ee_Ee_ffih  =E(2j sin j3h) 	 ...(5.61) 
Finally, by substitution for K(w) and since VL(u) = I(z, D)ZB we have: 
= 	 [(2jsinI3h)E[Zosinhys+Zi(coshys— 1)]1] 
	
...(5.62) 
This equation forms the basis of the model and a computer programme incorporating the 
equation was designed and coded to allow investigation of the physical phenomenon of 
coupling and enable subsequent model refinement. 
5.3.2 Comparison Of Model Results With Initial Empirical Data 
To gain confidence in the model as an initial representation of a real cable, loaded at both 
ends, entering an avionics box, a direct comparison of the model with available empirical 
data was conducted. Each of the data sources is discussed, followed by presentation and 
discussion of the comparison. Price [3-14] performed 2-18 GHz EMC Laboratory 
measurements aimed at quantifying the maximum pick-up inside an avionics box. A 
dummy avionics box with a single 0.5m, open circuit cable was investigated, by irradiating 
it at five spot frequencies. The internal instrumentation of the box is shown in Fig. 5.6 and 
the general test layout in Fig. 5.7, showing the position of the transmit horn antenna 
relative to the box and cable, all inside the three-sided RAM enclosure. Transfer functions 
of 5.0 (maximum) and 0.16 (minimum) mV/mWnc2 with no obvious frequency 
dependency were derived from cable end voltage vs. estimated illuminating power density. 
Negligible difference in the voltages was seen between CW and pulsed radiation. 
Radiation pattern distortion when attempting to measure the external field necessitated this 
assumption that illuminating power density was equal to transmitter power minus feeder 
loss plus antenna gain. This distortion, resulting from using the relatively large antenna 
with the cable clearly in the near field (0.2m from the cable, necessary in order to achieve 
detectable voltages with the low power signal generator used) reduces the quality of the 
transfer function values. 
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Figure 5.6: Internal Instrumentation Of Dummy Avionics Box 
Figure 5.7: General Layout Of Initial RAe Cable Ingress Tests 
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Willis [3-20] irradiated a 2m single wire, loaded at each end by a 50 ohm load, at nineteen 
spot frequencies between 1 and 10.9 GH.z using a wide angle double-ridged waveguide 
antenna. In these EMC laboratory tests he observed a decrease in load voltage with 
increasing frequency and noted that, >1 (3Hz, pick-up was more pronounced when the 
transmitting antenna was illuminating the im of wire at the measurement end of the cable 
rather than the far end I m of cable. Ditton [4-21] examined the effects of variation of 
source and load impedance on the pick-up on a 0.6m cable at 3.0 and 9.1 (3Hz. He 
concluded that VL  did not appreciably change as a function of load, for the three load 
combinations tested. He also noted that an earlier U.S. cable coupling study [5-3] had 
shown that an unshielded cable had a maximum effective aperture close to that calculated 
for a dipole. In conducting fbrther tests of a 0.19m cable at 3.0, 5.6 and 9.1 (3Hz, he 
observed no increase in maximum pick-up. Both cables tested were longer than for the 
frequencies tested. Roe [4-20] irradiated a 0.61m and a 3.05m cable at eight spot 
frequencies in the range 120 MHz to 2 GHz, concluding that his results appeared to show 
VL to be independent of length, twist or routing. From this data Roe produced, by the 
method of least squares fit, an equation for load voltage: 
VL =Pg + 5.86— 10log,0(t) 2 + 101090(PD) 	 dBpV 	 ...(5.63) 
where PR  = Received Power (dBm) and PD = Incident Power Density (Wm 2). 
In arriving at values of source and load impedance for insertion into the model a typical 
circuit configuration was chosen, that of cascaded operational amplifiers. The 741 
operational amplifier is still widely used in modem military avionics, as are transistors of the 
BCI07 and BCY70 genre. Its input is based on the traditional long-tailed pair, using 
transistors with characteristics similar to the 2N930. The values used in the model, 7592 in 
parallel with 30 pF for Z A  and 9.8 MQ in parallel with 3 pF for ZB,  are typical values taken 
from published work [5-4]. The cable material chosen was 0.001 m diameter copper, to 
match that used in aircraft and most of the referenced earlier research. The length chosen, 
10 m, is typically the longest cable length in a fighter aircraft of length 15 m and wingspan 
14 m. A height above ground plane of 0.05 m was chosen, the value used in avionics EMC 
qualification testing (see Appendix B) and the value used by at least Willis. 
* Roe's equation did not match the data presented in the paper, and two errors were 
discovered which were notified to Roe. The revised equation appears here. 
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Fig. 5.8 shows the comparison between the empirical data of Price (BAe), Willis (U.K.), 
Ditton (U.S.) and Roe (U.S.). The Roe data is the maximum pick-up, estimated by adding 
the one sigma value of 5-6 dB to the data sets presented in [4-20]. Eqn. 5.63 is also 
included, extrapolated above 2 (3Hz, to explore the possibility of its use in the 2-18 (3Hz 
band as an initial indicator of maximum pick-up. The model output shows an approximate 
20 dB decrease per decade frequency similar to the other data sets, with a voltage 
spectrum envelope. The waveform, with its many deep troughs and marked amplitude 
variation over small frequency steps, is reminiscent of the Chapter 3 airframe attenuation 
profiles. 
Definitive comparison between the unlike data sets is not possible as the experimental 
configuration is not described for the non-BAe data, but trends have been identified and 
qualitative observations made. The gradient of the Willis and Price data is similar to the 
Roe equation, at approximately 20 dB decrease in VL per decade increasing frequency, L e. 
a i dependency. There is marked amplitude difference between the data sets, with a 
maximum difference of 33 dB (= a voltage ratio of 1995). The absolute amplitude is 
significantly different between the Willis and Price data, and between the Willis and 
1-2 6Hz Roe data, and the Roe equation can be seen to lie half way between the Willis 
and Price data. Based on the findings of the aircraft investigations it is probable that an 
erroneous picture of amplitude is given by these data sets, all of which are from spot 
frequency tests. Those pseudo-swept frequency measurements (see Section 3.3.1) showed 
significant resonances, some only 20 MHz apart, with adjacent values as much as 50 dB 
different and, as shown in Fig. 3.12, the test frequency resolution can appreciably affect 
the profile. It is thus considered likely that all the data sets in Fig. 5.8 are broadly similar 
and clustered more closely about the Roe empirical equation. 
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A further aspect which may well affect the comparison of the different measurement data 
sets with each other and with the model is the question of what source and load 
impedances, cable length, height above ground plane, cable material and incident power 
density were used by the non-BAe researchers. Wherever possible data has been 
normalised to I Wm 2 but many of the other parameters used by those researchers are 
unknown, thus preventing a true comparison and highlighting the need for further 
experimentation where modelled and controlled test data can be compared. 
5.3.3 Load Voltage Variation With Cable Length 
The main item of interest with respect to the coupling of microwave energy to cables is why 
pick-up is considered to be negligible at distances fhrther than from the load, irrespective 
of frequency [2-17]. The inadequate resolution of the existing data sets for adequate 
coupling characterisation led to the deferment of detailed investigation of the V 
dependency on cable length s until appropriate measured data was available; Chapter 6 
covers these subsequent investigations. 
The observation that detectable V L  had been seen for cables of length up to 3.05 m can only 
be reconciled with the 'negligible' opinion above, voiced in many papers (of which [2-17] is 
one of the more recent and authoritative applicable to the E.C.), if levels of V L potentially 
capable of causing avionic upset reach a plateau at 1 from the box and get no higher for 
longer cable lengths. For this to occur a mechanism would need to occur whereby energy 
coupled to the cable is absorbed and/or re-radiated. Absorption is a function of skin depth 
5, see Eqn. 5.29, and is covered in the lossy cable model. An extra term was thus proposed 
for the model, a 'Re-Radiation' term, R to explain the extra loss which would have to occur 
for s~: 1 . This term was postulated to arise from re-radiation of microwave energy from the 
cable as the microwave current flows down the cable. To provide an indicator for the 
development of R,  wire material effects on V 1 were investigated using the model. 5, which 
was thought to be an element in the additional term, is directly affected by the relative 
resistivity of the cable material (hr  =1 at these frequencies for conductors). Fig. 5.9 shows 
the effects of using eight different cable materials for the case where ZA  open circuit, i.e. 
comparable with the dummy avionic box tests reported earlier in this section, which were to 
be repeated with higher frequency resolution (see Chapter 6). Little change is seen in the 
overall envelope, but there is significant damping of the many resonances when using 
materials with high resistivity, e.g. steel. 
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Figure 5.9: Variation Of Cable Pick-Up With Cable Metal 
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5.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Many relevant parameters used by the researchers identified in Section 5.3.2 are unknown, 
thus preventing a true comparison between the available empirical data and with the 
model. Further experimentation was thus needed where modelled and controlled test data 
could be compared. From the data so far presented (including that in Chapter 3), a need 
was also identified for this experimentation to include a pseudo-swept frequency resolution 
investigation to: 
a) enable the adequate characterisation of coupling, where the measurement steps chosen 
are small enough to ensure all peaks and (of lesser importance) troughs are captured. 
b) obtain an upper bound on the V L  profile, normalised to unit incident power density. 
Examination of the outputs of the model and earlier U.K. and U.S. empirical data suggests 
an additional loss term, the general form of which is thought to be a multiplier fn(cable 
length), which: 
a) has a maximum value of I for a cable of 3.05m (the maximum length discovered by the 
author, during literature and other searching, for measured pick-up in this band), 
b) increases as a function of increasing frequency above 1 (3Hz, 
c) contains a re-radiation term, potentially operating along the whole cable length. This 
could be modelled by considering the cable as a number of small dipole elements, of 
length say , and ignoring ground plane effects initially. 
d) has a component dependent on skin depth, which in turn depends on the relative 
resistivity of the cable material. 
Chapter 6 addresses all the above through high resolution cable coupling measurements 
conducted for different cable lengths and the subsequent investigations using, and 
refinement of, the model. 
5-21 
Chapter 6 
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers investigations arising from the results of Chapter 5, the development of 
an initial cable coupling model and the comparison of results with available test data. High 
resolution (10 and 50 MHz steps), pseudo-swept 2-18 GHz measurements were conducted 
for an aircraft cable of different lengths entering an avionic box. Investigations were then 
conducted using the model. Use was made of the measured data leading to refinement of 
the model. These investigations aimed to determine: 
a) the validity of the model for predicting microwave coupling and an upper bound on the 
load end voltage, V L
, 
profile, normalised to unit incident power density. 
b) the maximum frequency step size for adequate characterisation of energy coupling, 
where the steps chosen are small enough to capture all peaks and troughs. 
c) whether measurable coupling occurs for cable irradiation at distances >1 remote from 
the load and, if so, to describe the dependency of VL  on cable length. 
6.2 VALIDITY OF MODEL AT MICROWAVE FREQUENCIES 
To determine whether the coupling model is valid >1 GHz ([5-1] covers !~ 1 GHz) it was 
necessary to demonstrate correlation between measured and modelled data. The modelling 
approach taken was to examine load impedance and cable material effects on VL,  to arrive 
at an adequate set of input parameters to the model which gave minimum difference 
between modelled and measured data. This allowed exploration of the possibility that the 
model may be valid >1 GHz in unaltered form. From this basis the subsequent modelling 
study of the cable length dependency and re-radiation postulation was conducted. 
6.2.1 Laboratory Investigation and Initial Comparison with Model 
To satis& the requirements of the investigation the test item chosen was the same dummy 
avionic box used in the earlier BAe work [3-14], see Fig.5.7. A 2m length of single core 
aircraft cable to PANAVIA Standard 6411 [6-1] was threaded through one of the 
connector's socket holes and soldered to the internal SMA connection in the same way as 
for the earlier tests, see Figs. 5.6 and 5.7. This length was chosen for three reasons of 
which the most important was that, with the exception of Roe's 3.05m tests [4-20], it was 
the same [3-20] or exceeded the lengths used by other researchers, [4-21], [5-3] and 
Anderson [6-2]. It also represents the maximum cable length within a large (0.5 x 0.5 x 
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1. 0m) avionics bay, which has cables which can be routed in any combination of directions 
(usually around edges). This length also enabled four sets of data for investigations of the 
dependency of VL  on length. 
Each data set comprised 2-18 0Hz pseudo-swept measurements for a number of 
illuminating antenna positions along the length of the cable, noting that the 3 dB beamwidth 
of the antenna used resulted in a 0. Sm illumination 'footprint' on the cable. The cable was 
shortened by 0. Sm after each set of measurements, i.e. data was acquired for cable lengths 
of 2.0, 1.5, 1.0 and 0.5m. Aircraft cable was chosen rather than the enamelled copper wire 
used by the other researchers (see previous paragraph) for realism and to enable direct 
comparison with the results of the earlier BAe research, which was conducted with a 0. Sm 
length of the same type of aircraft cable [3-14]. All of the measurements were conducted 
using CW microwave signals, with signal detection by a spectrum analyser. The test 
arrangement is shown in Fig.6. 1. The box and cable were arranged within a corner RAM 
pen in the screened EMC Laboratory with the cable positioned perpendicular to the box 
face and suspended above the pen floor with cardboard at intervals over the cable's fill 
length. Positioning marks were made on the supporting test bench at 0.25m intervals over 
the length of the cable, to ensure the boresight of the antenna was positioned at these 
distances from the box face. Marks were also made at 0. im intervals from 0. 1-O.5m for the 
last test, where the cable had been cut to 0. Sm. Throughout this chapter the terms 'near 
end' and 'far end' illumination refer to the perpendicular position of the antenna to the cable 
as annotated in Fig. 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: Cable Coupling Experimentation: Test Arrangement 
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The computer-controlled signal generation, irradiation system and measurement equipment is 
shown schematically in Fig.6.2. The synthesised signal generator used is an industry 
standard, with excellent frequency and amplitude stability, see Table 6.1, and very low 
residual FM characteristics. Likewise, the spectrum analyser had the best amplitude and 
frequency accuracy available, see also Table 6.1. The BAe test control software effected 
pseudo-swept frequency testing by instructing the signal generator to produce a signal of a 
specified power and frequency, then waiting for the spectrum analyser to perform a search 
for the peak, store the maximum and take a power measurement at that frequency prior to 
moving up to the next frequency. This 'settling' time per frequency step in the pseudo-sweep 
from 2-18 6Hz is that needed to ensure high quality measurements with the equipment used 
and was calculated as 2.36 seconds per frequency step. This differs from EMC qualification 
test requirements, see Chapter 3 and Appendix B, for avionics and aircraft to have exposure 
periods representative of real world RF environments and which are linked to potential 
avionic susceptibilities. Ref. [2-17] suggests exposure times of up to 2 seconds could 
realistically be expected, but limits test times thus '.. . exposure at any one test frequency 
should not exceeds seconds.' This is discussed fUrther in Chapter 7. 
Figure 6.2: Test Instrumentation 
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Table 6.1: Key Features of Signal Generator, Amplifier and Analyser 
HP 8672A: 2-18 GHz Synthesised Signal Generator 
* Worst case accuracy Power 1-1.5dB for 2-18 GHz 
Frequency 10 MHz (i.e. <0.5%) 
* Other key features Harmonics <-25 dBc 
Spurious <-70 dBc for 2.0-6.2 0Hz 
<-64 dl3c for 6.2-12.4 0Hz 
<-60 dBc for 12.4-18.0 0Hz 
Phase noise -100 dBc at 100kHz from carrier 
Output switching <20 ms (<10 ms typical) 
Stability ageing rate: 
	 <5 x 10' °/day 
temperature: <1 x 10' °/°C 
line voltage: 	 <5 x 10' °/(+5% to -10%) 
- 	 HP 834911: 2-20 GHz 100 mW (+20 dUm) Microwave Amplifier 
* Harmonics (at fUll output) <-20 dBc for 2-11 0Hz 
<-3odBcfor 11-20GHz 
* Spurious -50dBc 
* Noise Figure < 13 dB, typical 
- 	 HP 8566B: 100 Hz - 22 GHz Spectrum Analyser 
* Worst case accuracy Power ±3 dO 
Frequency <10 MHz (i.e. <<0.5%) 
* Other key features Drift <5 kHzlminute of sweep time 
Residual FM <-110 dBm 
Image Responses <-70 dBc 
Multiple Responses <-60 dBc 
Experimental limitations 
The mechanical set-up of the experiment, shown in Fig.6. 1, was well controlled, with 
accurate and repeatable antenna positioning along the cable under test established by 
positioning the tripod mast against the calibrated marks on the edge of the RAM-covered 
test benck The cable was parallel with the edge of the bench to within ±2.5 mm and, by 
carefUl positioning of the cardboard supports, was seen to have minimal droop (not 
measured but estimated to be less than 5 mm for all cases). Care was taken to ensure that 
the cable did not move during any of the measurements taken for each of the four lengths 
investigated. Measurement errors resulting from antenna angular re-positioning were 
minimised by conducting received signal peak search (whilst moving the antenna) at the 
commencement of measurements at each cable length. Instrumentation pick-up 
measurements, conducted twice during the investigations, showed none above the 
instrumentation system noise floor. With the exception of one data sample, which was at 
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the noise floor, all experimental results were >5  dB above the instrumentation noise floor 
and were thus considered valid. This validity was reinforced when the medians of all data 
sets were examined and each found to be at least 22.8 dB above the noise floor. 
Repeatability measurements, conducted for the calibration of the box-to-analyser cable and 
during the test cable pick-up experiment, established repeatability to within 3 dB. In all, 
including the above, 30 sets of data were collected. The test equipment in Table 6.1 
dominated the overall experimental error budget and this leads to an estimated maximum 
experimental error budget of ±8 dB. The measurements were conducted over RAM, 
simulating infinite height above ground plane, rather than at the 0. 05m height of most EMC 
specifications for three reasons. First, the repeatability aspect of this research dictated the 
same configuration as the earlier BAe investigations, which were conducted over the same 
type of RAM. Secondly, the SHF/EHF field-to-wire coupling model enhancement to 
IEMCAP by Brock et aL [6-3] showed that the maximum coupled current reached a 
maximum plateau at heights above the ground plane of greater than L. Finally, 
measurements in [6-2] supported this although, as noted by Taylor and Harrison [6-4] (who 
also agreed with the plateau conclusion) a discrepancy exists between [6-2] and [6-3] which 
they thought was due in part to difficulty in determining accurately the height variation in 
VL  at the low heights (3/8" and 2") reported in [6-2]. 
Discussion of Test Frequency Resolution 
The two key differences between these investigations and the earlier BAe research were the 
use of pseudo-swept rather than spot frequency measurements and the use of a different 
illuminating antenna and a discussion on these differences follows. An important factor in 
assessing whether the model is valid >1 GHz is the minimum frequency step size (referred 
to hereafter as 'resolution') necessary for adequate coupling characterisation. The choice of 
appropriate resolution is also important in practice as aircraft and avionics EMC 
qualification test time, and hence cost, is directly proportional to the resolution used. 
Carter et aL, who conducted the most recent airframe attenuation measurements, see 
Section 3.3.2.1, used 50 MHz steps as he did on an earlier helicopter investigation [3-21] 
where he noted 'The step size was a compromise between providing adequate frequency 
resolution and minimising test time.' The aircraft research reported in Section 3.3. 
suggested that a frequency resolution of <20 MHz would be required and for the first 
measurements taken, those of far end illumination of the 2m cable, a test resolution of 10 
* IEMCAP = Intrasystem EMC Analysis Program 
M. 
MHz was utilised. The test duration was 63 minutes, excluding the 2-10 to 10-18 0Hz 
changeover time (necessary because of data storage limitations of the test control software), 
which equates to an average 2.36 seconds each of the 1601 measurements. The second set 
were conducted with 50 MHz resolution to enable comparison with the 10 MHz set and 
with the similar data gathered with 20-500 MHz resolution during the Chapter 3 aircraft 
investigations, see Table 3.1. Fig.6.3 shows the comparison between the 10 MHz and 50 
MHz resolution data, with the two data sets offset by 10 dB for visualisation. Fig.6.3 also 
shows the same behaviour, similar to a low Q resonant cavity, as seen during the aircraft 
research (Section 3.3.1), with many closely spaced peaks and troughs. Fig.3. 12 showed 
that the received signal envelope increased as the resolution used decreased from 500 M1-lz 
to 100 MHz and thence to 20 MHz. This effect can be used to determine the minimum 
resolution necessary for adequate characterisation, i.e. the resolution where the increase in 
the envelope <1.5 dB (the analyser accuracy). The delta increase in envelope between the 
higher and lower of pairs of adjacent test resolutions is shown in Fig.6.4. This shows that 
the increase in envelope reduces with decreasing resolution and graphical examination of 
the aircraft data trend shows that for 10 MHz resolution, which was not used in the aircraft 
investigations, the further increase in envelope size can be estimated at 1.6-2.6 dB. This 
agrees with the cable data which shows a 2.9 dB increase in envelope when using 10 MHz 
compared to 50 MHz resolution. 
Figure 6.3: Comparison of 50 MHz and 10 MHz Measured Data 
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Figure 6.4: VL  Envelope Magnitude vs. Test Frequency Resolution 
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An interesting aspect noted during this examination of the aircraft data supporting Fig.3.12 
and Table 3.1, and the cable data of Fig.6.4 was that the median and lo values for the data 
sets being compared were within 0.3 dB of each other, with the maxima and minima 
increasing by almost equal amounts. Following consideration of the trade-off of possible 
error in the profile with resolution vs. constraining the experiment's duration within practical 
limits, the remainder of measurements were conducted with 50 MHz resolution. The above 
suggests that the optimum resolution for characterisation of microwave coupling, i.e. where 
the error in VL  envelope is <1 dB, lies no more than an order or two below 10 MFIz. This 
knowledge was passed [6-5] to Barber and Rayment, the only other two U.K. researchers 
known to be examining potential microwave upset of circuitry, who were using coarse (250 
and 100 MHz) resolution in their work [6-6], [6-7]. The use of <10 MHz resolution is 
explored using the cable coupling model later in this chapter. The potential effect of mode 
stirring, see Section 3.3.2.1, on the conclusion to use 50 MHz resolution was examined. 
Figs. 9-11 of [3-21] shows that many of the maxima of the 2-18 GHz airframe attenuation 
(A,) measured are removed (without stirring = 30 dB; with stirring = 20.8 
dB), giving a pessimistic view of the aft enuation available. A similar effect, if present for the 
coupling of energy to a cable entering an avionics box, could lead to the artificial depression 
of VL  maxima, apparently increasing the safety margin of correct circuit operation in a given 
power density. This aspect warrants further study. 
illuminatinE Antenna 
Section 5.1 of [3-14] notes that the power density measured at 0.2m from the EMCO 3105 
antenna, i.e. the antenna-to-cable spacing, was quite different to that theoretically predicted 
and that the reason was distortion of the antenna's radiation pattern [as the cable was well 
within the 7. 14m far field boundary of the antenna]. The close proximity of the antenna (the 
only one available at the time) to the cable, accentuated in Fig. 5.7, was necessary to enable 
measurable VL. For this chapter's investigation a different antenna was needed, one which 
would enable measurable VL  with the amplifier power available with the cable in the 
antenna's far field, and with a <0.5m illumination 'footprint' on the cable. The antenna 
chosen was the smaller AEL H-1498, a double-ridged waveguide 2-18 GHz horn antenna. 
Table 6.2 compares the features relevant to the investigation: 
Table 6.2: Comparison of AEL H-1498 and EMCO 3105 Antennas 
3 dB 
Beamwidth 
Gain Size_(cm) 
 Aperture 
Far Field 
 at 2GHz 	 at 18GHz 
Footprintt 
(degrees) (dBi) H W D (m) (m) (m) 
AEL: 45 6. 1-12.5 7.3 12.5 9.8 0.21 1.88 0.51 
EMCO: 53 7.5-21.5 15.8 24.4 27.9 0.79 7.14 0.2 
* Footprint on cable at distance used in investigations. 
The tripod-mounted transmitting antenna was arranged so that the boresight was 
approximately 45 1 
 down from the horizontal but perpendicular to the cable, with horizontal 
polarisation to maximise energy pick-up on the cable and minimise extraneous reflections 
from areas of the EMC Laboratory without RAM screening. The initial visual boresighting 
of the antenna with the cable at 1 m from the avionic box, was followed by spectrum 
analyser peak searching to enable maximum attainable illumination power density and hence 
VL. The antenna face to cable distance was measured at 0.615m, i.e. in the antenna far 
field. 
Measurements 
Starting with the antenna illuminating the far end of the 2m cable, 2-18 GHz measurements 
were made. The antenna was then moved 0.25m closer to the box face and the 
measurements made again. This was repeated in 0.25m steps to 0.25m from the box. 0.5m 
of cable was cut off and the measurement cycle repeated, this time from 1.5 to 0.25m. This 
was repeated for a cable length of I .Om. Finally, for a 0.5m cable length, measurements 
were taken in 0. lm steps from 0.5 to 0. im. Noise floor measurements were taken to ensure 
that the cable test data was sufficiently above the noise floor (>6 dB) to be considered valid 
measurements. Instrumentation pick-up checks were conducted at the start and finish of the 
investigations using a 500 load connected to the spectrum analyser feeder cable inside the 
box instead of the cable under test and repeatability measurements were also made. 
Data Processing 
Power P, in dBm, was measured using the spectrum analyser. This data needed treatment 
to convert it into VL  in dB1iV at the 'load in the box (i.e. at the bulkhead 500 connector 
between the aircraft cable and the spectrum analyser cable), normalised to an incident 
power density of 1 Wm 2. This treatment comprised compensation for amplifier power 
output variations and transmit antenna gain vs. frequency characteristics, and for losses in 
the box-to-analyser received signal cable. The treatment, detailed below, was conducted 
partly on the Hewlett-Packard test control computer and completed, after data translation 
to PC-DOS format, on a DX2-50 PC, where the data analysis and modelling investigations 
were conducted. The transmitter power vs. frequency, PT, as measured at the antenna 
feeder output, see Fig. 6.2 (L e. output of the signal generator, power amplifier, three cables 
and an in-line connector) was measured using the spectrum analyser with a 30 dB 
attenuator on its input. The antenna gain vs. frequency, GT,  was taken as the measured data 
provided by its manufacturer. The loss vs. frequency profile of the received signal cable, 
LR, was measured using the signal generator and spectrum analyser. The incident power on 
the cable, P,  is given by 
PC ERP (in dEm) - (PT + 30)GT = (PT + 30)GT (dBm/m2) 	 (6.1) 
= 	 47rr2 	
- 4m(0.615) 2 	 4.7529 
The power in the 50Q load in the avionics box, P LI  is that measured by the spectrum 
analyser (PR)  minus 
 LR.  Its normalisation to 1 Wm 2 (+30 dBm/m2) and conversion to V L 
into 500 is given by Eqns.6.2 and 6.3: 
PL = (PR - LR) + ( lolog(4.7529) + 30-(PT + 3O)GT dBm 
VL =20 log[106J10 	 x 10 x 501 
The 2-10 and 10-18 GFIz data sets were then concatenated. 
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Repeatability and Comparison with Other Researchers' Data 
To enable comparison with the BAe spot frequency measurements of Section 5.3.2 and with 
data by other researchers, the maximum, minimum and median profiles vs. frequency were 
statistically generated from the measured VL  data sets. Fig.6. 5 contains a comparison of the 
measured data with that from Section 5.3.2 and clearly shows the good repeatability 
achieved. Only the 18 GH.z spot value (whose error budget was ±10 dB) lies outside the 
swept frequency profiles, by 3.5 dB, and this is within the ± 8 dB error budget applicable to 
those profiles. 
Figure 6.5: Measured VL  Statistics and Earlier BAe Spot Measurements 
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The measured data was compared to that by Anderson [6-2], who conducted a similar 
experiment, but where source and load impedance were 50Q. He also notes the highly 
resonant load voltage profile reported here, but presented the upper and lower bounds 
(calculated in the same way as for Fig.6.5) to his measured data in [6-2] rather than any 
actual results. Fig. 6.6 shows the comparison of this researcher's minimum and maximum V L 
profiles with those of Anderson. The amplitude profiles are comparable, noting that the 
10-20 dB differences in maxima are probably due to the differences in experimental 
configuration, in particular, cable length. This aspect is examined later in this chapter using 
the coupling model. 
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Figure 6.6: Comparison of Pywell and Anderson Cable Results 
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Upper Bound on VL  Profile 
Fig.6.7 shows the maximum VL profiles obtained by this researcher, Anderson, Willis [3.20] 
(spot frequencies) and Ditton [4-21], who conducted measurements at 3.0 and 9.1 GHz. 
Ditton investigated inter alia the effects of coupling to one of a twisted pair of un-shielded 
wires, of length 0.6m, with different source and load impedances and with the other wire 
grounded at each end. An important finding was that the maximum VL measured did not 
vary appreciably, at most 3.7 dB, as a function of load impedance, and maximum and 
minimum values are thus shown in Fig.6.7 to show this effect. Fig.6.7 also contains an 
extrapolation of Eqn.5.63 to examine its applicability above 2 GHz. 
The dependency of the data sets in Fig.6.7 per decade frequency are comparable, from 20.0 
dB (Eqn.5.63), through 20.6 dB (2-8 GHz) to 29.7 dB (8-18 GHz) (this researcher), to 
33.4 dB (Anderson). The Willis spot frequency data follows the Anderson line and is 
assumed to have approximately the same frequency dependence. The slope of the four 
profiles equates to a to 
	 dependence, which agrees with [6-2] where the observed bare 
wire slope of approximately 30 dB/decade was attributed to the effective aperture () 
characteristic of electrically long wire antennas (20 dB/decade frequency) and end effects of 
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V 
70 
GD 
so 
6-12 
the connector and transition to the 50Q load used. The measurements in [4-21] concur, 
indicating that the maximum effective aperture of such a wire is approximately the same as 
a half-wave dipole at microwave frequencies. However, [64] (reporting on [6-3]), notes 
that the predicted maximum coupling decreases with frequency as 1 , which is not supported 
by any of the measured data considered herein. 
Figure 6.7: Maximum VL  Amplitude Profile 
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Analysis of this researche?s high resolution empirical data has shown (see also the earlier 
discussion on Test Frequency Resolution) that up to 14 dB of amplitude error could be 
applicable to the other three data sets on Fig.6.7, as a result of under-sampling (which is 
usually random in nature, rather than frequency dependent). Correction for the 
under-sampling could result in the slope of the Anderson and Willis data approximating to 
this researcher's profile, but the correction is not possible with the available data. It is 
concluded from this analysis that un-screened wire coupling has a frequency-banded 
dependency of 20 dB/decade up to 8 GHz and 30 dB/decade for 8-18 (3Hz. The measured 
data also supports the use of Eqn.5.63 as an initial coupling predictor of maximum coupling 
up to 8 GHz and, with modification to change the slope to 30 dB/decade frequency, from 8 
to 18 GFIz. The possibility exists that this modification could be valid above 18 (3Hz and 
further research would be required to confirm this. 
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Model Validation 
An essential part of the modelling of microwave energy coupling to a cable conducted has 
been the modification and validation of the model at each stage of its evolution as the 
research has proceeded. Rigorous manual calculations were conducted on each of the 
modules when first coded during the software design prior to validation tests. The final 
validation tests comprised direct comparison with Figs. 2-11 and 2-17 of [5-1]. To enable 
this the model was modified to reflect the twin transmission lines in these figures. The 
initial validation showed the model outputs to have maximum amplitudes 3 dB higher than 
the [5-1] figures. This was investigated and the reason found to be an error in Eqn.2-15 of 
[5-1]. The model follows [5-1] in this area, with Zo being calculated thus: 
Z. =276*log () =276*log 
 L' 	 ...[5-1] Eqn.2-15 
where a = wire diameter, h = wire height above ground plane, h = b/2 	 ...[5-1] Eqn.2-13 
where b = conductor spacing of equivalent isolated twin wire transmission line. On further 
inspection and investigation of this aspect it can be seen that an error exists in [5-1], as 
Eqn.2-13 (p.31) states h=b/2, but Eqn.2-15 (p.31) states 2b/a = h/a, or h=2b, a factor of 4 
different, explaining why an input of four times the height above ground plane produced 
the correct value of Zo. Eqn.2-1 5 of [5-1] should therefore be 
Z. =276*log () =276*log () 
The error is an isolated case, with all subsequent [5-1] equations and graphs inspected being 
correct.' This error had affected all modelling canied out up to this point, Le. including all 
connector impedance, cable material and some of the cable length dependency 
investigations, and led to (at most) an increase in V L of 3 dB. With this modification 
incorporated and with input parameters set appropriately to match each of the lines on the 
two [5-1] Figures, a number of model runs were conducted. A revised number of points 
was used, 4000 per frequency sweep, equating to 25 kHz steps for Fig.2-17 and 250 kHz 
steps for Fig.2-1 1, higher resolutions than proposed in Section 6.3.2 for that necessary for 
adequate characterisation of microwave energy coupling to avionics bays, cables and 
circuitry. The model outputs were overlaid on the appropriate [5-1] Figure and these are 
presented as Figs. 6.8 and 6.9. 
* Smith, the author of [5-1], has been notified of this revision. 
6-14 
Figure 6.8: Smith Figure 2-11 vs. Modelled Response 
Figure 6.9: Smith Figure 2-17 vs. Modelled Response 
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Good correlation can be seen between the three modelled data sets and the three lines on 
[5-1] Fig.2-11. It can be seen that the original Figure omitted (probably for clarity) the 
Z1=Z2=192 line above 30 MHz and, of more relevance to this research, the Z1=10 5 0, 
Z2=10 line, where no data is presented above 250 MHz. The modelled data shows that the 
former line continues to I GFIz, as expected from inspection of the equation. In addition, 
the one discontinuity on the latter line is seen to actually be a series of discontinuities of the 
same profile as those discussed in Section 6.2.2, thus confirming the suspicion that this 
aphysical response, which does not occur in any aircraft or laboratory microwave coupling 
measurements seen to date, is a feature of the basic transmission line equations used in 
[5-1]. Good correlation can also be seen between the modelled and [5-1] Fig.2-17 for the 
lossless and steel conductor cases. The differences between the lossless lines at 50-60 MHz 
is believed to be an error on the Smith figure in that this part of his curve is not 
symmetrical with the 3040 MHz portion of the same line. A similar problem can be seen 
on the Smith steel conductor data line between 60-80 MHz. This is reinforced by 
examination of [5-1] Fig.2-18, where the peaks and nulls profile of lossless and steel cable 
is symmetrical for each line and both data sets are synchronised in profile. The small 
amplitude and profile difference in the nulls is attributed to differences in the relative 
permeability and resistivity of the steel used in the model. The values in [5-1] are not 
stated, whereas the model uses the maximum values for steel in [5-1] Table 1-1. 
6.2.2 Load Impedance Effects 
The load impedance Z 8, across which VL  is developed, was expected to be a major factor in 
matching modelled to measured data. Ref. [6-3] noted how impedance was one of the most 
sensitive parameters in transmission line-based models (e.g. LEMCAP and Eqn.(5.62)). For 
the configuration tested, with the 501] dominating ZB, large changes in '1L  were not 
expected for small variations in other components of Z 5. This was demonstrated in [4-21] 
where six load impedances were examined, from 55+j75f), through 500 to 88-j550, and 
at most 3.7 dB difference was seen in VL. 4, representing the connector, the box internals 
and parasitics in between the connector, case and wire, is shown in Fig.6. 10. It comprises 
the spectrum analyser input (which has negligible C and L), the short semi-rigid cable to 
the box internal bulkhead connector, and the connector assembly through which the cable 
passes (see Fig.5.6). The connector assembly and semi-rigid cable can be considered to be 
equivalent to a lumped circuit model comprising series Lb, shunt R and shunt C with series 
R< ,,. Variations in each of these parameters were investigated in turn. It is assumed that 
MV 
CABLE 	 CONNECTOR 
SPECTRUM 
ANALYSER 
impedances match at each of the physical interfaces, e.g. at the wire to semi-rigid 
waveguide bulkhead. This is justified in this research as any mismatch reflections would 
most probably reduce VL  (i.e. lessening the risk of circuit upset), although there is an 
unlikely possibility that the resonances cause°d could enhance VL  at the expense of 'L 
Figure 6.10: Lumped Element Model of Connector and Load 
Lb 
For the initial modelling the circuit configuration was as in Fig. 5.3, with the load impedance 
comprising 500 (spectrum analyser input) with zero Cb and the source impedance 
represented an open circuit cable by a very high Ra (10MQ) with a shunt Ca. Cable 
diameter was set at 1mm and height above ground plane at 0.51m (3X at 2 GH.z and t30A 
at 18 GHz; noting from Section 6.2 that maximum VL saturates for h>). For this 
arrangement the model outputs were compared with 50 MHz measured data for variation in 
Ca of 0-10 pF and 0.5 pF gave the closest match. The first element examined was the 
variation of Cb, with all other elements but the 50 Rb set to zero. Cb was varied between 
0-10 pF in 2 pF steps to identil' any trends in modelled VL.  The 2 pF profile was shown to 
be nearest to the measured data and fI.trther modelling at either side of 2 pF showed the VL 
profile to reduce in amplitude. This value was thus chosen for the remaining investigations. 
The shunt resistance R was then varied over the representative range 100 kO - 100 MO. 
Trivial calculations show that, due to R shunting the 500, 
'1L  is insensitive to variations of 
R in this range. The model was modified to enable input of R cAP in series with Cb and a 
series inductance Lb, see Fig.6. 10. In practice 0cR,<0. 10 and, with Lb=0 nH and the 
other terms as previously stated, VL  dependency on R, was examined for 0<R.,<0. 100 
in 0.020 steps. The modelled VL showed a decrease of (at most) 0.018 dEpV, which is 
considered negligible, and R,, was set to zero for the remaining modelling. Finally, with 
R=R< ,=092, Lb was varied between 0-5 nH, the range for a short piece of the semi-rigid 
coaxial cable. Fig.6. 11 shows the difference between V L(maximum), which occurs for Lb=5 
nH, and the 0-4 nH data. It shows that in this case V L is 5.5 dBgV higher than for Lb=0 nil 
at 2 GHz, reducing to 1 dBpjV higher at 5 GHz. Above 5 GHz there is less than 1 dB 
difference for 0<Lb<5 nil. A comparison of the measured data with the model output, for 
Cb = 2 pF, R=R,= 0 and Lb = 5 nil, is given in Fig.6. 12 which shows the modelled and 
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measured maximum VL profiles to be within 10 dB, but that there is substantial difference in 
frequency and amplitude content. 
Figure 6.11: VL  Dependency on Series Inductance in Load 
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Figure 6.12: Modelled vs. Measured 50 MHz Data 
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6.2.3 Cable Material and Construction 
To achieve a match between measured and modelled results, having determined Z A  and 4 
representative of the experimental configuration, it was necessary to examine the cable used 
during the experiment to ensure the correct inputs were used in the model. The cable used 
in the laboratory investigations was type DPOI2 to specification [6-I], manufactured by 
British Insulated Cable Company. This cable has a single insulated conductor and is often 
used on modem military aircraft. Aircraft cable, rather than enamelled copper wire as used 
by the other researchers referred to in this Chapter, was chosen for realism. For flexibility 
the conductor comprises 19 individual cores, each of 0.3mm diameter, which are helically 
stranded together to give a nominal MI conductor diameter of 1.45mm. This overall 
conductor is then lap wound with insulation tape, with 67-69% overlap, of Du Pont 
KAPTAN FEP, i.e. 0.001' polyamide with 0.0001" each side of Fluorinated Ethylene 
Propylene (FEP). This is then over-wrapped with white PTFE tape with a PTFE lacquer 
top coat, giving a total cable diameter of nominally 2.00mm (the sample used was 2.00mm 
as measured with a vemier calliper). For a perpendicular cut through the cable there are 
thus three layers of KAPTAN (cr=3. 1) and a single PTFE over-wrap (8r2.0), of total 
radial thickness 2751im and forming a dielectric sheath. The impact of this potentially lossy 
sheath was not considered since, as previously stated, this research concentrates on 
derivation of the maximum VL  to be encountered at a potentially susceptible component. 
There is a possibility that it contributes to the loss term covered in Section 6.3.2 and this 
forms a topic for ftzrther study. The conductor construction was considered to determine 
any changes necessary to the inputs to the model, as up to this point a non-stranded, 1mm 
diameter copper conductor had been assumed. The cross-section of stranded cables is 
described in Dummer and Blackband [6-8] and Fig.6.13 shows the arrangement for the 19 
core conductor used. 
Figure 6.13: Arrangement of Cores in Stranded Conductor 
19 CORE 
BUNDLE 
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Each core in the cable used is nickel-plated copper, for environmental protection, with a 
minimum plating thickness of 1.3 p.im. For the model the connector bundle in Fig.6. 13 can 
be represented as a single copper core plated with nickel on the outside only. This is 
justified in [6-8] where it is noted that at frequencies where skin effect is prominent (as is 
the case for 2-18 GHz) the current in the cores may be considered as concentrated on the 
surface. Ref [6-8] also notes that for all but the most accurate computations it is 
permissible to neglect the effects of helical lay on Z. and C, L and per unit length. This is 
because the effects of the elliptical cross-sections (of the cores due to twisting) and internal 
inductance are small, of the same order and opposed in sign. By manipulation of the 
cross-sectional areas of the 19 cores and the plating area on each, an equivalent single core 
conductor diameter of 1.3077mm and the nickel plating thickness of 5.647pm are 
determined. This is interesting as the skin depth for nickel can be calculated using Eqn.5.29 
to be 3.316pm (2 GHz) to 1105pm (18 GHz). Since the minimum plating thickness is 
5 647pm, all the microwave current flows in the plating material, rather than some in the 
plating and the remainder in the copper core. Thus, for the model, the conductor can be 
assumed to be wholly nickel, whose Pr=S.OS.  A 10 MHz resolution model run was 
conducted for a 2m nickel cable of diameter (1.3077mm + 2*5.647p m=) 1.3191mm with 
the remaining inputs as derived in Section 6.2.2, see Fig. 6.14. The maximum of the 
measured data was 104.4 dB and that of the modelled data was 104.5 dB, representing the 
best correlation of measured and modelled data so far. 
* The error in [5-1] discussed in Model Validation was discovered late in this modelling 
phase, but all the figures presented in this chapter use the corrected model. 
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6.2.4 Comparison With 10 MRz Sampled Measurements 
The preceding Sections have described the validation of the model and the determination of 
representative termination impedances and cable parameter& Comparison of the model 
with the one set of 10 MHz resolution measured data, see Fig.6. 14, reveals a level of detail 
not seen before in published literature. 
Figure 6.14: 10 MFIz Modelled vs. Measured Data 
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Prior to investigating the re-radiation postulation as the reason for the diminishing V L  seen 
with reducing cable length and increasing antenna distance from the box, three aspects arise 
from inspection of Fig.6. 14. These are the three deepest nulls at 5, 10 and 15 0Hz, the 
difference in oscillation frequency spacing between measured and modelled data, and the V L 
envelope difference between them. The nulls, which are evident in all the modelled data but 
do not occur in practice, were investigated by model runs at resolutions decreasing in steps 
to 20 kHz. By using scatter rather than line graphs, it was observed that only one value at 
each frequency lay below 0 dBpiV (at -112, -119.4 and -122.6 dB1jV for 5, 10 and 15 0Hz 
respectively). By conducting a further 1001 point (2mHz resolution) model run centred on 
5 0Hz, a number of data points were seen below 0 dBxV, but only one point below -75 
dB1iV, again highlighting interpolation by the analysis computer and plotter as a major 
contributor to this erroneous picture. Examination of Eqn.5.62 shows that VL  will oscillate 
according to the sin(j3h) term in the numerator, giving rise to deep nulls and peaks. Ref 
[6-4] concurs with the observation that these nulls are an aphysical function of the model's 
base equations. To compensate for this, an estimate of the actual minima of the deep nulls 
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was made for the data set of Fig.6.14 as 38, 25 and 20 dBpV for 5,10 and 15 GHz 
respectively. A lower limit to the sin(f3h) term was arrived at by sequential approximation 
to these VL  values, ensuring that the term did not change the other values in the data set by 
>0.05 dBpiV. This term in Eqn.5.62 (reproduced here) was modified, see Eqn.6.5, and 
incorporated in the model. 
VL(c)) = 	 [(2jsin 3h)E[Z 0sinhys + Z i(coshys - 1)1] 	 . ..(5.62) 
	
(sin(f3h) + sgn(sinh)) x 0.006) 	 . ..(6.5) 
where 'sgn' denotes whether the function is positive or negative. 
The modified model successfiully removed the deep nulls, increasing the profile's similarity 
with the measured data. Verification of no adverse effects of this change was conducted by 
six model runs, at different heights in the range 1 Smm<h<0.9m, which also served to 
confirm the earlier researchers' findings that V L does not increase for increasing cable 
heights above the ground plane of h>, see Section 6.2.1. This also enabled examination of 
the frequency spacing difference between modelled and measured data seen in Fig.6.14. 
The Isin(f3h)I term of Eqn.5.62 causes the oscillations and, whilst the V L  amplitude does not 
increase for h>, its frequency spacing, is given by: 
	
I3hic, which isf= c 	 . . .(6.6) 
This can be seen in Fig.6.15, which shows the profiles for h=0.51m (3.4A at 2 0Hz, 30.6X 
at 18 0Hz) and h'0.9m (6X at 2 0Hz, 54?. at 18 0Hz). 
Figure 6.15: Effect of Cable Height on Frequency Spacing of Oscillations 
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Inspection of the measured cable data for Fig. 6.14 shows that the frequency spacing of 
nulls is 400 MHz, with ± 10 MHz variations between 2-18 0Hz, and that the model's 
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spacing (h=0.51m) is 294 MHz. The model input of h was changed to 0.375m, the value 
calculated using Eqn.6.6 for 400 MHz spacing. Fig.6. 16 shows the resulting comparison 
between the 2m measured data and the model outputs, demonstrating good frequency 
correlation, but with a residual amount of null positioning error. Closer examination of the 
measured profile gives the spacing as 416 MHz, i.e. h=0.3605m, with Ia = 45.5 MHz. 
Further study of this aspect, with laboratory tests at a number of heights over a ground 
plane, is required if this Vdependency is to be hilly understood. 
Figure 6.16: Comparison Using Modified Height Input to Model 
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Comparison of Fig.6. 16 (10 MHz resolution) also showed for the first time that the model's 
output oscillations could also be seen in the measured data. Fig.6. 12, in common with all 
the data sets taken with 50 MHz resolution, does not show this detail. For 10-16.4 (3Hz in 
Fig.6. 16, 16 cycles occurred in the modelled data and 13 clearly visible cycles in the 
measured data (none were discernible for 10-11 (3Hz). The peak-to-null median values 
were for modelled data: 44.5 dBEIV and for measured data: 16.5 dBpiV, a difference of 28 
dB. The model's peak-to-null magnitude is determined by resistive cable losses, the result 
of a (a junction of 1J ,  Jiiand ]j, see Eqn.5.54). Fig.6.9 (lOm length) and [5-1] 
Fig.2-18 (lOOm length) show the difference between a matched steel line, where a is 61.7 
times that of copper, and the lossless case. A decrease in peak-to-null magnitude for the 
steel case is shown, with the magnitude also reducing with frequency, since a increases 
with B This is pronounced for the lOOm case, as a is in dBni', with the oscillations 
totally suppressed at 100 MHz. The possibility that the difference was caused by an 
increased a was explored via 2m cable model runs, with h'0.3605m (as calculated on the 
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previous page) and four cable material inputs: lossless, copper (p T =l, Rr=D,  nickel (Pr 
505, Rr=l) and steel (pr12.7, J.tr=1). Fig.6.17 highlights two aspects: the predicted 
reduction in peak-to-null magnitude can be seen, and the VL  profile loses its noisy 
appearance with increasing a, making the steel profile closely resemble the measured data. 
The median peak-to-null magnitude of the steel data in Fig.6. 17 is 16.0 dBpV i.e. within 0.5 
dBp.tV of the measured data. Three possible causes for this a multiplier of 27.5 exist, but, 
as only one 10 MHz data set was taken, no conclusion can be drawn. These causes are 
dielectric losses in the FEP/PTFE cable sheathing, mismatch losses (neglected in the model, 
see Section 6.2.2) and increased resistance caused by using a stranded rather than single 
conductor cable. Ref [6-8] indicates the latter results from the increased conductor length 
due to helical lay within the stranded bundle and concentration of RF current at the 
peripheral surface of the conductors at the outside of the bundle. Ref [6-8] lumps these 
effects together and allows for stranding by multiplying the RF resistance of a single 
conductor by a form factor of 1.25, which has been 'well confirmed experimentally'. 
Further measurements on cables with different materials are required to understand this a 
multiplier of 27.5. 
Figure 6.17: Effects of Cable Material on VL  Profile 
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Figure 6.18 shows the final comparison of the 2m, 10 MFIz measured data with the refined 
model, demonstrating that, assuming the multiplier is verified, correlation of modelled and 
measured maximum VL  can be achieved if a good definition of the test configuration is 
known 
Figure 6.18: Final Comparison of 10 MI-k Sampled vs. Modelled Data 
110 
-80 
70 
4 	 6 	 8 	 10 	 12 	 14 	 16 	 18 
FREQUENCY (OHz) 
- MODELLED DATA - MEASURED DATA 
6-25 
6.3 ENERGY COUPLING VS. CABLE LENGTH 
6.3.1 Examination of Cable Data Sets 
An important part of the laboratory research was the investigation of the Chapter 5 
re-radiation postulation. Ref [6-2] also supports the postulation, although little data is 
presented in the paper to substantiate the statement: 'However, the data does indicate that 
at line lengths of greater than there is an energy loss due to reradiation that needs to be 
included/n the models based on the telegrapher's equations.' Ref [4-21] also noted that 
'Both cable lengths [0.6m and 0.1 9m] were greater than 1 yet no additional pickup 
occurred due to increased length' and that the maximum effective aperture of the shorter 
wire was close to that of the 0.6m wire and the half-wave dipole model. In his investigation 
of coupling to a 2m wire when far end or centre illuminated, Willis [3-20] noted that 'In the 
higher frequency range the pickup was more pronounced when the transmitting antenna 
was illuminating the area nearest the detector [near end of the 2m wire].' This can be seen 
in Fig.6. 19 where, despite the coarse frequency resolution, there is a clear trend >5 GHz of 
decreasing VL with antenna distance from the load. This suggests that the re-radiation 
factor is a function of cable length or remoteness of the load from the illuminated portion, 
and frequency. 
Figure 6.19: Willis VL  Data Dependency on Antenna Position 
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Initial analysis of this researcher's data showed no correlation with either cable length or 
antenna distance from the avionic box. Fig.6.20 shows the processed measurements for the 
2m cable to demonstrate the large and frequency dependent amplitude variation typical of 
all cable lengths investigated. The initial inspection did show that most data sets have 
similar maximum VL envelope profile with frequency, that the profiles are very similar for 
cable length >0.5m (3X at 2 GHz) and that measurable VL  existed for the 2m cable when 
illuminated at its far end. This latter aspect concurs with U.S. work [4-20] where 
measurable signals existed for far end illumination of a 3.05m cable. V, in Fig.6.20 is 
similar for all data sets up to 8 GHz and >8 GHz the envelope of all VL  values (for all cable 
lengths and antenna positions investigated) is 15 dB maximum, with no distinct frequency 
trend. 
Figure 6.20: 2m Cable V. Measurements vs. Antenna Position 
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A more detailed analysis of the 24 data sets for the four cable lengths antenna position data 
sets was undertaken and a clear trend of median VL dependency on cable length was 
established, see Fig.6.21, which agrees with Willis's observation (see Fig.6.19), although no 
trend was seen in the maxima or minima of the data sets. 
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Figure 6.21: Median VL  Dependency on Cable Length and Antenna Position 
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Fig.6.21 shows that there is a 6-8.5 dB reduction in VL  in the first 0.75m from the box. A 
similar trend is difficult to establish for the 0.5m cable, since only one antenna position is the 
same as the other cables (the 0.25m value on Fig.6.21 is interpolated but is within the range 
of values of the other cables, adding confidence to the observation). The VL  profile for the 
three longer cables, which is clearly a function of cable length and antenna position, 
comprises three main elements: a steep reduction, a lower gradient reduction and an upturn 
whose eventual destination is unknown. The breakpoints for the 2.Om cable occur at 5k 
and 10k at 2 0Hz or 33.3k and 667X at 18 0Hz, a relationship suggesting that a further 
profile element occurs at 2.5k (2 0Hz) or 0.375m. This antenna position was not 
measured, but it can be argued that Fig.6.21 shows a fourth, lower gradient profile element 
between 0.25 and 0.5m. This indicates a dependency with antenna position of 2.5Ak, 
where A = antenna position in metres from the box. A similar profile exists for the I .5m 
and I .Om cable lengths, but with the lower gradient slope and upturn elements occurring for 
antenna positions 0.5m (I Sm cable) and I .Om (I .Om cable) nearer the box. This suggests a 
VL  cable length dependency of 0.5s where s = cable length. It is considered that these 
findings confirm the postulation, and this dependency is discussed fbrther in Section 6.3.2. 
Examination of the experimental arrangement shows that potential for cable illumination by 
side-lobes existed, which could have affected the measurements. For the antenna used, 
where the side-lobes are small (<10 dB below boresight gain), this is not thought to have 
adversely affected the experiment. For any future cable coupling research, the use of RAM 
collars should be considered to suppress the transmission of microwave currents along 
those parts of the cable which are not required to be illuminated, noting that their use may 
also artificially enhance the loss (and consequently depress V3. 
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6.3.2 Re-Radiation Postulation and Empirical Equation 
The research reported in this Chapter suggests that transmission line-based models can be 
used in the 2-18 GFIz range, conditional upon precise definition of test configuration, 
especially load impedance. It was established through model runs with cable lengths set to 
2, 5, 10 and 50m, where identical V L  amplitude profiles were seen and granularity 
suppression with increasing length, that the model did not exhibit the significant amplitude 
reduction with cable length and antenna position away from the avionic box, as seen in the 
laboratory measurement& Consequently, investigations were conducted into how such an 
effect might be included in the model. These investigations, covered in this section, were 
based on representing the effect as a cable material loss and include the derivation of an 
empirical equation describing the effect. The cable material loss approach is appropriate as 
the measured data suggests transmission on the wire is probably no longer TEM, which is 
assumed in the model. 
Table 1-1 of [5-1] gives Pr  and 
 Ir  which, suitably updated, were used in the model. The 
investigation of cable material effects on VL  (Section 6.5.2 and the earlier part of this 
section) showed that transit from copper to steel via nickel removed much of the waveform 
granularity and reduced the V L envelope magnitude, with the steel case bearing much 
similarity to the measured data. This suggested that an increased a term with a resistive 
element (re-radiator) in the transmission line equations could be the explanation for both the 
difference between modelled and 2m cable measured data and L'  cable length dependency 
as seen in Fig.6.21. To explore this the cable resistance per unit length was increased from 
R f)m' to (R+RJ Qm where R,  is the proposed re-radiation resistance. To quantif' 
R, the difference between a for steel and nickel was calculated using the precursor to 
Eqn.5.54 and equated to the extra term thus: 
Rmd 	 aRrj2 
a was calculated for nickel and steel at three points, see Table 63, and regression analysis 
conducted on the difference between them to arrive at a value: 
R =39.728f-i-317.0781Q 
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Table 6.3: Attenuation Constant for Nickel vs. Steel 
Alpha (xl 0 3  nepers/metre) 
Frequency 2(3Hz 10 (3Hz 18 (1Hz 
Nickel 9.1 20.4 27.3 
Steel 197.3 441.2 591.9 
Difference 188.2 420.8 564.6 
Comparing this modified a for nickel with that of steel gave agreement to within ±3.5%. 
The model was modified to include K, and a 2-18 0Hz, 10 MHz resolution run conducted 
which showed that the resultant VL  profile using nickel matched that using steel as the cable 
material. This modification did not, however, provide any change in the length dependency 
of VL.  A different approach, that of describing the cable as a series of radiating Hertzian 
dipole elements was studied. From [3-24] the radiation resistance of such an element is 
given by: 
2 
Rrad =8olt2(f)  
where I = the dipole length. Connors [6-9] notes that the nearest practical approach to the 
Hertzian dipole is for dl !~ , for which the characteristic of uniform current along its 
length can still be assumed valid. If we consider the 2m cable and =1.7mm at the 
highest frequency (18 0Hz), ad! value of 0.17mm equates to th which easily satisfies the 
above criterion. In this case the cable is 2/0.00017 = 11765 dipoles in length and, assuming 
series addition of R, would give 0.07896Q per dipole, or 92812 in total. This is 
counter-intuitive as the cable entering the avionic box is by analogy a monopole and R for 
a monopole is shown [3-24] to be 36.81] at resonance, much lower than the above figure. 
This was examined flirther, for~ dl ~ , but with the similar results. To ensure this 
equivalence to a monopole was achieved, an analysis was conducted of the change in dl 
with frequency which resulted in 
dl= 	 (610) (140.3677f— 10.5276) 
which, on calculation, gives R of 108.1 4E-4Q at 2 0Hz, 4.068E4n at 10 GHz and 
I .247E-412 at 18 0Hz. Eqn.6. 10 was temporarily programmed into the model and a 
comparison made between R using this equation vs. using Eqn.6.8. The Hertzian dipole 
version gave a lower value than the nickel-to-steel factor across 2-18 0Hz and thus 
contributes little to the explanation of the VL  dependency on cable length. 
The possibility that higher order transmission modes, which radiate effectively, were being 
excited was considered. Much work has been conducted in this area, including [4-3], 
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Adams et al. [6-10] and [6-4] and their references. The consensus is that the higher order 
modes are undoubtedly excited to some degree, particularly in cases where, as in this 
research, line separations >5X but that their effect on current distribution does not appear to 
be significant for the cases investigated. The currents were also concluded to be of a 
relatively simple form, explainable in terms of TEM modes. To conclude the investigation 
of cable length and antenna position dependency, an examination ofFig.6.21 was conducted 
to determine an empirical equation describing the dependency. This approach had also been 
taken by Brock et aL [6-3] who noted that the enhanced IEMCAP algorithm uses 
transmission line predictions <1 GHz, a weighted average between the transmission line 
model and the new empirical model for 1<f<3 GHz, and the empirical model predictions >3 
GHz. The empirical models were derived from a series of experimental measurements 
performed in a mode-tuned chamber and from the bounding behaviour of bare wire 
coupling as characterised by method-of-moment calculations. The examination yielded 
Eqn.6. 11, which was developed by curve-fitting using the (2.5*A) 
 relationship identified in 
Section 6.3.1 as a basis. Eqn.6.1 I is valid for the limited number of cable lengths and 
antenna positions investigated. 
VL=VwO)+7* (11 .3*A*sin(2#) ) dBpV 	 ...(6. 11) 
	
where A 
	 = 	 antenna position in metres from the avionic box 
	
s 	 = 	 cable length in metres 
	
VL(o) = 
	 L measured at nearest point to box (76.7 dBiiV in this case) 
A comparison between Eqn.6. 12 and the Fig.6.21 data is presented in Fig.6.22 and 
agreement in all cases to within +4.4 to -1.1 dB is achieved. Further test data is required to 
enable refinement of this equation and extend its validity to the general case. 
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Figure 6.22: Modelled vs. Measured Length and Antenna Position Dependency 
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Future work should include modelling partial illumination of a cable at various distances 
from the load and further laboratory investigations to examine this length dependency in 
more detail, using a greater number of cable lengths and antenna positions. The illuminating 
antenna for this work requires development, as a much smaller Tootprint' on the cable is 
required than was achieved in these investigations. Modification of the model could then 
follow, possibly based upon modelling footprint illumination by voltage source phase 
change over a given length of the cable. Appendix G is the model listing (less Eqn6.1 1). 
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6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The research covered in this chapter has shown that validated transmission line-based 
models can be used to predict maximum VL  per Wm 2 in the range 2-18 GHz. The key 
factors in achieving this are the precise knowledge of the line termination impedances 
(including connector impedance and parasitics) and construction characteristics of the cable 
under consideration, and use of modelling and measurement resolution of at worst 10 MHz. 
These models require an extra term to describe the reduction in V L with cable length and 
illuminating antenna distance from the load. The postulation of re-radiation of energy from 
the wire as the cause was examined, but no satisfactory term was derived for the model. 
However, statistical analysis of the laboratory test data showed clear trends of V L with 
length and antenna position, which enabled the development of an empirical equation 
describing the dependency. 
There is a need for further research on a number of topics of which the more important are 
laboratory tests to further investigate the cable length and antenna position dependency and 
thus refine the model, and an examination of the smallest resolution required for complete 
characterisation of microwave field coupling to cables, to minimise the Vt  error bound. 
It is important to recognise that point-to-point agreement of modelled and measured data 
does not exist and will never be possible due to the nature of the problem and its 
dependency on small details, often uncontrollable, and thus coupling to a cable is best 
predicted on a statistical basis, with the V L maximum profile being of most relevance to the 
potential for avionics upset. 
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Chapter 7 
MICROWAVE EFFECTS ON 
ELECTRONIC CIRCUITRY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines reported microwave upset of electronics, civil or military, the 
identification of upset mechanisms, modelling of circuitry and its contribution to the 
prediction of upset. Eqn.4.2, the overall ingress equation in Section 4.2, is re-visited and 
the last term quantified, enabling a prediction of the power delivered to a circuit inside an 
avionics box. A determination of required protection levels then follows from 
examination of this received power profile vs. the results of the investigation of electronic 
component and system upset. Finally, an improved microwave EM hazard protection 
strategy is proposed. 
7.2 REPORTED UPSET OF ELECTRONICS 
7.2.1 Circuit Technologies 
The RF susceptibility of circuitry was thought, see Section 1.1, to be a function inter a/ia 
of the circuit technology used in the avionics of military or civil aircraft. Before 
proceeding to an examination of reported electronics upset an investigation of circuit 
technology developments and predictions was undertaken. Refs. [2-19] and [7-1] to [7-17] 
were extracted from literature search and their relevant aspects of transistors/integrated 
circuit, device minimum line width (i.e. device size) and processor clock rates were 
distilled into Fig.7. 1. Examples of all transistor and IC technologies, including the latest 
VHSIC devices, are now in many processors, radars and EW systems on military aircraft 
and ships world-wide [7-3]. An example is the latest UK military fighter's computer 
processor IC, the Motorola 68020, which has a gate size of 1.0 gm. Fig.7. 1 includes 
predictions of future growth by the companies where data was published, i.e. NEC, Sony, 
Toshiba, the [US/EC] Advanced Lithography Group and the Semiconductor Industry 
Association, and shows a steady increase in device density per IC of 250 times/decade and 
a continuous increase in circuit speed of 20-30 times/decade, agreeing with [7-5]. As the 
device sizes reduce below 0.25gm they transit from being transistors to a new class of 
'resonant tunnelling' devices. These devices are described under the heading 
'Nano-electronics' [7-18] and [7-19], a field where the Japanese in particular are active, 
with 15 rim line widths thought an achievable goal by the year 2000. In parallel with this 
increase in IC performance, there have been similar advances in discrete devices, with 
many transistors designed to operate above 1 6Hz (the highest speed at this time, by a 
Hetero-structure Field Effect Transistor [HFET], is 175 6Hz). Increased operating 
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frequencies make more of the RFI 'in-band' and thus are capable of causing upset. 
Ref [2-19] estimated that in going from 0.35-5 GHz, devices are likely to experience a 10 
dB susceptibility increase. 
Figure 7.1: Circuit Technology Trends 
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7.2.2 Evidence Of Upset Of Electronics 
The term 'Upset' is defined as RF Interference (RFI) or permanent damage. RFI is 
transitory in nature, i.e. with RF applied interference occurs, which in itself could cause a 
life-threatening situation, and with the RF off the electronics returns to normal operation. 
Component damage renders that function inoperative and irrecoverable and can, dependent 
upon the equipment affected, result in mission termination or aircraft loss. Digital circuit 
latch-up is a specific state which forms a sub-set of both the RFI and damage categories of 
upset. In the latch-up state, the circuit element ceases responding to inputs and remains so 
even after removal of the RF, until the circuit is powered down and re-initialised. In some 
cases, e.g. CMOS ICs, such latch-up can lead to IC damage as the device draws currents 
higher than its capability. Latch-up is caused by a parasitic transistor, formed during the 
IC fabrication process, which forms an unintentional Silicon-Controlled Rectifier-type 
switch. Transitory effects are particularly relevant to civil or military aircraft in flight, 
where, see Section 2.3.2, transmitter-to-aircraft sight line angle rates and ranges are 
continuously changing. This probability of illumination, in conjunction with the highly 
probabilistic microwave ingress path to the circuit, explains why microwave RFI problems 
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are rarely reported from flight, although they have been seen at various frequencies during 
aircraft ground EMC tests. RFI <0.4 GH.z with all classes of electronics is a known 
phenomenon which can be alleviated, if not eradicated, by good EMC design practice and 
installation, e.g. in [2-17]. The situation >0.5 GHz is less understood and >1 GI-Iz there is 
a dearth of understanding which this research aims to resolve. Table 7.1 gives a selection 
of reported upset effects. 
Table 7.1: Upset Examples 
AIRCRAFT YEAR SOURCE EFFECT REF 
USS Forrestal: Aircraft 
Carrier 
1967 Carrier radar Poorly shielded plug: Missile fired into other 
aircraft: 134 dead $72M damage  
[7-20] 
Black Hawk Helicopter since- 
1982 
Radar/radio 
masts 
Several crashes attributed to RFI of flight control 
systems  
[7-211 
Various civil since- 
1986 
Portable 
devices 
24 pilot reports of RFI due to passenger-operated 
electronic devices 
[2-26] 
8747-100 1995 Camcorder Slow left turn [7-22] 
8747-200 1995 2 Laptops Compass moved 15 ° [7-221 
Augusta 109 Helicopter 1995 U.K. HIRTA Spurious engine readings, to normal after 7-10s [7-23] 
Various 1995 Radio Masts Spurious readings on GPS [7-23] 
Until the commencement of this research there had been little openly published data on the 
microwave upset of components and systems, and it was generally thought that, due to the 
poor coupling mechanisms involved on aircraft >400 MHz, no real problem existed above 
this frequency. This research has uncovered a variety of component and equipment upset 
data, of inter a/ia (now) openly published U.S. research, from BAe EMC trials on a 
number of aircraft and BAe EMC Laboratory investigations on PCs and avionic 
equipment. The investigations have also revealed that open publication of equipment, 
system or product failures at any frequency is rare and is likely to remain so for 
commercial-legal (liability claims) and national security reasons. The following data on 
equipment upset has thus necessarily had its source disguised, by merging civil and 
military data and other means, to allow its use in this thesis. The subsequent data on 
component upset is filly referenced, openly published research. 
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Eauin,nent Unset 
Few reported microwave effects exist, with most avionic systems functioning normally up 
to and above high peak power densities (>1 kWm 2). Pre-1989 only two RFI incidents were 
reported, a Head-Up Display [7-241 (which was high up in the exposed cockpit, with 
radiation entering the un-screened optical aperture and affecting the timebase circuitry) and 
an unrepeatable avionic occurrence during an aircraft EMC trial [7-25]. BAe EMC 
qualification research demonstrated repeatable microwave RH of two avionic equipment 
types [7-26], [7-27]. This included unintentional damage of 2 bipolar transistors, 2 FETs 
and a 741 operational amplifier in one equipment, which had been successfully EMC 
qualified, on exposure to very high power densities. This was investigated and explained by 
inadequate box shielding for circuit protection from radiation of this intensity, 80 dB above 
its design specification. One phase of this research involved high power irradiation of an 
avionic equipment in the EMC Laboratory where a 4 dB improvement in failure thresholds 
was achieved by wrapping Aluminium foil around the cable loom for the first 1.5-4.8k from 
the connector at the frequencies investigated. This supports the view referenced in Chapter 
5 that cable-borne 1-18 GHz energy coupled at > can be enough to cause upset. 
Aluminium tape applied to all seams of the [7-27] unit's four loose-fitting side panels 
resulted in a RFI P d  improvement of 12 dB minimum (with the available RF power it could 
no longer be upset). 
In a study of microwave upset of avionics [7-28] it was shown that various levels of 
microwave RFI had been encountered on thirteen avionic equipments, one of which was a 
similar unit to the unrepeatable item above. None of these cases could be considered 
serious, with ten being operationally insignificant and the others recommended for further 
study. As computers, which are usually un-screened, are the most sensitive ground-based 
civil electronics to RFI, investigations were conducted into their 1-18 GHz susceptibility 
[7-29] to [7-31], in addition to those on three early generation microprocessor boards 
[7-32]. The latter author observed that 1-10 GFIz RFI was rare for P d <1 Wn12 but that 
failures were frequent <1 GHz at Pd  up to I Wm 2. A valid worry was the nature of the RFI 
effects: these included wild running displays, similar alpha-numerics in all display elements 
and display absence. Failures were also seen where incorrect data was displayed, which is 
of greater concern operationally as an operator may act inappropriately rather than, in the 
case of the clearly recognisable faults, not act at all based on the information. 
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Similar RFJ effects have been seen during this researcher's related industrial experience 
and ftirther study is warranted. Braun [7-33] conducted 0.3-2.0 GHz RS measurements of 
four hand-held Global Positioning System receivers showed a range of RFI effects e.g. 
auto-switch-off/on, display errors and one where, as cautioned above, the unit was capable 
of giving incorrect information to the user. The RFI thresholds observed were: for CW 
signals: 5.2 mWm 2, for single pulse: 586-7665 Wn12, and for 1 kHz repetition rate: 
586-2394 Wm 2. It should be noted that 1-2 GHz RFI occurred for all the GPS units tested 
at levels below 10.6 mWm 2 (2 Vni'). 
Fig.7.2 is a distillation of available civil and military microwave RFI data. It shows the 
number of occurrences independent of equipment type and minimum upset mean power 
density vs. frequency, noting that the latter also shows a trend of decreasing severity of 
RFI with increasing frequency. Of note is that no flight-reported occurrences of 
microwave upset have been found. Consideration of the susceptibilities of the 1970's and 
early 1980's technologies, installations and shielding practices involved suggest that the 
RFI is predictable and which now could be prevented through improved EMC design and 
shielding practice. It is concluded that some current and older standards of avionic 
equipment are upset at levels to be encountered in today's microwave RF environment. 
Figure 7.2: Trends of RFI Occurrences and Minimum Power Density 
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Component Upset 
Since the late 1960s much component RFI and damage research has been conducted, 
primarily under the auspices of the U.S Departments of Defense and Energy at the Harry 
Diamond, Lawrence Livermore National and various industry laboratories, under contract 
from the U.S. Air Force Wright Laboratories and the U.S. Naval Surface Weapons Centre 
- Dahigren Laboratory. Much of the research results are now available and that of 2-18 
GHz relevance was examined, [5-4], [7-34]-[7-36] and six references from [7-37], which 
between them cover RFI and HPM damage of various IC technologies and discrete 
components. Ref. [7-3 8] builds on the Harry Diamond laboratory's earlier work [7-34] to 
produce an empirically derived picture of IC pulsed-RF damage threshold at 3 and 10 
GHz, see Fig.7.3, demonstrating the higher RFI sensitivity of ICs with smaller device 
sizes. 
Figure 7.3: IC Damage Threshold for O.ijis RF Pulses 
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Much of the research results of [5-4] and [7-35] are now presented as reference tables of 
susceptibility in Keiser [7-39] for TTL, CMOS, Line Drivers and Receivers, Operational 
Amplifiers, Comparators and Voltage Regulators. The susceptibility of VHSIC/VLSL was 
projected in [2-19] as needing over 100dB of protection for 0.001-100 GHz. Fig.7.4, 
from [2-19], compares the CW RF power required to upset TTL and ECL ICs with those 
calculated for VHSIC, noting predictions of future device line widths at that time (1986) 
were 2-5 pim. Widths <2 jim are now common, see Section 7.2.1, with increased 
susceptibility implications. 
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Figure 7.4: RFI Power Levels for Major IC Technologies 
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Fig.7.5, taken from [7-20], is based on much of the earlier referenced material in this 
Section and provides a summary of damage thresholds for a range of device types. 
Figure 7.5: Typical Damage Threshold Levels for 1 ts Pulses 
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Two other aspects are relevant; frequency dependency of RFI and RFI modes. Le Vine and 
Richardson [740] and [2-17] show device RFI sensitivity decreases at 15-20 dBldecade 
frequency, with occasional resonances linked to parasitic inductances and capacitances in 
the leads of typical 14-16 pin dual in line packages. Roach [741] noted that different RFI 
effects could be obtained dependent upon which IC pin had RF current injected into it and 
at what point in the read/write cycle the MOS memory IC the injection was initiated. This 
latter point has been identified by a number of subsequent authors, and suggests an 
important finding, that the pulse width, pulse repetition rate and frequency of a waveform 
may be as important as its peak power. This effect has been seen in RAe EMC laboratory 
tests [7-27] where a different RFI mode was seen when an electronic equipment was 
illuminated with different RF characteristics and lower power than the initially reported 
RFI incident. 
Antinone and Ng, in a recent openly published document [7-36] on FIPM effects on 
components, conducted 0.1-5.0 GHz, 20 gs pulse width, 1 kHz repetition frequency RFI 
tests and 1-2 GHz, 10 pis pulse width, single shot component damage trend tests on 
analogue and digital ICs, infra-red detectors, CMOS digital ICs and hybrid amplifiers. 
The results showed that the microwave power for RH in a digital device (15.8-79.4 mW) 
was more than that for an analogue one (0.04-39.8 mW), that the frequency dependence of 
the RFI was stronger for analogue devices, and that a maximum 7 dB (typical 5 dB) 
variation existed across a small number of samples of the same device. Of importance was 
the finding that damage power levels, which were similar for digital and analogue devices 
(at 100±50 W for 10 pis pulse width), were 20-64 dB (100-2.5 million times) greater than 
those for causing RFI, concurring with Roe [4-20] who, on examining studies conducted 
by McDonnell Douglas Astronautics, showed a worst case RFI-to-damage margin for TTL 
ICs of 25 dB at 1 GHz, reducing to 10dB at 10 GHz. The Tit RFI findings in [7-36] and 
[7-39] were expanded by Barber and Herke [6-6], who injected 1-18 GHz current into the 
input pin of one 7400 series IC and into the output pins of three each standard and Low 
Power Shottky (LS) 7400 ICs. The 1-10 (3Hz RFI signatures showed the LS series to be 
the more susceptible, agreeing with [7-36], with a decrease in sensitivity with frequency of 
12-25 dB/decade, concurring with [740] ('about 15dB/decade') and [2-17] ('in general by 
20dB/decade'). Test jig effects above 10 GHz prevented useful observations. 
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7.3 IDENTIFICATION OF UPSET MECHANISM 
The effects of HPM radiation on semiconductors, as noted in [2-21] by Dr. Hriar Cabayan, 
Program Manager of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's HPM effects division, is governed 
by semiconductor physics equations. For electronics under illumination or with cable-
borne RFI input signals, the principal mode by which the energy is coupled into the 
electronics is rectification. It occurs at diode and transistor p-n junctions, found in discrete 
components or within ICs. The phenomenon is explained in [7-20], [7-3 8] and 
[7-42]-[7-45]. The main effects of the demodulated RFI are operating voltage offsets for 
transistors and operational amplifiers, output state changes or latch-ups in logic devices 
and voltage comparators, and erroneous signals capable of inhibiting or upsetting data 
transmission and storage if the demodulated (wideband) RFI is within the circuit passband. 
The relative susceptibility of devices to RFI is given by each devicets Rectification 
Efficiency (RE). RE is defined as the ratio of the rectified DC voltage at the device output 
to the RF power level incident at the input. Richardson, in Ref 3 of [7-38], proposed that 
the absorbed power level that gives 100 mV be used as a standard for characterising the 
RE of a specific junction. The detected voltage rises rapidly for increasing RF power and, 
at the levels required to produce the 100 mV bias shift, Richardson observed that the 
difference between incident and absorbed power was insignificant. In practice most 
devices yield 100 mV at the 1-2 mW level, see Fig.7.6. Fig.7.6 also shows the increased 
susceptibility of VLSI, with its much smaller device size, compared with standard TTL. 
Figure 7.6: Rectification Efficiencies of ICs 
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Richardson [7-44] used a RF rectification model of a diode to derive an equation for RE in 
a bipolar junction transistor, see Eqn.7. 1, which enabled examination of the device size 
dependency of RE. The demodulation effect had already been shown (via calculations and 
measurements, [7-44]) to occur principally in the base-emitter junction of such transistors. 
1 	 El '  vw1 	 (7.1) 
B, = Base sheet resistivity, Q/square, determined by base region p, base width and PE 
AE = Emitter Area (m) 	 PE = Emitter perimeter (m) 
= Emitter-base capacitance (F) 
	 2L = Emitter width (m) 
VT = 26 mV. The rectified offset voltage follows a square law [7-44] and is proportional 
to the absorbed power as long as the RF voltage at the junction does not exceed 26 
mV. 
For small transistors, e.g. those in the 741 operational amplifier, RE values of 3.1-5.0 
kVW' are calculated, indicating that micro-watts of RF energy are adequate to produce 
milli-volts of offset in these devices. Using Eqn.7. I, a graph of RE vs. emitter perimeter 
can be produced, see Fig.7.7. Fig.7.7 clearly shows that extrapolation of the equation to 
modern, high speed ICs using smaller transistor/FET sizes, leads to a prediction of 
increased RFI susceptibility. 
Figure 7.7: Variation of Rectification Efficiency with Device Size 
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RE also differs between device types as the detection mechanisms are different [2-14]. In 
bipolar transistors it occurs at the emitter-base junction, whereas for MOS devices it 
occurs at the gate input. The effect in the former decreasing with jj, see Eqn.7. 1, whilst 
for the latter the decrease is with fr [743], explaining why bipolar transistors (and related 
ICs) are more sensitive at a given out-of-band frequency. This aspect is very noticeable 
for ICs with Shottky diodes on their inputs for electro-static protection. Due to their 
excellent rectification efficiency at microwave frequencies compared with ordinary diodes, 
they are very susceptible [7-36]. 
As suggested by Fig.7.7, VLSI circuits have much greater rectification efficiencies than 
standard TTL ICs [7-38], due to their small size, resulting in their predicted much higher 
susceptibility [7-20]. The reduction in gate size and increase in device density shown in 
Fig.7.1 in turn thus leads to a decrease in the amount of energy to cause upset or damage, 
i.e. to increased susceptibility to microwave and other frequency upset. This situation and 
its associated EMC implications was predicted by Audone [2-24]. 
Discussions with Prof J.J. Whalen of the State University of Buffalo, New York, yielded 
references [746]-[7-50] which cover the mechanisms of pulsed microwave damage of 
semiconductor devices. Ref. [7-47] showed that at 9.3 (3Hz, GaAs 1 pm MESFETs 
exhibit no degradation in performance, rather suffering catastrophic damage associated 
with metallic gate-source short circuit, see Fig.7.8. This photograph shows extensive 
damage which extends over a large area, including the entire metallisation path from the 
gate pad to the gate stripe, the gate pad metallisation, the source metallisation, and the gate 
stripe. The test data indicated an apparent incident power threshold, for both continuous 
wave and pulsed energy above 2 gs. This level was 3-6 W for MESFETs with 
Titanium-Platinum- Gold gate metallisation, and 1.5-3 W for those with Aluminium gate 
metallisation. 
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Figure 7.8: Scanning Electron Micrograph of MESFET Damage 
Tschursin [7-34] conducted 7-11 GHz irradiation testing of a number of samples of 
devices using a 10 W amplifier and with leads cut to form a quarter-wave dipole antenna, 
which was oriented parallel to the electric field for maximum coupling. Gennanium 
diodes went short-circuit at 23.8 kWm 2 and Silicon ones went open-circuit at 32.5 kWm 2 , 
Both types of transistors sustained 955 Wm 2 for six minutes without damage. Current 
gain was pennanently increased (up to 20%) in the Silicon transistors for power densities 
above 717 Wn1 2. Over 50% of the devices suffered catastrophic damage when subjected 
to 2.15 kWm 2 (Germanium) and 2.65 kWm 2 (Silicon), equating to a case temperature of 
1150 (Germanium) and 1800 
 (Silicon). Forced air cooling of resistors in the range 20091 
-2 M0 gave unchanged resistance beyond 10.61 kWm 2, whereas convection-cooled items 
showed a permanent, up to three-fold increase in resistance, starting at 4.5 kWm 2. In 
these items a sharp decrease in resistance was noted, to well below the original value, 
above 10.61 kWm 2. The results showed that permanent changes in the component's 
electrical characteristics were predominantly thermally initiated with the electric field 
strength contributing little by itself. This, with research results from [54], led to the 
postulation that increasing or introducing forced-air cooling of components could lead to a 
decrease in susceptibility of Germanium and Silicon devices and resistors to microwave 
(and other) frequency upset. It was also thought that the careflil choice of encapsulation 
type and better heat-sinking would also aid the heat transfer from junctions. This has been 
explored in the BAe EMC Laboratory and the results were inconclusive [7-27]. 
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Semiconductor devices are thus damaged in three ways. Reverse bias of the junction 
causes avalanche breakdown and leads to open circuit, metal filamentation flows into the 
p-n junction material, which changes its characteristics leading eventually to severe 
junction damage or short-circuit, and electric field breakdown of the junction material, 
permanently changing the devices characteristics (e.g. transistor gain). In most cases the 
damage is thermal in nature rather than caused by high electric fields. 
7.4 CiRC1T MODELS AS AN All) TO UPSET PREDICTION 
For frequencies below 100 MHz there are currently a number of electronic circuit analysis 
programmes, e.g. SPICE and variants IsSPICE, HSPICE Super-SPICE and SmartSPICE 
[7-51]-[7-56], which are appropriate for modelling RFI effects. They contain large-signal 
semiconductor device models and use time-domain techniques to predict RFI in linear and 
digital ICs. They are costly in run time for examination of the steady state response of 
devices to amplitude-modulated RF. Mother programme, NCAP, which contains 
non-linear incremental (i.e. small signal) models and uses frequency domain techniques, 
has been successfully used to predict RFI at up to 100 MHz, though not of digital circuits. 
These programmes, though adequate for their intended purpose, L e. the design of circuits 
to perform in-band, are limited by their basic device and circuit models [7-57]. To be of 
use above 10 MHz, parasitics need to be included and the situation becomes more complex 
as the microwave region is approached, where printed circuit tacks and IC pin inductances 
and pin-to-pin capacitances become appreciable. Modifications to the basic Ebers-Moll 
bipolar transistor model and Curtice and Statz FET models has enabled RFI prediction 
over the frequency range 50 kHz to 5 0Hz using the SPICE and NCAP models 
[7-58]-[7-64]. 
The quality of the circuit simulation is highly dependent upon the individual device 
models. These are usually based on standard semiconductor physics equations, e.g. [7-65], 
and extensive parameter extraction measurements on real devices [7-66],[7-67]. This 
approach, particularly for microwave devices, is time consuming and the measurements 
difficult and a revised model, the Root FET model [7-68],[7-69], has superior performance 
than the earlier Curtice and Statz models. Data is fitted to physical effects, but only in as 
much as they appear in measurements. Thus a closer fit to reality is achieved without the 
time overhead of full physics-based models. Other aspects relevant to predicting RFI in 
electronics includes the ability to accurately model printed circuit boards, connectors 
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[7-70] and IC pin-to-chip interconnects [7-71] at microwave frequencies. Tools now exist, 
of which the Hewlett-Packard High-Frequency Design Software and the EEsof Series IV 
High Frequency Analog Design System are leading examples, [7-72], [7-73]. Continuing 
developments in device models and the wide availability of circuit simulation capabilities, 
as seen from RF and microwave CAD surveys [7-74]-[7-76], holds promise for the ibture 
of predicting microwave RFI of circuits. For the foreseeable future, however, the task of 
attempting to model RFI effects on the complex contents of a typical avionic box is still 
considered impractical. A probabilistic assessment of a database of statistically treated 
component RFI data and radiated susceptibility tests on exposed (i.e. with no covers) 
avionic circuitry offers a way ahead and this is discussed further in the following section. 
7.5 PREDICTION OF UPSET AT MICROWAVE FREQUENCIES 
7.5.1 Completion Of Ingress Equation 
To predict P1(f),  the microwave power delivered to the circuit element in the avionic 
box, the last term in Eqn.4.2, G CCI(f), must be evaluated. The maximum effective 
aperture, A, coupling the microwave energy within an avionic box to the circuitry has 
been equated to a half-wave dipole [4-2 1J, [7-20], [7-38], [7-78]: 
Ae = GCCT(0A 2 
4it ..(7.1) 
where, as shown in Section 4.2, G JJ(fl is the gain of the effective antenna connected to 
the device's leads. Ref.[7-39] gives an empirical equation based on Eqn.7. ito predict the 
power delivered to the device through pick-up of fields by cables, wire and PCB traces 
within the box: 
PL O. 13A2 Pd W, for A :53.0 m 
Where L  is the power in the junction to which any conductor is connected, noting that at 
microwave frequencies parasitics may reduce the power actually dissipated in the junction. 
In reality PL  comprises two elements: cable-borne microwave current, as shown in Chapter 
6, and pick-up of fields inside the box resulting from aperture ingress and re-radiation 
from the cable(s) carrying microwave current. The quantification of the relative 
contributions to PL of cable-borne current and antenna pick-up within the box is suggested 
as a topic for further study. 
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Thus each term of Eqn.4.2 has been quantified. PJf) and FSL(f) are easily calculated as 
shown in Ch.2, to give the power density at the skin of the aircraft. Current and predicted 
future microwave environments are given in Figs.2.2 and 2.6. These represent the worst 
case, without atmospheric and illumination probability effects, both of which are highly 
mission scenario dependent and would reduce the actual power density vs. frequency vs. 
time profile to be encountered. A vehicle-independent predictor for AA(f) has been 
developed, see Section 3.3.1 and Fig.3.11. ABOX(f) was shown in Chapter 4 to comprise 
aperture ingress, for which equations exist which suffice for practical purposes, and cable 
ingress which is quantified in Ch.5 and 6. For typical avionic case thickness 1-18 GHz 
ingress through the material was shown to be negligible. Required protection levels 
against a given RF environment can then be determined from comparison of the P(f) 
profile vs. the circuit susceptibility profile, see Section 7.2.2. 
To determine whether a real threat to avionic circuitry is posed by the current microwave 
environment, see Fig.2.2, it is necessary to insert appropriate data values into the overall 
ingress equation and compare the resultant P,(t) with device RFI levels (Fig.7.4) and 
damage threshold levels (Fig. 7.5). Table 7.2 presents a worst case assessment at 1 (3Hz. 
It is important to note, as will be discussed in Section 7.5.2, that most of the equation's 
terms are highly dependent upon aircraft type and manufacture techniques, avionic box 
construction and device technology. Thus the output of Table 7.2 can only be expressed as 
there being a high probability of upset for the cases identified. 
Table 7.2: Worst Case Assessment of Power in a Circuit Device 
Ref. Ch.2 Ch.3 Ch.4,5,6 - Ch.7 Ch.7 
Term Incident Pd 
(current Envt.) 
Airframe 
Attenuation 
Box 
Shielding 
Pd Inside 
the Box 
Circuit 
Gain 
Power in 
the Device 
(PS9-FSL(f)) 
- AA 	 (0 	 - A(0 	 + GCCI(0 	 = F'CCT(O 
Value 5kW/m2 mean, 
IMW/m2 peak 
+21±5.9dB, 
Mm. -3.2dB 
55dB(Reqd. 
by[2-17])  
0.I3X2Pd(Eqn.7.2) 
Set I 106  W/m2 -21.0 dB -55dB 0.025 W/m2 0.29 mW 
Set 2 " -15.1 dB -55dB 0.098 W/m2 1.15 mW 
Set 3 +3.2dB -55 dB 5.248 W/m2 61.4 mW 
Set4 1 -15.1dB -30dB 30W/m 2 362mW 
SetS " +3.2 dB 1 	 -30 dB 12089 W/m2 24.4W 
The following notes should be read in conjunction with the table. 
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Set 1: 21 dB is the median of all the A. measurements covered in Chapter 3. 55 dB is the 
box shielding required to ensure compliance with EUROCAE EMC qualification at 
1 GHz. Careful design and construction techniques are required to guarantee this 
level of shielding, which is not commonly achieved in existing aircraft. 
Set 2: 15.1 dB is the median minus one sigma of the Chapter 3 A A  measurements and is 
considered a better prediction of airframe attenuation. 
Set 3: Uses the worst case A A from the Chapter 3 data, where a gain (rather than 
attenuation) of 3.2 dB was measured. 
Set 4: Is the set thought most representative of existing aircraft, with 15.1 dB of airframe 
attenuation and (a practically achievable) 30 dB of avionic box shielding at I GHz. 
Actual values are highly dependent upon individual box construction and cabling. 
Set 5: Is given as a demonstration of the absolute worst case envisaged, where there is no 
airframe shielding (using the same 3.2 dB gain as for set 3) in conjunction with 30 
dE box shielding. The findings of this Thesis suggest that the probability of this 
being encountered is extremely low. 
The more likely configuration to be encountered in existing aircraft will yield P 1(f) 
values at 1 GHz which lie between the 1.15 mW and 362 mW values in Table 7.2. By 
inspection of Fig.7.4 and the underlying data sets in Keiser [7-39], it can be seen that most 
device types can be upset by these levels of RF power dissipation. The upper end of this 
range also impinges on the damage threshold levels for some sensitive devices, see Fig.7.5. 
It is concluded, therefore, that a real threat exists to avionics from the current microwave 
environment, but which is highly dependent on the precise definition of that RF 
environment. This situation is exacerbated for the future environment, see Fig.2.6, where 
a maximum pulsed level of 15.3 GW/m 2 (41.8 dB higher that the current environemnt 
maximum) is predicted. 
Pulse width is an important factor in determining circuit RFI or damage and much research 
has been performed on component damage by pulsed or CW microwave RF radiation, as 
discussed in Sections 7.2.2 and 7.3. Taylor and Younan [7-201 showed that the failure 
mechanism for thermal breakdown in discrete semiconductors can be described by 
PDAMAGE 
—K' JXrI,Kr0.5  + ft ° 
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DAMAGE = 	 Damage threshold power (W) 	 A1 = Junction area (m) 
K, K', K" = 	 Device-specific proportionality constants, which can be computed from 
product data or can be measured. 
Ref. [7-20] noted that tests had shown that Eqn.7.3 is valid for ICs for 0.li.ts<tC100 its 
and provided a table of fifteen devices tested, of which five failed at 3 5-90 W (100 ns 
pulse). Measurements by Antinone and Ng [7-36] indicate that device damage levels are 
typically 100W for 1 jis pulses at 1-4 0Hz. Using Eqn.7.3 to estimate the dependence on 
pulse width indicates power levels of 320 W are needed for 100 ns pulses, which is 
consistent with the IC damage power levels in [7-20]. Typical damage threshold ranges 
are shown in Fig.7.5. 
It should be noted, however, that there is significant variation in K, K' and K" between 
device types because of the nature of the breakdown process. This is highlighted by the 
work of Whalen et al. [7-46] and [7-47] on 1 xm GaAs MIESFET pulsed RF damage at 9.3 
0Hz, where it was shown that the relationship between t and EA, the absorbed pulse 
energy for damage, lay in the range 60-20 nJ for 1.5-10 ns pulse widths and could be 
described by: 
EA  (in Joules) = 2t (in seconds) for I psCt<10 ms 
7.5.2 Upset Prediction Models 
No upset prediction models are currently available [7-79], but expressions by Ditton [4-2 1] 
and Garver and Tatum [7-38] using a Port of Entry (PoE) analysis technique are useful and 
are given in Eqns. 7.5 and 7.6. 
Garver and Tatum: 	 Sf = Pf  (W) 
Sj = system failure power density (Wm 2), Pf = component upset level (Wm 2), A 
effective area of PoE (m 2) and LT  = transmission loss (expressed as a ratio) from PoE to 
component. 
Ditton: 	 PL = Pd * A * SEc&,ie * SE e, icio 	 (W) 	 ..(7.6) 
PL = power in the component, Pd = incident power density (Wm 2), A = PoE effective 
aperture (m 2), SE 10 = cable shielding (dB) and SEa,do ,, = box shielding (dB). In both 
cases the major problem in determining circuit RFI thresholds is that the terms in their 
expressions are each a function of a number of highly variable factors. Ref.[7-38] concurs 
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with the findings in Chapters 3 and 4 that the effective area of the PoE (i.e. A A and 
A(fl) depends on frequency, polarisation and angle of arrival of the 1ff energy, and that 
component susceptibility is a function of RF pulse width, rise time, repetition rate and 
frequency. Neither cover the important issue of probability of illumination, discussed in 
Ch.2. The findings reported in this thesis agree with the statement in Garver and Tatum 
[7-38] which states that Most of these factors are neither well con trolled nor repeatable, 
but are relatively predictable when care)lilly analyzed (sic) statistically. As a resul4 the 
system susceptibility threshold is also somewhat random in nature and ideally should be 
treated as a probability of system failure rather than afixed value.' 
It appears that statistical analyses of each of the variable factors using Cumulative 
Probability Functions (CPFs) may be the most suitable approach to solving the problem. 
By considering a given circuit technology type's susceptibility profile, a probability of 
failure CPF may be calculated. It may be noted that combination of CPFs with large 
uncertainties with those with smaller uncertainties tends to obscure the latter, this in effect 
substantiates the refinement of using only the larger ones, e.g. AA. The approach is, 
however, limited in the area of circuit and component susceptibility where there is little 
data on which to conduct CPF analysis vs. circuit technology, although [7-3 8] notes that 
the uncertainty on this factor is not as large as that on the PoE. This suggests that further 
study of the dominant PoE coupling uncertainties may be more efficient than of electronic 
component CPFs. A further limitation of the appmach is that avionic boxes contain 
complex combinations of circuit technologies, multi-layer printed circuit boards and 
wiring, suggesting that deterministic modelling may never be practical and that a 
probabilistic approach using the susceptibility CPFs of individual circuit elements and 
technologies may prove the only alternative to extensive and costly EMC tests on each 
avionic box type. 
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7.5.3 Protection Strategies Against Microwave Upset Of Avionics 
Numerous publications, [2-17], [4-4,14,21,22], [7-20], and [7-80]-[7-84], describe design 
and protection methodologies necessary to ensure safe and correct operation of electronics, 
but are mostly applicable <1 GHz. Above 1 GHz EM energy can easily penetrate any 
enclosure unless great care is taken with respect to minimising apertures. Table 7.3 uses a 
schematic of coupling mechanisms and protection issues from [7-80] and shows a 
proposed protection regime additional to that outlined in Ref. [2-17]. The level of 
additional complexity and cost compared with current practice on BAe military aircraft is 
given, with an indication of the feasibility of protection benefits of modifying aircraft 
already in service. Emphasis is placed on first determining the actual microwave 
environment in which the aircraft must operate, then ascertaining system susceptibility and 
required safety margins, and finally deciding how the resulting protection requirement 
may be satisfied most cost-effectively. To date this route has rarely been followed and 
thus most aircraft are over-specified. 
Two good design examples are a commercial aircraft fire and overheat detection system 
[4-4], and a U.S. Navy turbo-prop digital engine control unit [4-14]. These papers show 
that, by the careful application of existing design principles and practices, current civil 
[2-17] and military microwave EMC requirements can be met. Tests reported in [4-14] 
show that using protection methods in Table 7.3, the unit operated correctly when 
irradiated at up to 82 MWm 2 at 2.85 GHz, with continual one inch arcing observed 
between the connector backshell and the overbraid shield at Pd>4 MWm 2 . 
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7.6 CONCLUDITiG REMARKS 
The research has demonstrated that there is a real threat to electronic systems from the 
current microwave environment, but that the threat level is highly dependent upon the 
precise definition of that environment. Greater demands are placed on circuit protection as 
a result of both the changing environment (including speculative 11PM weapons) and 
increasing susceptibility of circuitry with reducing device size. The research suggests that 
appropriate levels of protection will be difficult to meet for the worst case environment. It 
is shown that probabilistic approaches using statistical databases may be the only practical 
solution to many aspects of the upset equation. Further significant research effort in this 
area is required. An upset protection regime has been proposed which offers potential 
solutions for new aircraft designs. For existing aircraft which are required to operate in 
microwave environments harsher than those they are specified to, ingress modelling and 
equipment upset statistics are required to quantify the minimum extra required protection, 
thus minimising implementation costs. Further airframe attenuation measurements are 
required on different BAe aircraft types, preferably in an anechoic environment, with 
exploration of the effect of elevation angle of incidence of impinging EM radiation. 
In the light of the current/future environment predictions reported in Chapter 2, it is 
recommended that future aircraft be specified to at least the latest UK military aircraft 
EMC specification levels. These are I kWm 2 mean and 265.3 kWm 2 peak pulse. The 
earlier specifications, 66 mWm 2 (5 Vm') mean and peak, fall well short of even current 
international definitions of the mean microwave environment. It is suggested that 
additional radiated susceptibility tests are conducted using the actual modulations of 
off-board transmitters, particularly those on formation flying aircraft. The dependency of 
component, circuit and equipment upset of the pulsed RF parameters of frequency, pulse 
width and repetition frequency should also be investigated. 
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
FOR FURTHER WORK 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the conclusions of the research and suggests further areas of 
research which would extend the understanding of mechanisms contributing to the 
microwave upset of avionics. The discussion is presented by the major topic areas of the 
thesis. 
8.2 RF ENVIRONMENT PREDICTION 
8.2.1 Conclusions 
It is concluded that the precise definition of the external microwave environment level is a 
key factor in determining whether microwave upset of circuitry will occur, but that no 
definition of that level of quality is currently available 
Consequently it is also concluded that the EMC clearance power density profiles specified 
for U.K. military aircraft and, to a lesser extent, European-built civil aircraft are unduly 
harsh. This lack of precise environment definition has also resulted in equipment and 
aircraft EMC test safety margins which are pessimistic. 
It is further concluded that the use of computer-based environment modelling tools, e.g. 
BAe's EW Evaluation System, could enable the required prediction of the realistic 
environment. This could lead to a reduction in the EMC qualification requirements of 
avionics and aircraft, with the potential for reduction in aircraft test timescales and costs. 
8.2.2 Suggested Further Research Areas 
RI' Environment Prediction techniques need to be studied if the potential for reduced 
design and test timescales and costs are to be realised. The precise RF environments 
aircraft are subjected to should be determined, with a quantitative assessment of the 
probability of illumination for a given set of flight profiles. An estimation of probability 
of upset of avionics can be superimposed on this to yield higher quality EMC 
specifications, with more realistic, frequency dependent, safety margins than at present. 
This research should examine the possible need for extra EMC qualification tests to 
address specific modulations to be encountered (especially relevant for formation flying, 
where high power radiation by adjacent aircraft's radars and jammers is possible). Revised 
EMC qualification techniques should be researched to minimise over-test, possibly by 
driving the RF amplifiers used with signal generators capable of producing adequate 
representations of the RF scenarios to be encountered, e.g. EW RF threat simulators. 
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8.3 AIRFRAME ENERGY INGRESS 
8.3.1 Conclusions 
It is concluded that there are very few occasions where the airframe attenuation values 
measured on in-service aircraft approach the minimum required to prevent 1970's and 
1980's avionics from being subjected to levels of power density approaching their qualified 
level. However, there is not thought to be a problem at this time for reasons stated in 
Chapter 3, which include the paucity of reported microwave upset occurrences, 
EMC-determined flying restrictions in the U.K., and the use of more appropriate levels in 
the latest aircraft EMC specification. 
It is also concluded that the frequency-independent values of airframe attenuation assumed 
in the military and civil aircraft and avionic equipment design process are unduly severe in 
the microwave band. A possible and novel vehicle-independent correlation between 
cumulative probability functions of data measured on different aircraft has been 
demonstrated, which represents a step improvement in the ability to estimate microwave 
airframe attenuation for a given aircraft type. If ratified it offers the potential for 
supporting aircraft EMC design and qualification without aircraft tests. 
8.3.2 Suggested Further Research Areas 
Airframe Attenuation Predictor, Theoretical Study: To determine the worth of the 
proposed predictor, an expansion of the cumulative probability function (CPF) study 
reported in Chapter 3 is required. The research should first examine the CPFs of the 
available measured data (from 6 aircraft specimens) by frequency sub-band to determine 
whether the predictor remains valid, and an initial sub-banding of 1 0Hz is recommended. 
The theoretical aspect of this study should conclude with a wider statistical survey of such 
data from non-RAe aircraft types and result in an attenuation characteristics database. 
Airframe Attenuation Predictor, Empirical Investigations: Further airframe attenuation 
data should then be gathered, from BAe military aircraft not yet examined, and similar 
1-18 0Hz and 1 0Hz sub-banded CPF analyses performed. The attenuation measurements 
should cover full azimuth and elevation illumination, as the existing data sets cover only a 
limited number of azimuth angles of incidence of EM radiation of the aircraft. The 
optimum trade-off between test time and frequency resolution should be examined, with a 
minimum resolution of 10 MHz and an initial target of I Mhz. To minimise ground and 
other reflections and obviate interference from other RF transmitters, the tests should 
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preferably be conducted in an anechoic environment. The results of these analyses should 
be compared with the existing data sets and conclusions drawn on the predictor's extent of 
validity. If appropriate, further research would be required to extend the predictor's 
validity to civil aircraft types. 
Avionic Bay Resonance Damping: The Chapter 3 results suggest that selective RAM 
placement within bays can considerably reduce the bay's internal field amplitude, thus 
offering a potentially low cost safety margin against the risk of avionic upset. A materials 
study is suggested, to examine the possible use of various absorber materials (including 
RAM paint) inside aircraft bays. The potential of this RAM lining for aiding low radar 
cross-section by minimising re-radiation of energy from the aircraft via apertures should 
be examined. The study should also address the possible application and benefits of such 
materials to the insides of avionic boxes containing particularly susceptible circuitry. 
8.4 AVIONIC EQUIPMENT ENERGY INGRESS 
8.4.1 Conclusions 
From the Chapter 4 consideration of an overall equation developed to describe energy 
ingress to circuit device level, it is concluded that ingress through the case material of 
avionic boxes is negligible >1 GHz, but that cable pick-up may not be as relatively 
insignificant >1 GHz as previously thought by the international EMC community. Due to 
the significant variation in box construction in practice, it is not possible to conclude 
which ingress route, aperture or cable, is dominant at microwave frequencies. The 
airframe and box attenuation terms of the equation pose complex and time consuming 
modelling problems on even the most powerthl computers available and, it is concluded, 
may thus lend themselves only to probabilistic determination. Ingress via regular shaped 
apertures, e.g. circular or slot, can be reasonably well predicted for most cases and it is 
concluded that careful application of existing EMC design rules can afford >55 dB of box 
shielding >1 CuI-Iz, adequate protection for most current avionics. 
It is concluded that a significant part of the overall circuit protection required can be 
afforded at the box rather than airframe level by the use of appropriate box construction, 
application of conductive gasketting and good EMC design of ventilating and other 
apertures. Under these conditions the primary microwave ingress path is via the cable and 
connector route, where previously no adequate models existed to describe energy coupling 
from an incident field. 
8.5 INGRESS VIA CABLE AND CONNECTOR COMBINATIONS 
8.5.1 Conclusions 
It is concluded from Chapters 5 and 6 that validated transmission line-based models can be 
used to predict the upper bound of voltage developed across a load in an avionic box, vs. 
incident power density on a wire entering it, in the range 2-18 GHz. Key enabling factors 
are precise knowledge of the line termination impedances, cable construction 
characteristics and use of modelling and measurement resolution of at worst 10 MI-h. 
It is also concluded that measurable pick-up does in fact occur for line illumination at 
distances much higher than the half-wavelength previously accepted value. The research 
did not investigate per se the fiuthest distance from the load that measurable voltage 
occurred, but the highest figure established was 3.05m. The transmission-line models 
require an extra term to describe the reduction in load voltage with cable length and 
illuminating antenna distance from the load. A postulation of re-radiation of energy from 
the wire as the cause was inconclusively examined, however an empirical equation 
describing the dependency was developed. 
It is concluded that point-to-point agreement of modelled and measured data does not exist 
and will never be possible due to the high dependency on small features of the measured 
data and thus it is also concluded that coupling to a cable is best predicted on a statistical 
basis. 
8.5.2 Suggested Further Research Areas 
Measurement Resolution: Further practical examination of the smallest resolution 
required for complete characterisation of microwave field coupling to cables is suggested, 
to minimise the error bound on the measured load voltage. The investigation, covering the 
resolution range 10-0.1 Ml-Lz, should also address the results' applicability to airframe 
attenuation measurements. The trade-off of measurement time vs. error bound should be 
examined to determine the optimum resolution for practical laboratory and aircraft use. 
Cable Length and Antenna Position Dependency: To hilly understand this dependency 
further laboratory investigations are suggested to enable refinement of the empirical 
equation developed and explore the frequency range over which it is valid. It is suggested 
that these investigations should be conducted on a 4 m length of cable of the same type 
examined during this research and that smaller antenna position steps along the cable are 
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used. The frequency range suggested is 0.4-18 (3Hz, the lower frequency being the upper 
limit of the existing Conducted Susceptibility qualification tests and arguably the 
frequency at which the primary mode of energy coupling on aircraft commences the 
transition from cable-borne to via apertures. 
The research work should include modelling partial illumination of a cable at various 
distances from the load and further laboratory investigations to examine this length 
dependency in more detail, using a greater number of cable lengths and antenna positions 
than before. The illuminating antenna for this work requires development, as a much 
smaller 'footprint' on the cable is required than was achieved in this research. Modification 
of the model could then follow, possibly based upon modelling footprint illumination by 
voltage source phase change over a given length of the cable. Finally, the possible need 
for Conducted Susceptibility tests above the current frequency limit of 0.4 (3Hz (for 
equipment which are neither RF transmitters nor receivers) should be investigated. 
Other Cable Coupling Model Issues: Dependent upon the outcome of the two previous 
suggested research topics, the study of two further aspects may be worthwhile. Further 
examination of the modelled vs. measured load voltage profile as a function of height 
above ground plane, using the high resolution measured data gathered during that research. 
The second aspect concerns the use of different materials in practical cables used on 
aircraft: further measurements on different cable types and sizes may lead to better 
understanding of the 'form factor' applicable to stranded conductor cables. 
8.6 EFFECTS ON ELECTRONICS 
8.6.1 Conclusions 
Chapter 7 concludes that a real threat to airborne electronic systems is posed by the current 
microwave environment, but that the level of threat is highly dependent on the precise 
definition of the RF environment. Increasing susceptibility of circuitry with reducing 
device size and changing environment, including speculative HPM weapons, places greater 
demands on circuit protection and suggests that appropriate levels of protection will be 
difficult to meet for the predicted worst case environment. In the light of the Chapter 2 
environment predictions and with the current lack of scenario-driven power density levels 
and safety margins, it is concluded that future and upgraded avionics need to be specified 
to at least the latest U.K. military aircraft EMC specification levels. A microwave upset 
protection regime is proposed which offers potential solutions for new aircraft designs. 
Two important conclusions are that deterministic modelling of avionic boxes will never be 
practical and that a probabilistic approach using the susceptibility CPFs of individual 
circuit elements and technologies may prove the only alternative to extensive and costly 
EMC tests on each avionic box type, as conducted at present. 
8.6.2 Suggested Further Research Areas 
Effects of Modulation Parameters on Upset Potential: The possible need to conduct 
Radiated Susceptibility EMC qualification using the actual modulations of off-board 
transmitters, particularly those on formation flying aircraft, should be studied. This should 
include examination of the dependency of component, circuit and equipment upset on the 
pulsed RF parameters of frequency, pulse width and repetition frequency. The output is 
envisaged as a dependency surface, where the contours show the probability of upset for a 
given combination of these parameters. The use of EW RF threat simulators as signal 
sources to drive high power test amplifiers in support of this work is suggested. To 
support this investigation there may be a need to conduct tests on a sample avionic 
equipment with its panels removed to more readily be able to induce upset. 
Equipment Failure Modes: An investigation of electronic equipment failure modes is 
required to enable the understanding and prevention of the rarely encountered cases where 
incorrect (and thus potentially dangerous) information is generated and/or displayed by 
electronics when irradiated by even modest microwave power density levels. 
Aircraft Microwave Susceptibility Profiles: A statistical study of the component parts of 
the overall ingress equation per aircraft type is suggested, using the outputs of a number of 
the topics suggested earlier in this chapter. The study should include the examination of 
the potential to use these susceptibility profiles vs. RF scenarios to identify potential 
problem areas early in the aircraft development cycle and be able to propose minimum 
cost protection measures. 
Degradtztion of Microwave Protection Strategies: A study is suggested of the degradation 
of the protection methods, identified in Table 7.2, over the life-cycle of an aircraft. 
Cabayan [2-25], for example, shows that sequential salt spray and temperature/humidity 
cycling can lead to a 40 dB reduction in gasket shielding performance and suggests a need 
for a hardening database which would enable identification of minimal cost improvements 
and enable the trade-off of protection improvement vs. cost, degradation, weight penalty, 
and ease of installation. The suggested study should examine these aspects. 
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ABSTRACT with 	 aspects 	 of 	 this 	 research, 	 in 	 particular 
Unnecessary 	 concern 	 is 	 caused 	 whenever repeatability issues, when merged with the creative 
non-ionising radiation (NIR) is mentioned in the talent of the media results in wasted company, 
media. 	 The term 'non-ionising' adds to the public's national and international effort in redressing the 
confusion, with Radio/Radar Frequency (RF) and 'balance of truth' and allaying the fears of both 
Laser radiation being assimilated to nuclear, i.e. employees and the public. 	 The overall state of 
ionising radiation. 	 The scientific community thus ensuing flux then leads to the formulation of new 
has difficulty, convincing the public that any form of guide-lines and legislation such as the proposed 
MR can be used safely. 	 This paper aims to show European Physical Agents Directive (EPAD) (3) 
that, given adequate Control and Assessment (C&A) which requires protection methods that are believed 
Procedures, an appropriate level of RF safety can be to be unnecessary once an adequate risk assessment 
assured in any situation. 	 It addresses the types and is carried out in accordance with the present legal 
 
quantities of fixed site and mobile RF emitters (fl) requirements (4). 
that may be present, and details the risks they pose to MAD implements a RF safety programme which is 
humans, 	 flammable 	 atmospheres, 	 electrically- directed at ensuring a safe working enviromnent for 
initiated 	 electro-explosive 	 devices 	 (EED5) 	 and all persons to which it has a duty of care, both on 
electricall' 	 electronic 	 equipment. 	 The 	 rationale and off of its premises. 	 It takes a positive and 
behind C&A Procedures is then explained, including pro-active approach to health and safety (H&S) 
the need for Specialist support. The level of Control issues including those related to the safety of EM 
is shown to be commensurate with the level of Risk fields and participates in the preparation of both 
perceived. 	 The paper draws on the experience of national and intcrnational standards so as to ensure 
instigating such a RF Safety regime, gathered at that a 'slate of the art' RF safety programme is in 
British 	 Aerospace 	 Defence's 	 Warton 	 Unit 	 in place. 	 This approach enables an adequate and cost 
Lancashire 	
- 	 a 	 multi-site 	 facility 	 comprising effective response to the needs and concerns of its 
manufacturing facilities, offices and an operational most valuable asset, the employees. Additionally this 
aitheld used by both military and civil aircraft, also minimiscs sickness rates due to accidents and 
Finally data on over nearly two decades of operations possible exposure to H&S litigation. 
	 All of this is 
are 	 presented 	 to 	 underline 	 the 
	
benefits 	 of based upon a realistic common sense approach 
implementing such a C&A regime in ensuring the carried out through an understanding of the issues 
safety of both employee and public alike, and risks involved. 
I BACKGROUND 2 SUSCEPTIBLE DEVICES 
British Aerospace Defence Limited's Militaiy 
Aircraft Division (MAD) has many and varied 
electromagnetic (EM) sources covering much of the 
RF spectrum, both as part of its production and 
flight test facilities and on its products (military 
aircraft). These pose varying levels of risk to a 
variety of susceptible device types in the form of 
humans, weapon systems, electronics and flammable 
atmospheres. In four years MAD have gone from a 
loosely defined RF Radiation Hazard (R.ADHAZ) 
control structure aimed at specific potential problem 
areas, to a fully controlled regime to the best 
standards currently in place around the world. 
Over recent years the health issues associated with 
EM fields have moved steadily into the limelight 
including the 'Killing Fields' articles (1,2). It is an 
unfortunate fact of life that the media across the 
world generally find negative issues to be more 
news-worthy. Largely as a result of media-
promoted public concern, significant research has 
been and is being carried out across the whole field 
of the biological effects of EM radiation. Problems 
Four categories of susceptible device exist: biological 
systems (i.e. humans in this context), EEDs, 
flammable atmospheres and electrical/ electronic 
apparatus. Each represents a different problem and 
is covered by separate legislation and standards, 
although experience has shown that all may be 
adequately controlled via one C&A regime. 
Susceptibility problems associated with each of the 
categories are now given: 
RADHAZ to Humans 
The most widely publicised of the 'susceptible 
devices' is the human. The majority of the 
world-wide standards follow a reasonably similar 
approach, although precise rationales are different. 
In the radio frequency and microwave region of the 
EM spectrum, the hazardous effects are considered 
to be primarily thermal in nature. Such alarmist 
press articles as Darby (5), which follows on from 
(1,2), suggest proven links between low level power 
line frequency EM radiation and various health 
problems. Unfortunately, although no substantive 
and repeatable supporting evidence is given, these 
rai 
articles create a false impression of hazard and risk (9) 	 and 	 the 
	 withdrawal 	 of 	 one 	 U.S. 	 finn's 
levels which is difficult (and time consuming) to pacemakers from the market in Germany, after 
allay - they unnecessarily generate real fears in the German laboratory tests proved that failure could be 
minds of employees, especially and understandably induced via mobile telephones (10), so particular 
those of pregnant women. 
	 Although different care is required in any C&A procedure. 
mechanisms for interaction between EM fields and RADIIAL to Electrical/Electronic Systems humans have been proposed, the body of argument at 
the present time is simplistically defined as there RADFIAZ to these systems is identical to EMC and 
appears to be no biological evidence as to the ability is treated by MAD as such. 	 RADHAZ C&A 
of EM fields to initiate or promote cancers or cause therefore 	 is 	 limited 	 to 	 determining 	 the 	 RF 
birth defects or other reproductive problems, Doll enviromnent in which MAD's products and other 
(6,7) and Oak Ridge Associated Universities (8). equipment assets have to operate and ensuring that 
Doll does, however, sensibly advocate urgent studies appropriate control procedures are in place. 	 For 
into the work done so far, particularly by the Nordic military products these include EMC design guides, 
countries, which suggests some weak link may exist specifications and aircraft test procedures and, along 
in which RADHAZ could be a co-promoter rather with all other EMC aspects, are covered by the 
than a cause. Division's 	 EM 	 Hazards 	 Specialist 	 and 	 EMC 
The bulk of public concern at this time centres on Controller 	 in 	 concert. 	 For 	 civil 	 aircraft 	 and 
hazards' from power line frequency NTR and this is ground-based 	 electrical/electronic 	 equipment 	 the 
the 	 concern 	 Doll 	 et 	 al. 	 have 	 primarily 	 been responsibilities are similar, with the EM Hazards 
addressing. 	 This is also reflected in E.C. concerns Specialist taking the lead in such areas as computer 
on irradiation of humans at low field levels for a systems operations in airfield buildings. 
long duration from a variety of equipment in The hazards to be encountered range from minor 
common industrial and domestic use. At this time at display interference (as can be seen when Personal 
MAID the Radiation Safety Officer is responsible for Computers are irradiated) to major upset of avionics 
3 kHz-300 GHz, with 50 Hz aspects covered under - a number of spectacular examples have been 
general H&S and Electricity at Work auspices. published in the open press in recent years. 	 EMC 
Discussions 	 are 
	 ongoing 	 with 
	
U.S. 
	 RADHAZ specification, design and test for civil and military 
specialists to learn from their experiences in this airborne systems is a well covered topic and is not 
band, aimed at possibly including 0-3 kHz in the discussed further in this paper. 
tenns of reference. 	 In this way alignment with the RADHAZ to Electro-Explosive Devices 
frequency 	 range 	 of the 	 latest 	 U.K. 	 biological RF radiation of sufliciently high levels can cause RADHAZ guidelines will be achieved, making the 
weapons to be fired or weapons/external stores 
'NIR' 	 'RF' Safety Officer more 	 rather than just 	 as at 
ejected by the inadvertent initiation of EEDs whilst present. 	 It is apparent that the existing C&A 
on aircraft in flight or transit, being handled or in procedures will require minimal change to mo re 
formally control this additional sub-band. 
	 It is storage. 	 The worst case example of this was an 
believed that the U.K. and other countries' research incident on the U.S.S. Fonestal during the Vietnam 
into this topic, augmented by learning from the U.S. war, where the carrier's radar initiated an aircraft 
where a number of RADHAZ litigations have missile which resulted in the loss of 134 lives and 
occurred in recent times, will enable a C&A regime numerous aircraft, with some $72M of damage (11). 
consistent with the actual level of risk. 	 In this way It is worth noting that RADHAZ to EEDs includes 
the employees can be adequately protected and it both initiation of the bare EED and upset of the 
should prove unnecessary to enact the worst case weapon system electronics (an EMC aspect) which 
scenario of having to assess, by measurement, all can result in the EED being 'deliberately' initiated. 
50 liz pieces of equipment at regular intervals. EEDs are essentially explosive devices 	 that arc initiated by passing a current through a resistive wire 
Apart from the very widely publicised effects of EM ('Bridge-Wire' devices), or through a mixture of a 
Fields on humans in general, high levels of RF primary 	 explosive 	 and 	 graphite 	 particles 
radiation 	 may 	 present 	 a 	 specific 	 hazard 	 via ('Conducting Composition' devices). 
	 Bridge-Wire 
dysfunction or malfunction of prosthetic devices, devices are initiated when the primary explosive is 
such as cardiac pacemakers. 
	 This dysfunction is ignited by the resistive wire heating up. In the case 
basically an EM Compatibility (EMC) problem of Conducting composition devices, the graphite 
caused by upset of the circuitry, 
	 rather than a forms a conductor and power is dissipated at the 
biological RADHAZ per se. 	 Generally modem junctions of the particles causing 'Hot Spots' which 
pacemakers are tested to reasonably high levels of initiate the primary explosive. 
EM fields and they usually have reversionary modes 
in case of failure. Although such devices have been Explosion/lwition of flammable Atmospheres 
 
available 	 for 	 a 	 significant 	 number 	 of 	 years, All conducting structures behave as receiving aerials 
occasional problems are noted 
- such as airport and there is a risk that sufficient current may be 
weapon detectors and medical diathermy equipment induced 	 which, if a structural discontinuity exists 
A-2 
and is surrounded by a flammable atmosphere, may the highest power 'unintentional' RFE to be 
cause a spark which in turn causes ignition or encountered in the industrial environment. 
evnlncinn Whilci thc merh,nicm .nnaorc ta ha Design/Commercial/Airfield Support Facilities 
Within the office a different environment has 
generally been created over the last ten years. This 
consists of attenuated fields from the airfield/aircraft 
transmitters and those from Cathode Ray Tubes in 
the large number of computer systems, portable and 
cellular telephones, lighting and dimmer circuits, 
heating and air conditioning. Other emitters include 
microwave security devices, microwave ovens, flight 
test RF telemetry links and portable V/UHF 
transmitters used by airfield Fire, Ambulance and 
- Its headquarters at Warton (Lancashire), an 
operational civil/military airfield with aircraft 
design, production and ground/flight test facilities as well as commercial/other office communication links and radio telemetry links. 
Accurate Quantification of the Environment 
Air Traffic Control services. RFE used by other 
industries and businesses include microwave 
buildings. A second site (Samlesbujy), some This is a complex task, even in the U.K. where a 
miles away, has materials manufacturing High Intensity Radio Transmission Area (HJRTA) 
facilities and various office/stores buildings. scheme (14) is operated by the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) to ensure the safe operation of military 
- Actual/potential Export Customers' air bases, to aircraft and helicopters with their weapon systems. 
date as far afield as Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. This scheme comprises a database of emitters with 
- Any location, world-wide, where MAD Effective Radiated Power (ERP) above 500 W. An 
personnel work. It should be noted however that, associated Flight Information Publication defines 
where in place, the local RADI-IAZ C&A their geographical location and the safe vertical/ 
procedures take precedence and are only horizontal spacing between each HIRTA (sub-
augmented by the MAD ones when deficiencies divided into four frequency sub-bands) and an in the local C&A regime are perceived. 	
ziircrnft with a  uiven level of  FM(' rlenrnnrr 
The RF environment on and around the Warton site 
is typical of the most complex situation to be 
assessed and controlled, with EM fields ranging 
across the spectrum from Medium frequency (MF) to 
Extremely High Frequency (EHF). These fields are 
generated by both intentional and unintentional 
emitters. The primary emitters are emitted from 
radio/radar antennas and the secondary emitters are 
such things as induction welding machines. 
Airfield/Aircraft Transmitters 
Within the MF, HF, V/UHF bands reside aircraft and 
ground-based communications systems and EMC 
test facilities. Ground/aircraft radars systems 
operate in the SHF/EHF bands, whilst airborne 
janimers operate throughout the HF-SHF bands and 
are subject to military Jamming Control Authority 
clearance in addition to local RADI-LAZ C&A 
procedures. Table I shows typical installations 
which may be found operating on or from an 
establishment such as the Warton Airfield. 
Manufacturing Facilities 
The airfield/aircraft transmitters are referred to as 
'intentional' RFE whereas 'unintentional' emitters, 
such as induction welders and dielectric heaters, are 
more commonly found in manufacturing areas. 
High power RF induction furnaces, although there 
are none on BAe's two Lancashire sites, are typically 
Information published from the database covers 
primarily fixed location, high power ground 
transmitters, at frequencies mainly <5 
 GHz. More 
recently the database has been extended to include 
airborne and shipborne HIRTAs (15), but not yet for 
all nations' platforms. The U.K. HIRTA scheme is 
considered adequate for the task intended and can be 
considered a model scheme for the rest of the world, 
where such schemes do not yet exist. This causes 
particular problems when attempting to perform a 
RADHAZ assessment for BAe aircraft abroad. 
The scheme has limitations in that, in conjunction 
with current EMC clearance methods (which include 
safety margins thought to be higher than necessary) 
it gives RADHAZ distances which are believed to be 
absolute worst case - higher than strictly necessary. 
In addition the scheme does not currently take into 
account probability and time of irradiation, or 
perform multi-emitter assessments as per (22). These 
aspects prevent an entirely accurate picture of the RF 
environment for RADHAZ purposes. These 
limitations can also adversely affect operational 
safety margins under certain conditions, particularly 
with respect to co-sited and/or co-frequency emitters 
where some or all have ERPs below the HIRTA 
minimum level, for example. Constructing a 
complete database of emitters is an unrealistic aim 
as, for example, the sheer numbers of emitters 
involved are enormous - for example it was 
estimated (16) that there were at least 0.5 million 
.'.rnrnoLtIaIJI.naIaLvLfl., 
unlikely - and the risks are usually small in reality - 
a number of instances of this type of accident have 
been reported (12). The hazards to flammable 
atmospheres and protective measures are described 
in BS6656 (13). 
3 THE RF ENVIRONMENT 
Adequate and accurate definition of the RF 
environment in the vicinity of susceptible devices is 
crucial to quantifying the operational risks involved. 
The definition of ' vicinity ' for MAD extends to: 
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microwave transmitters in the U.K. alone in 
November 1989. Of these 542 were high power 
systems covered by the HIRTA scheme, with an 
estimated rate of increase in transmitters (including 
transmitter 'retirements') of up to 100 per aimuin as 
communications systems migrated from the lower 
frequencies (e.g. HF band) to the microwave region, 
where the same data rate can be transmitted for a 
lower percentage of the available bandwidth. 
Environment Definition - RADHAZ Assessments 
Most RADHAZ assessments are still conducted 
using simple radio/radar system models and worst 
case RF parametrics, e.g. maximum ERP, antenna 
gain and beam coverage are generally used, with 
little or no consideration of probability or time of 
irradiation of the susceptible device. This historical 
situation is driven by the computationally intensive 
situation of trying to model an aircrafl or aircraft 
formation, each one with multiple susceptible 
devices and device types, flying through a 
multi-emitter environment. The increased capability 
and performance of relational database technology 
and RF scenario generators (such as used by the 
Electronic Warfare fraternity), coupled with better 
antenna/radar system modelling promises substantial 
improvements in the quality of RADHAZ 
assessments. Rapid, low-cost and realistic RADHAZ 
assessment of any system on any vehicle, anywhere 
in the world appears now to be a realistic near term 
aim. To identilr and understand any limitations of 
existing safety margins, C&A procedures and EMC 
clearance level requirements, research now targets: 
a) quanti'ing the time line profile of fields vs. 
frequency to be experienced by susceptible devices 
under various peace/war time conditions; and b) 
assessing any possible LED/electronic equipment 
safety margin degradation caused by dynamic flight 
through those multiple emitter environments, most 
of which have complex radar waveforms that are not 
yet fully addressed in U.K./U.S. standards. 
Possible additional benefits of this research are the 
lowering of some civil/military equipment EMC 
requirement levels and safety margins, and a 
reduction of screening/siting requirements. This 
would be achieved through better definition of the 
environment, quantification of the probability of 
encountering high field levels in specified frequency 
sub-bands, and quantification of the risk of exposure 
to those fields for given time periods. 
4 SUSCEPTIBILITY ASSESSMENT 
The assessment of the susceptibility of devices is 
particularly difficult given the various frequencies 
that may be received by the device at any given 
instant. The complexity of the situation is 
significantly increased by the proximity of 
conducting objects and by the complex fields emitted 
by secondary emitters. This is exacerbated in the 
case of ground-based commercial electronics, such as 
computers, where there is very limited quantitative 
(i.e. manufacturer-provided) susceptibility and safety 
margin data. Some computer manufacturers will 
only guarantee correct operation if field strengths are 
kept below 1-5 V/m for up to I (3Hz. Most will not 
guarantee operations for frequencies >1 (3Hz and 
will not state upset levels at any frequency. MAD 
and others have thus been forced to conduct some 
practical measurements in order to scope the safety 
margins in specific frequency bands of interest. 
Although the European Community (E.C.) EMC 
Directive (17) will assist in this area, such systems 
are likely to remain some of the most susceptible 
devices to RF radiation - increasingly so as their 
clock frequencies transit into the hundreds of MHz. 
Assessments of susceptibility have traditionally been 
conducted on a single transmitter vs. a single 
susceptible device at a time. If an adequate safety 
margin can be theoretically demonstrated then 
neither multiple emitter assessments nor practical 
measurements are generally warranted. These are 
complex as they involve a number of generally 
dynamic fields in which phase changes, with relative 
position, can cause there to be a large margin of 
error due to signal phase summation when carrying 
out assessments based purely upon power or 
amplitude. Computers can ease the difficulty 
involved in carrying out the relatively simple but 
laborious field strength summation, but invariably a 
ratiometric summation of the relative effectiveness of 
the field to induce a harmful effect (a susceptibility 
ratio) is required in order to complete the RADHAZ 
assessment. Another significant problem is that 
susceptible devices and emitters may be mobile, e.g. 
vehicles and aircraft, which results in rapid variation 
of the components of the susceptibility ratio. 
As the frequency of the field decreases the Rayleigh 
distance increases. Therefore at low frequencies it 
becomes increasingly more difficult to evaluate any 
potential hazard distances due to localised hot spots 
within the near-field of the emitter. Conducting 
media in the near-field will couple better into field 
and as such will significantly modi' the field that 
would exist if the object were not there. These errors 
are particularly difficult to theoretically assess unless 
complex and expensive EM modelling is used. 
ANSI-IEEE C95.3 (18) is the U.S. standard (no 
U.K./E.C. equivalent exists) for conducting 
measurements in order to establish whether a 
RADHAZ exists or not. However even within this 
standard there are acknowledged inconsistencies and 
errors, including the lack of a measurement quality 
factor to account for, or remove the inconsistencies 
that would occur between two or three sets of 
independently conducted surveys. 
5 RISK CONSIDERATIONS 
Risk assessment is a requirement of (4) although 
formal quantitative risk assessment plays little part 
in the present application of RF Safety Standards. 
However comparative risk assessment is an everyday 
task in carrying out safety assessments. Relative 
risks due to a RFE installation have to be assessed. 
Woolnough (19) indicated the relative risks due to a 
typical radar system and, as with the system as a 
whole, the relative risk due to the presence of NIR 
have to be equally assessed. This initial risk 
assessment is used by MAD to determine how 
comprehensive a RADHAZ assessment needs to be 
carried out. This risk assessment considers both the 
likelihood of the different types of susceptible device 
being present and other emitters which may affect 
the validity of the emitter in isolation assessment. 
This initial assessment ensures a cost-effective 
approach to RADHAZ C&A is achieved, only 
necessitating field measurements to be taken when 
an inadequate level of safety margin can be 
established via physical or procedural constraints, or 
when a specific risk of concern is identified. In 
practice this cautious but effective approach to 
RADHAZ assessments rarely results in the need for 
extensive field measurements. The most important 
item to remember when canying out a risk 
assessment is that the risk is the product of the 
severity of the hazard and the likelihood of exposure 
to that hazard. Table 2 shows a risk assessment 
matrix recently produced by the Engineering 
Employers Federation (20). This matrix is used to 
determine what action is taken to reduce high risk 
areas and the priority in dealing with them. 
6 LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
At this point it is appropriate to outline the U.K. 
legal requirements for RADHAZ by topic. This 
section outlines present knowledge of the legal 
situation, however it is likely that other regulations 
may be found to be applicable. It is worthy of note 
that the standards/guidelines usually associated with 
RADHAZ C&A, listed below, are not per se legally 
enforceable unless included in contract documents. 
They can, however, be considered to be 'Codes of 
Practice' and thus enforceable via the Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974 (HASAWA), which has a 
very broad base and a general duty of care is placed 
upon manufacturers, importers and suppliers of 
systems, employers, and employees to ensure, 'as far 
as reasonably practicable', the health, safety and 
welfare of others at work. 
- National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) 
'Yellow Book' (21): RADI-IAZ to humans 
- U.K. Ordnance Board Pillar Proc. P101 (22): 
RADHAZ to EEDs and firing circuits. 
- BS6656(13):RADHAZ-Flainmable Atmospheres 
- BS6657 (23): RADHAZ to EEDs 
- DEF. STAN. 05-74 (24): RADHAZ (in 
particular) to Humans 
- U.K. HIRTA(14,15): military aircraft RADHAZ 
- EUROpean Civil Aircraft Equipment (25) 
Additionally there is a proposal by the E.C. for the 
EPAD (3) which will cover any mechanism for 
hazard which is governed by the laws of physics, e.g. 
Vibration, Non-optical Non-ionising Radiations and 
Optical Radiations. It should be noted that the EPAD 
is considered by some to be restrictive in its 
application. The main requirement is (4), which 
calls for a risk assessment of all situations to be 
carried out amongst other H&S management 
activities. This is applicable to all hazards to humans 
caused by RADHAZ, whether directly via irradiation 
or indirectly through RADHAZ to one or more of the 
other categories of susceptible device. 
RADHAZ to Humans 
There are at present no explicit U.K. regulations 
defining exposure levels for workers or members of 
the public to EM fields <300 0Hz. The H&S 
(Display Screen Equipment) Regulations (26) states 
that 'All radiation with the exception of the visible 
part of the EM spectrum shall be reduced to 
negligible levels from the point of view of the 
protection of operators' or users' health and safety.' 
Allen (27) indicates fields of 1-10 VIm and 
<1 micro-T at a distance of 30 cm from a computer 
cathode ray tube at 15 kHz, levels which are orders 
of magnitude below the investigation levels 
recommended by the NRPB. The Reporting of 
Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences 
regulations 1985 (28) state that any incidence of 
cataract due to exposure to EM radiation shall be 
reported as a dangerous occurrence. While the 
application of this regulation relates mainly to 
optical radiations, causing such conditions as 
'Glassblowers' eye', the wide scope includes those 
caused by RF and microwave exposure. Regulation 
13 of the Provision and use of Work Equipment 
Regulations 1992 (29) states that 'Persons shall be 
protected from burns, scalds or sears from Work 
Equipment or its contents'. Although this does not 
apply to radiant heat this regulation could be applied 
to prevent RF burns from conducting objects in the 
fields of RFE. 
RADHAZ to Electrical/Electronic Equipment 
There are currently no explicit national Regulations 
covering RADHAZ to electrical and electronic 
equipment although legal compliance in this area is 
implicitly linked to the relevant military/civil aircraft 
contract through EMC specifications. Eventual full 
implementation, from 1996, of(17) will form a legal 
requirement on all new electrical/electronic 
equipment for both RF susceptibility and emissions. 
RADHAZ to EEDs 
The relevant Acts of Parliament that cover this field 
are the Explosives Act of 1875 and 1923. 
Regulation 12 of (29) states that 'Measures shall be 
taken as should prevent or adequately control risk to 
the H&S of users from the following hazards - 
unintended or premature discharges or explosions 
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(e.g. detonators).' Regulation 3 of (28) defines any 
unintentional ignition or explosion of explosives to 
be a dangerous occurrence. 
RADHAZ to Flammable Atmospheres 
Regulation 9 of the Flighly Flammable Liquids and 
Liquefied Petroleum Gases Regulations (30) places a 
responsibility on occupier of any facto'y to prevent 
the presence of any means likely to ignite a 
flammable vapour where such a vapour may exist. 
Additionally the HASAWA may be considered to be 
applicable. Regulation 3 of (28) defines any 
explosion or fire involving process materials or 
products and resulting in 24 hours stoppage to be a 
dangerous occurrence. 
7 FORMAL C&A REGIME CONSTRUCTION 
The construction of a fill formal C&A regime is a 
costly and complicated task, with a balance needing 
to be drawn between the extent of the risk and the 
cost of reducing that risk to acceptable levels. It 
therefore follows that it would be most expedient to 
draw up a modular RF Safety programme from 
which compulsoiy and optional modules could be 
selected to optimise the control measures versus risk 
ratio for a given industrial situation. The basic 
modules of such a 1ff safety progranune, as used by 
MAD, are described below. It is vely important to 
remember that retrospective application of LW safety 
principles will be both more expensive and difficult 
to implement. Organisations which decide to 
implement RF Safety programmes should do so as 
early in the product/facility life-cycle as possible so 
as to ensure real financial gains in addition to 
improved safety. 
7.1 Development Of Control Procedure 
When the development of a formal RF Safety 
programme was started at MAD the only parts of a 
programme that were in place were an airfield RF 
enviromnent assessment report (comprising a 
theoretical assessment and some measurement data) 
and local procedures for some of the microwave 
systems that were in use on site. These documents, 
together with the site explosives and prohibited 
weapons safety manual (31), fonned the total of RF 
protection in this area and had provided adequate 
levels of safety up to that time. An initial risk 
assessment was carried out (32) which, together with 
research into the basic problems associated with 
RADHAZ and the state of the art in international 
standards, allowed the development of a draft 
Control Procedure. This was discussed with a 
number of national and international experts to 
ensure that an adequate set of provisions had been 
incorporated and the document (33) has now been in 
use since early 1990. In the last year (33) has been 
taken up in the U.S. as one of the framework 
documents for a draft IEEE standard on practical RF 
safety. 
7.2 RADHAZ Control Procedure Requirements 
This section covers the general requirements of the 
RF Safety Programme. It is based on (33) and work 
being carried out in the U.S.A. on a practical RF 
safely progranune, which is utilising (33). The 
requirements of a RF safety programme are based 
upon both the individual level of risk posed by RFE 
and the total level of risk to susceptible devices 
located around the site under consideration. The 
following outline the elements of (33). 
Introduction to RADHAZ. This is used to train 
personnel in the subject of RADFIAZ. It is written 
so as to be informative and easily understood and 
covers policy position and statement, the EM 
spectrum, basic sources of RF radiation, the effects 
of RADHAZ and legal requirements. 
Introduction of Equipment This defines what 
equipment may not be brought on site; it is the first 
level of control and may be a total exclusion unless 
individual risk assessments are conducted. 
Registration and Assessment. This defines the 
procedure to be carried out before the introduction of 
equipment onto the site or any modifications to 
existing systems. It includes sections on RFE 
registration and assessment and may actually include 
levels and techniques. At MAD the assessment 
procedure is maintained as a separate document (34). 
Training Requirements. In general terms this 
describes the depth and scope of training to be given 
to different personnel, from the RFE operator to the 
personnel assessing RADHAZ. 
Auditing and Monitoring. This is required under 
the Management of Health and Safety Regulations 
and is used to check systems of work and inspect 
equipment safety provisions and procedures. 
Medical Screening of Personnel. Whilst medical 
screening for RF radiation is not generally necessaiy. 
MAD operate a medical screening programme that 
requires personnel to declare prosthetic devices to 
the Chief Medical Officer. A risk assessment is then 
carried out to evaluate whether the person is likely to 
suffer any harmful effects and to ensure any 
location/movement limitations are identified. Great 
care is required when instigating a medical 
screening programme. Boeing Inc. (U.S.A.) found 
out to their cost that a medical screening programme 
could actually be counter-productive. Their well-
intentioned collaboration with a university and the 
method of screening used may have been seen as 
experimentation on personnel working within the 
EM pulse generator and led to an out of court 
settlement of $500,000 (35). 
Appointment of a Radiation Safety Officer. The 
appointment of a person to administer the 
application of the 1ff safety programme is 
considered essential. The duties and reponsibilities 
of the Radiation Safety Officer (Non-lonising) 
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IRSO(NI)J are covered below. 	 The '(NI)' 
differentiates between this and the lonising RSO, 
who covers nuclear aspects of the site's 
manufacturing and development operations. 
Accident and Incident Reporting. This defines the 
duties of different levels of personnel involved in, or 
investigating an accident or incident. 
Responsibilities. 	 This 	 defines 	 specific 
responsibilities with respect of RADI-LAZ and 
includes the terms of reference of all personnel 
involved in the implementation of the Control plan. 
Safety Precautions for Specific Equipment. This 
includes control methods for specific generic systems 
e.g. microwave ovens, induction heating devices and 
management radios. It may also include control 
methods related to specific susceptible devices. 
8 ROLES OF RSO(NI) AND SPECIALIST 
As a company with large numbers of emitters and 
susceptible devices, MAD have felt the need to 
appoint a full time specialist covering both RB and 
Laser Safety. In addition a RSO(Nl) and Laser 
Safety Officer have been appointed to be responsible 
for the individual subjects. The role of a RSO(NI) is 
the same as for any safety related field, acting as a 
focal point for questions on RE Safety and 
responsible for the formulation and implementation 
of the RE Safety programme. A RSO(NII) does not 
necessarily have to be a technical specialist but must 
be technically competent, with a basic understanding 
of the effects and implications of RE radiation safety. 
It is also vital that the RSO(Nl) has the authority to 
adequately control the hazards, including the power 
to close transmitters down under incident/accident 
conditions or where adherence to the C&A 
procedures is not demonstrated. 
The role of a technical specialist is precisely that of a 
consultant. The technical specialist may or may not 
be the RSO(NI), but given the wide scope of the task 
a veiy detailed evaluation of whether organisations 
can afford to procure or train and maintain a 
technical specialist must be carried out. For 
facilities where the risk is assessed to be insufficient 
to support an employed specialist then there are a 
number of consultants and consultancy services 
available within the U.K. 
For each company where RF Hazards may be present 
it appears reasonable to expect a person should be 
appointed as RSO(Nl). As with any other safety 
issue, one person should be responsible for the RF 
safety of each system; often this can be satisfied by 
the system supervisor. If the evaluation of the risk is 
technically difficult or the output indicates that the 
risk is significant, then it would appear reasonable to 
consult a specialist. It would be wrong for this to be 
considered as appropriate for all companies as each 
organisation must evaluate its own levels of risk and 
operational methods. 
9 HISTORICAL DATA 
It is, as with other H&S areas, and probably always 
will be veiy difficult to measure the 
cost-effectiveness of RADHAZ C&A procedures. 
What is known is that failure to address and 
adequately control hazards to U.K. personnel from 
products or operations will, in the future, attract the 
attention of the law in the form of prison sentences 
and potentially unlimited fines (36). It is important 
therefore to be able to demonstrate, in the 
unfortunate case of incident or accident, that all 
sensible and reasonable precautions had been taken 
to prevent such an event. To this end MAD are also 
actively involved in the construction of international 
RE/laser incident/accident databases to enable 
preventative actions to be taken where appropriate. 
In these ever more cost-conscious days, other 
cost/performance metrics need to be developed, 
rather than just the lack of incidents/accidents. 
Initial work has commenced on developing suitable 
metrics and, as an indication of the type of data 
which could be used, Table 3 gives some raw 
RADHAZ assessment statistics. The number of 
RADHAZ assessments for on- and off-site RFE and 
susceptible devices is given, with one column each 
covering new, changed or relocated transmitters and 
susceptible devices. The latter column also covers 
the case where changed standards and/or guidelines 
has required a re-assessment of the hazards posed to 
the devices. The table includes incident/accident 
numbers and it should be noted that, to date, none 
has resulted in any person sustaining physical 
damage or requiring medical treatment. Although a 
small number of incidents/accidents has occurred 
over the last two decades, procedures have been in 
place to contain them. Great care has been taken to 
learn from the experiences, modiling working 
practices and equipmcnt wherever possible to 
prevent recurrence. One of the major limitations of 
this kind of data is that it gives little indication of the 
effort involved, e.g. the assessment of aircraft/ 
weapons operations from a foreign air base involves 
substantially more effort than for the same 
aircraft/weapons from the Warton airfield where the 
RF parametrics and other features contributing to the 
RE environment are well known. 
10 INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION 
In a relatively new scientific topic, where the first 
international protection limits were set in 1958, 
there is still much to be confirmed with respect to the 
safety of Nut There is a large range of levels set as 
NW protection standards ranging from the levels set 
by the Commonwealth of Independent States to the 
levels set by both the Americans and the U.K. 
NRPW Those of the US and U.K., having a wealth 
of supporting research data acquired over the last 
few years, are acknowledged to represent the highest 
quality world-wide. Substantial research is still 
required to ensure a consistent approach across the 
km 
whole frequency spectnim. International research 
collaboration is highly desirable to: ensure coherence 
and qualification of research; optimise scientific 
expertise available per topic; improve the techniques 
used in the research; and ease the financial burden of 
the research. 
This approach, coupled with the adoption of 
techniques used in other more established sciences, 
should enable an international consensus to be 
reached in all of the aspects of MR Safety. This 
reasoning is further advanced by the emphasis for 
international standards to be developed to ease the 
financial burden of [exporting] companies' 
compliance with differing national standards. 
Given the way that standards, particularly those 
related to safety, affect industry it must be considered 
important for U.K. Industry to have a direct voice 
into international and national standards setting so 
as to ensure that prohibitive standards are not 
unnecessarily set and, wherever possible, the needs 
of U.K. industry are adequately addressed. It is 
suggested that the only way for the cost-effective 
achievement of this objective is that Industry must 
have a select group of highly trained and 
internationally respected technical specialists. MAD 
supports this objective and has taken a forward 
looking approach in this area in the last four years 
and is seen to have paid dividends. The 
RADHAZILaser Safety Specialist provided detailed 
comments to the NRPB in the consultative stage of 
the development of their latest guidance and is a 
member of Sub-committee's 2 and 4 of the American 
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
Standard Co-ordinating Committee 28 (IEEE 
SCC-28) who develop the U.S. standards in this 
area. IEEE SCC-28 are developing the new standard 
on a practical 1W safety programme mentioned 
earlier in this paper. It is hoped that this evolving 
progranunelstandard will, in due course, be offered 
to the International Electro-Technical Committee for 
possible adoption as an international standard. 
11 THE WAY AHEAD 
Although work to date has enabled MAD to ensure 
the adequate control of hazards to its operations 
posed by RF radiation, there remains much to be 
done in the area of RF safety standards, control 
method and assessment techniques. The conduct of 
this further work is of great importance as 
non-compliance with recently introduced (U.K.) and 
pending (E.C.) legislation on H&S carries severe 
penalties. The prime elements of the way ahead are: 
International consensus (military and civil) is 
required within the topic matter of RF safety. 
Efforts towards this objective are being actively 
taken by a number of national and international 
organisations, with the development of such items 
as a revised NATO Standard for personnel 
exposure to RF Radiation, to which MAD have 
contributed. 
- Realistic modelling of both the RF environment 
and susceptible devices is required. Research is 
being conducted in a number of areas in order to 
establish new methods and techniques in the 
definition of the RF environment. This is focussed 
on field mapping techniques rather that the wire 
line analysis approach. It is hoped that traditional 
EM modelling techniques, which are very 
computer intensive, may in due course be 
simplified and incorporated within the arsenal of 
RADHAZ assessment tools. 
Quantitative RADHAZ risk assessment techniques 
require development and international acceptance. 
Appropriate numerical techniques already exist 
but, at present, those techniques are not generally 
applied. Work now being conducted in this area 
strongly suggests that quantitative assessment of 
the likelihood of fields being present will play an 
important part within the assessment of RADHAZ. 
- Databases of RADHAZ incidents/accidents are 
urgently required. The potential cost benefits to 
Industry and the Armed Services of learning from 
earlier experiences to prevent the 'many incidents 
precede an accident' syndrome cannot be over 
emphasised. Such preventative systems already 
pay dividends in other safety areas. MAD are 
actively involved with international organisations 
in such work, both on RF transmitters and lasers. 
12 CONCLUSIONS 
BAeDEF(MAD) has developed a RADHAZ Control 
and Assessment scheme of international calibre. 
This is currently being partly adopted as a U.S. 
standard and may in turn be adopted internationally. 
Such a scheme, having been operated successfully 
for some time, is believed to provide appropriate and 
cost-effective control of the risks associated with 
non-compliance with U.K. legal requirements, 
particularly in the area of human Health and Safety. 
It is probable that this scheme, or a sub-set thereof, 
would suffice for most industrial situations. 
Co-operation and collaboration with national 
(NRPB/MoD et al.) and international agencies 
(primarily in the U.S.A.) enables industry to have a 
strong voice in standards setting. As much 
RADHAZ research still remains to be done, such 
work also ensures that the latest world-wide research 
ideas and information are available to assist in the 
timely identification of any additional precautions. 
Thus BAeDEF(MAD) continues to ensure the 
highest level of protection from HF hazards for 
employees, Customers and the public. 
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TABLE 1- TYPICAL INTENTIONAL RF EMITFERS 
EMIflER FREQUENCY 
(MHz) 
PEAK POWER 
(kW)  
MODULATION 
ATC RADAR 600 500 4 gs Pulses 
Air Surveillance Radar 2750-3050 58 Pulsed 
Radar IFF/SSR 1000 1 Pulsed 
Precision Approach Radar 9000-9200 320 Pulsed 
HF Radio 2.8-23 0.4 Single Side band 
VHFRadios 118-225 0.125 AM/FM 
UHF Radios 225400 0.125 AM/FM 
Military Radar 9000-10000 2000 Pulsed 
Radar/Comins. jammers HF-SHF (classified) (various) 
Medical Diathermy 27 0.1 CW 
Cell-phones 900 0.013 AM/Digital 
TABLE 2- RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX 
Likelihood (Exposure) 
	 Sevedty (Hazard) 
Minor 	 uptoaoays 	 SDeys+ 	 Major 	 Death 
1 Exaemely Unlikely 
2 Unlikely 
3 Likely 
4 Vow  Likely 
5 Certain 
2 
1 2 3 	 4 	 5 
2 4 8 	 8 	 10 
3 6 pV 
4 8 ft 	 16! lr  
- 	
---.- y 
5 
Insignificant-  
IOWpflonty vP4al&YI: 	 - 1 	
-H-- 	 - . ..., 
P pl. 
TABLE 3- HISTORICAL DATA ON RADHAZ ASSESSMENTS 
YEAR No. OF CHANGED 
RF TRANSMITtERS 
CHANGED/RELOCATED 
SUSCEPTIBLE DEVICES 
No. OF 
INCIDENTS 
No. OF 
ACCIDENTS 
1982 I 0 0 0 
1983 0 0 0 0 
1984 1 6 0 0 
1985 3 1 0 0 
1986 5 4 0 0 
1987 13 6 2 I 
1988 6 7 1 0 
1989 9 12 2 I 
1990 9 7 0 0 
1991 7 3 1 0 
1992 75 2 0 0 
1993 Il 6 3 0 
1994 8(10 19 July) 4 (to 19 July) 0 0 
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APPENDIX B: EMC OUALIFICATION OF 
MILITARY AVIONICS AND AIRCRAFT 
Bi INTRODUCTION 
This appendix covers the above and discusses the outcome of a review of EMC 
qualification standards for military avionics. It also addresses EMC test requirements and 
techniques applicable to whole aircraft. 
B2 EMC QUALIFICATION OF AVIONICS EQUIPMENT 
Military avionics are subjected to numerous different tests prior to fitment to aircraft to 
ensure conformance to specification. An important area of these tests is the qualification of 
the equipment to function correctly when exposed to the aircraft's operational environment. 
This covers standard items, e.g. fluid contamination, salt, sand, altitude, temperature, rain 
and vibration, as well as more esoteric tests, e.g. EMC and fungus resistance. EMC tests 
cover many aspects, from conducted susceptibility and voltage transient resilience to 
compass safe distance, lightning strike and radiated emissions. The specific tests of 
relevance to this research programme are the Radiated Susceptibility (RS) tests, where each 
Unit Under Test (UUT) is irradiated at given microwave power density levels whilst its 
capability to continue operating correctly is examined. Applicable test standards and test 
techniques used are discussed. 
B2.1 STANDARDS 
All currently used microwave irradiation EMC qualification test specifications were 
reviewed and the relevant ones identified [B-i] to [B3], [3-8] and [3-9]. It was established 
that the latest UK military aircraft EMC specification [3-9], whilst based on earlier 
documents (mainly US MIL. STD. 46113/2 [B-2]), contains much higher test level 
requirements at microwave frequencies than any other specification, thus partially reflecting 
the anticipated worsening of the RF environment in that band. The prime changes to the RS 
test above I 0Hz in the transition from [B-2] through [B-3] and [3-8] to [3-9] are: 
- upper limit lowered to 18 0Hz, then later re-instated at 40 0Hz, 
- the requirement to measure power density at the Unit UUT, 
- introduction of a restriction of the choice and modified use of transmitting antennae, 
- new modulation requirements to simulate the effect of radars (i.e. high peak fields); with 
an additional double modulation test to simulate the effect of rotating radars. 
B2.2 TEST TECHNIQUES 
A review was carried out of the test techniques used in avionics EMC qualification >1 0Hz 
for the [3-8] and [3-9] specifications, the only two directly applicable to this research 
programme. 
B2.2.I The Eurofighter 2000 EMC Specification 
Tests above 1 0Hz for the Eurofighter (EF2000, formerly known as EFA) are given below. 
Items a. -c. are only applicable to receivers and tuned amplifiers operating in the range 1 
MHz to 40 0Hz and are therefore not directly relevant to this research. 
a CS-EFA-5: Conducted Susceptibility, Inter-modulation 30 Hz to 40 0Hz, upper 
frequency to be defined by aircraft company's EMC specialist. 
b. CS-EFA-6: Conducted Susceptibility, undesirable signals rejection, 30 Hz to 40 0Hz, 
upper frequency as above. 
c. CS-EFA-7: Conducted Susceptibility, Cross-Modulation, 30 Hz to 40 0Hz, upper 
frequency as above. 
d. RS-EFA-3: RS, Electric Field, 14 kHz to 40 GHz. Upper frequency "shall be defined by 
the aircraft manufacturers EMC Specialist. Normally, for equipment with operating 
frequencies below I GHz, the upper test frequency shall be 18 GHz." The equipment 
has to operate up to specified interference limits without any degradation of 
performance; with swept frequency irradiation up to 18 GHz, and spot frequencies 
permissible for 1840 GHz. Up to limits increased by 6 dB safety critical equipment 
must either perform satisfactorily or may go into fail safe conditions, returning to fhll 
performance when the interference signal is reduced to the un-enhanced limits. The 
r.m.s. CW field strength requirement for both externally mounted or in open EM areas 
equipment is 955 Wm 2 (600 Vm4), and for internally mounted equipment is 26.5 Wn1 2 
(100 Viii'). In addition the worst case modulation "shall be determined and used 
thereafter in the test". Also, as a minimum, the following is required to be used: A 
double modulation consisting of 100% pulse modulation with a pulse repetition 
frequency of I kHz (± 0.1 kHz) with a pulse duration of 1 ps (± 0.1 is) together with a 
square wave modulation at 100% with a frequency of 0.5 (± 0.1) Hz. Whilst the peak 
field strength under these conditions is to be specified by the aircraft manufacturer's 
EMC specialist, as a general rule that it will be equivalent to the CW requirement. 
B2.2.2 DEF. STAN. 59-41 (Part 3) 
A smaller, but similar list of tests as those above apply, with the equivalent to EFA-RS-3 
being DRS02: RS for 0.79-18 GHz. Pulse modulated test levels of 27 Wm 2 (100 Vm') are 
defined, plus 6 dB (= 105.6 Wn1 2 or 200 Vm1) for equipment generating drive signals to 
external stores, e.g. weapons and fuel tanks. CW test levels for 1-18 0Hz are 1.1 Wn1 2 
(20 VmS') and, as above, plus 6 dB (= 4.2 Wm 2 or 39.8 Vm') for stores-driving circuits. 
This test, in common with EF-RS-3, is performed in a screened room, utilising RAM 
suitably positioned to minimise reflections. With the UUT on the ground plane, it is 
irradiated by a waveguide horn transmitting antenna spaced 1 m from each face of the UUT 
in turn. A field probe (also a waveguide horn at these frequencies) is used adjacent to the 
Till!' to ratify the test power density level achieved. It is then irradiated with swept 
frequency RF energy whilst checking for malfunctions. Above 1 GFIz any discontinuities in 
the HUT, i.e. potential energy ingress routes, are also presented perpendicularly to the 
linearly polarised transmitting antenna in turn and the test repeated. Limiting tests to only 
horizontal and vertical polarisations is driven by time and cost considerations. 
B2.3 DISCUSSION 
The radiated susceptibility test techniques of Sections B2.2. 1 and B2.2.2 are equivalent, 
excepting the frequency range and absolute test levels difference, with the latter of [3-9] 
being 5-15 times higher than those of[3-8]. Ref. [3-9] contains a qualifier on the peak field 
strength requirement that "If investigations indicate that the equipment under test will be 
subjected to higher pulse field strength when used on the aircraft system (externally or 
internally mounted) these higher requirements apply." It was unclear how this would be 
effected in practice, but it is known that the maximum peak power density requirement is 1 
MWm 2 (19.4 kVm'), to a MoD-defined frequency profile, but with mean power density not 
greater than I kWni 2. These values ensure that equipment is qualified to levels much closer 
to the current and predicted future microwave environments in Chapter 2. 
Conducting high power RS tests in a non-fully anechoic room leads to reflections, causing 
erroneous measurements of incident power density on the UUT and poor repeatability. The 
positioning of the measurement probe, which is usually specified as a double-ridged 
waveguide horn for 240 0Hz, necessarily close to the HUT at these power density levels is 
also likely to lead to measurement errors due to field perturbation by the antenna itself 
These measurement probes are calibrated by comparison against Standard Gain horn 
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antennas, used as a reference, whose performance is calculated using high accuracy 
mechanical details. 
B3 AIRCRAFt' EMC QUALIFICATION 
As discussed in Section 3.2 no other technique is available for whole aircraft EMC 
qualification and thus tests on aircraft, known as 'EMC clearance', are necessary to 
demonstrate adequate safety margins for safe and correct operation of systems when in the 
presence of both on-board generated and external EM fields. MoD and BAe research is 
targeted at the development of other techniques and tools which will reduce and eventually 
obviate the need for aircraft tests in the 1-40 0Hz band. The cost and timescale benefits of 
obtaining EMC clearance without using the aircraft are substantial. For UK military aircraft 
any alternative clearance techniques must be acceptable to the clearance authority, the UK 
MoD, who have indicated willingness to consider such alternatives, if presented with 
supporting research evidence. This section outlines clearance requirements applicable to 
military aircraft and discusses how they are satisfied. 
B3.1 CURRENT AND FUTURE TEST REQUIREMENTS 
Microwave EMC clearance requirements for UK military aircraft currently in service are 
determined by the MoD's Technical Authority, the Armament and Aircraft Experimental 
Establishment, Boscombe Down. The techniques to be used, see Section B3.2, are 
researched and developed by the Defence Research Agency at Farnborough (DRA(F)). For 
export aircraft the Customer often mandates that the requirement and techniques are 
underwritten by the UK MoD, and thus the same procedures as for RAF aircraft are used. 
Even for Private Venture sales abroad, BAe normally use these established EMC clearance 
procedures as appropriate to the particular aircraft contract. 
The current requirement for microwave EMC clearance of aircraft is to irradiate the aircraft 
under test with a series of high power (pulse) radar transmitters, whilst monitoring for 
upset. The test levels are generally as high as the transmitters, which are currently located 
at Boscombe Down, can attain. These mean levels (before [3-8] and [3-9] there was no 
peak pulse requirement for UK aircraft tests) are then translated, by subtracting the 
appropriate safety margin, into a HIRTA clearance for '[V band (0.79-40 0Hz), giving 
vertical and horizontal separation between the aircraft and high power transmitters in the 
UK. This requirement is intended to cover not only irradiation of the aircraft by ground 
based radars, but also, as noted by Audone [2-24], by radars and jammers on other aircraft, 
whether formation flying of the same type or on nearby aircraft. 
Figure B I: Current Test Level Requirement For Unrestricted UK Flying 
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Current safety margin requirements for frequencies below 1 0Hz, which are driven by the 
MoD, are 6 dB for flight safety and navigation/radio systems, and 15-20 dB for weapons 
systems. Fig. Bi depicts the current 0.79-40 0Hz test level requirements, which have a 
3 dB safety margin applied, for a military aircraft to fly anywhere in the UK, i.e. with a 
clearance to fly close to HIRTA zones (see Section 2.2). Future clearance requirements for 
new or updated UK military fighter aircraft involve the more rigorous demonstration by test 
of elevated clearance levels. Since the microwave clearance specifications for these and 
future aircraft reflect the worsening RF environment, realistic safety margins are required, 
based on the probability of actually encountering a given microwave power density, as 
discussed in Section 2.3.2. This in turn also relies on a better prediction of the environment 
to be encountered vs. geographical location. 
B3.2 AIRCRAFT TEST TECIIN!QUES 
The aircraft is irradiated and examined to ensure that no adverse effects are caused to 
avionics, primarily flight safety critical and weapons systems. These tests have been 
conducted for many years at MoD Armaments & Aircraft Evaluation (now Defence 
Evaluation & Research) Establishment, Boscombe Down, Wiltshire using high power radars 
operating at a few spot frequencies in the 1-10 GHz band. Because of the limited number 
of radars available, and the absence of reported avionic problems >1 GFIz, it was considered 
adequate to extrapolate clearance levels from the few frequencies tested to 0.79-40 GHz. 
During 1989 another technique was re-introduced by using two other aircraft types as high 
power test transmitters. The test was not a formation flying test, although is is now also 
used for this purpose, rather being an additional microwave irradiation test adding more 
frequency points to the characterisation of the aircraft. Fig. B2 depicts the technique, with 
the aircraft under test in the background and the irradiating aircraft in the foreground. In 
order to satisf' the much elevated clearance test levels for the latest UK military aircraft is 
was necessary to develop new test techniques. Test techniques research at BAe, including 
that reported in Chapter 3, was conducted with a view to testing aircraft using a 'footprint' 
technique, where selected areas only of the aircraft are irradiated using high power RF 
sources, thus mininiising free space losses incurred by the traditional method described in 
Section B3 .2. The airframe attenuation research results were briefed to MoD (Ordnance 
Board and A&AEE) [BA] in support of BAe's proposed use of the alternative clearance 
technique. In conjunction with avionics upset data also presented at the time, agreement in 
principle was achieved. Following further work by A&AEE and DR.A(F) [2-17] the 
technique, in conjunction with avionics qualification evidence, is now a fully accepted EMC 
clearance technique for military and civil aircraft. An improvement to the technique for 
measuring airframe attenuation, mode stirring, was discussed in Chapter 3. High power 
commercial microwave amplifiers and antennas, recently acquired by A&AEE and BAe, 
now enable pseudo-swept clearance testing of aircraft, representing a significant 
improvement in the quality of EMC clearance testing of UK aircraft. This recent improved 
test capability will also enable better installed avionics susceptibility characterisation and 
could provide data to support the reduction of safety margins applicable to these tests. 
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APPENDIX C: ENVIRONMENT MODELLING AND ThREAT SIMULATORS - 
111GB OUALITY & LOWER COST VALIDATION OF EW SYSTEMS 
M.Pywefl and N. Stubley (BAe). Presented at NATO AGARD 3rd Symposium of Sensor & Propagation Panel on 
'Enviromnental Factors in Electronic Warfare related to Aerospace Systems Practica di Marc Air Force Base, Rome, 
Italy, 8-I1 May 1995. 
SUMMARY: 
Recent conflicts such as the Falkiands campaign, Gulf conflict and Bosnia have amply demonstrated the importance 
of LW to Mission Effectiveness and crew Survivability. in addition to this, since world-wide defence budgets are still 
reducing overall, the key driver for most Customers is Affordability. To a major aircraft prime contractor such as 
BAe Defence, these Customer requirements mean addressing a number of issues related to establishing the minimum 
necessary aircraft LW suite to satisfy those requirements. A key issue in this determination is a precise definition of 
the radar, RF and Electro-Optic (EO) electromagnetic enviromnent that the aircraft must operate correctly in. This 
paper addresses this aspect and the tools and techniques necessary to produce aircraft EW systems that not only 
conform to specification, i.e. have no defects, but also have adequate performance, i.e. are 'fit for purpose'. It 
concentrates on the 1W environment (modelling and threat simulators) as relevant to the tesling of ESM/RWRJELINT 
and ECM systems, although the principles are equally applicable to the EO, i.e. Infra-Red (Ilk) and Ultra-Violet (UV) 
regimes, and this is also discussed. It outlines LW System specification, describes LW environment modelling and its 
role in the design and validation process, covers EW Test and Evaluation (T&E) improvements, identifies shortfalls in 
current modelling capabilities, and gives major thrusts aimed at improving the LW development process. It 
addresses the issues above in the light of BAe Defence, Military Aircraft Division's experience in the field of both RF 
scenario modelling in support of a number of aircraft projects and planned ESM-LCM development work using 
scenario and equipment modelling, two world-class 1ff threat simulators, state-of-the-art ECM response measurement 
equipment and EW data analysis tools. It develops the argument that one of the main contributors to previous/current 
poor press on EW systems is believed to be the lack of adequate LW scenario definition at equipment/aircraft contract 
signature and that such definition should appear in specifications along side electromagnetic compatibility and other 
environmental issues. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Successful validation of complex LW systems prior to combat is a major technical goal of Industry, Government and 
Military Engineers alike. Adequate EW systems' performance is crucial to mission effectiveness and crew 
survivability and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Even as current and future aircraft strive for ever 
lower multi-spectral signatures it is considered that a plateau will soon be reached at which point mission success and 
survivability will again depend largely on the capability of the vehicle's EW systems. 
For a variety of reasons, EW systems world-wide have justifiably received bad publicity for many years - mainly 
through appearing to offer substantial technical promises which either have not been, or could not have been, realised. 
The methods of validating these systems, particularly ESM/ECM systems, have given cause for concern to the 
Customer and User alike. In particular there has appeared to be poor repeatability and substantial mismatch of results 
between laboratory tests and in-Service bebaviour of LW equipment. 
In addition, the traditional validation methods involving extensive flight trials can no longer be afforded in the light of 
shrinking defence budgets and there is a thrust both in the U.SA. and Europe to move much of this work to the 
modelling and ground test phase, by aircraft testing in an anechoic chamber and a combination of avionic rig and 
threat simulator tests. This work, which includes extensive scenario modelling and the increasing use of LW 
equipment models, offers great promise in reducing not only the expensive flight testing phase, but also overall LW 
development timescales and costs. The affordability thrust also means that the following issues must be addressed, 
and this paper addresses primarily the last two: 
What is the minimum necessary LW suite to provide appropriate level of aircraft survivability? 
What are the trade-offs between various factors affecting the level of complexity of that suite and how are they 
related? 
•Radar Cross Section vs. Altitude vs. ECM capability 
•IR Signature vs. countermeasures capability, e.g. flares 
•Use of Stand-Off or Escort Jammers vs. fully capable Self-Protection Jammner 
What is the RF/EO environment (threat and other emitters) in which mission effectiveness and survivability are 
required? 
How to specify, design and validate the performance of an installed EW suite with highest quality and at minimum 
cost. 
For LW systems validation to be achieved via this relatively new and more cost-effective route there is a need for 
better environment and emitter models, more capable and multi-spectral threat simulators for EW test and evaluation, 
realistic modelling of EW equipments and high power analysis capabilities. Although 1W environment and threat 
simulation tools have existed for some time, it is only more recently that some of the more complex issues of 
environment modelling, such as terrain masking, have been addressed in any detail. Recent computing power 
increases now enable some of these computationally intensive tasks to be conducted in real time. 
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2. EW SYSTEMS 
A typical modern aircraft LW suite is shown in Figure I Its prime objective is the immediate and unambiguous 
identification and classification of threat RF/EO emitters, and automatic engagement of countermeasures and/or 
timely set-on of own weapon systems, preferably via passive targeting. A factor in common between Radar Warning 
Receivers (RWR), EW Support Measures (ESM) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) is their function of detecting 
and processing radar signals. Although differences exist, in terms of this paper their main functions are effectively 
the same and thus hereafter the term ESM is taken to mean all three. Missile Warning (MW) systems are sub-divided 
into pulse doppler radar Missile Approach Warners (MAW) and passive (IR/IJV) Missile Launch Warner (MLW). 
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Detailed knowledge of the following three items is crucial to the precise specification of EW suites, of whatever 
complexity: 
The RF/EO threat scenario(s), including geopolitical data to enable determination of non-military emitters in the 
theatre of operations for inclusion in the scenario(s), 
111gb quality RF/EO emitter parametric data, and 
Equally high quality operational analysis, covering tactics and the determination of Electronic Order of Battle. 
This information is used to generate time ordered histories of engagements which form quantitative benclunarks of 
performance for the aircraft and its installed EW suite. Such benchmarks for ESMIECM systems include pulse 
density (pulses per second) vs. frequency sub-bands vs. time, instantaneous dynamic range requirements vs. time, 
number of simultaneous pulsed and CW emitters vs. time, etc. 
An ideal EW equipment specification is one where these time histories are included pre-contract, such that no 
ambiguity on performance issues can exist, and such that the aircraft and EW equipment suppliers can understand 
fully and concisely what is expected of their products, i.e. what is the definition of 'fit for purpose for that aircraft 
when performing stated roles and missions. This level of specification, which requires significant modelling 
capability and effort, is rarely seen in specifications and less often, if ever, included pre-contract award. It is seen as 
an area when aircraft and LW equipment manufacturers, in concert with Defence Ministry and Air Force agencies, 
can enact major improvements in aircraft LW performance in tenns of Affordability and reduced development 
timescales, balanced Survivability and Operational Effectiveness. Use of the modelling tools and techniques 
described later, during the Staff Target/Requirements phases of projects, is seen as a potential enabler of these major 
improvements. 
4. EW ENVIRONMENT MODELLING AND ITS ROLE IN SPECLFICATION/VAUDATION PROCESS 
4.1 Use of Modellinf in the Specification/Validation Process 
BAe Defence (Military Aircraft Division), in its role as a major aircraft manufacturer and systems integrator, has a 
suite of appropriate models and simulators to support the conceptualisation, design and development of whole aircraft 
and their systems. The two modelling tools of most relevance here are BAe's Airborne Weapon System Engagement 
Model (AWSEM) and the EW Evaluation System (EWES) by Data Sciences (U.K.) Ltd. AWSEM, which nms on an 
IBM Model 5 Mainframe, enables operational analysts to take a Customer's threat scenario and tactical information 
and create an Electrouic Order of Battle for input to the EWES. Figure 2 gives a block diagram of the EWES suite of 
programmes and AWSEM as used by like. Figure 3 shows the considerable computing resources required to support 
such modelling capabilities as EWES. Slow run times for complex scenarios has, for example, led to a 1995 EWES 
upgrade, inter a/ia, to a DEC Alpha main host. 
4.2 Use In Validation of ESM Systems 
Figure 4 shows the typical arrangement and interaction of receiver model and EW receiver equipment in the 
validation process, whether at EW equipment supplier, ground avionic integration rig or aircraft ground/flight test 
stage. This shows how emitter and scenario data is input to both the EWES tool and RE threat simulator, and how the 
output of each is fed into the EWES or ESM Receiver Model and real avionic equipment respectively. The output of 
the Receiver model and real equipment, primarily in the form of time-ordered emitter track files with associated RE 
parametric and identification data, is correlated off-line via use of EW Analysis Post-Processor (EWAPP) and/or 
comprehensive LW [test] Data Merge, Analysis, Correlation and Statistics package (DMACS). By pre-determining 
allowable modelling and test error budgets and pass/fail criteria, a suitable regime for the quantitative demonstration 
of performance to specification can be determined through the comparison of modelled data with those acquired from 
rig or aircraft testing of the LW system. Where full ESM performance cannot be cost-effectively demonstrated via 
hardware tests, such as in the area of maximum pulse densities, it is necessary to use EWES and the receiver model as 
the verification tool. This requires that the receiver model is validated. This can be achieved by driving both real and 
modelled receivers with the same emitter scenarios and comparing their outputs. A typical EWES 'ESPRiT 
(man/machine interface) tactical scenario page is given in Figures 5 and typical outputs of the EW Scenario Generator 
and Analysis Post-Processor are showim in Figures 6 (pulse descriptor file for input to Receiver Model) and 7 (two 
commonly used analysis pages) respectively. 
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4.3 The Need for Rich quality Emitter Parametric Data 
As stated in section 3, high quality emitter parametric data is crucial to precise specification of both RF and EO EW 
systems. The performance and effectiveness of EW systems in ensuring survivability and first time mission success is 
directly related to the quality of the emitter data used in the specification and design of, and subsequent programming 
into modern EW systems. This level of importance is recognised world-wide and most new LW equipments are now 
flight line re-programmable with the latest emitter data of the highest quality. Such parametrics include primary 
items such as frequency, pulse width, pulse repetition rate and scan parameters, and more difficult parameters to 
measure and/or determine, such as pulse jitter/stagger rate4,atteni, frequency agility, and modulation on pulse. 
Since many radar and RF emitters occupy a fairly small portion of the total electromagnetic spectnnn it is hardly 
surprising that many emitters have broadly similar radar/I4F parametrics. This in turn poses one of the most difficult 
tasks for an ESM system - that of unambiguously identifying a given emitter, often in the presence of many other 
emitters (including the aircraft's own transmissions). Quality and validated emitter parametrics used both in the 
specification and design stages, ensures that the ESM-ECM receiver has a measurement capability equal to (if not in 
excess of) the maximum range of each parametric it is specified to handle, but also that it can use the latest 'picture' of 
a given emitter to form a multi-parametric 'windoW to aid in the identification/classification process within the ESM. 
Parametric data on Red (potentially hostile), Blue (own/friendly) and Grey (neutral/other) emitters is collected 
through various inteffigence gathering, including interception of actual transmissions by the threat radar - the ELINT 
mission. Data is analysed and collated into an Emitter Data Base (EDB). These are usually of the highest national 
and/or NATO security classification. The data gathering, analysis and database functions are complex and costly, yet 
essential [I]. 
Such data is only released to Industry on a project by project and strictly need-to-know basis, in relation to specific 
LW and aircraft contracts. This poses a problem to Industry where bid preparation and other pre-contract work often 
requires such data to enable the determination of the level of LW suite complexity and thus the level of test effort and 
resources/facilities required - both of which directly impact upon the bid price. It is therefore in the interest of 
Goveriunents and Industry alike that suitably sanitised data is available during the bid and pre-contract phases of a 
programme. Although it is possible to construct unclassified emitter databases with a reasonable level of confidence 
in quality/fidelity of the data, a far better solution to enable a minimum of over-specification for Industry and Services 
alike is believed to be the production of down-graded versions of the national database(s). When using such data in 
support of EW system specification, design and validation, it is important to maintain adequate configuration control 
of the database. A method of assessing the impact of adding a new emitter, changed parametrics or behaviour of an 
emitter in a given scenario is required that gives confidence that the LW system still remains fit for purpose, as a 
change in parametric(s) can result in a significant change to the overall electromagnetic environment seen by the 
aircraft during a given mission. 
4.4 EO and Combined RF/EO Environment modellinc 
To date most attention has been paid to radar/RE threat scenario definition, modelling and ME facilities. The 
recognition that the majority of aircraft kills since the Vietnam war have been to nt-guided missiles, combined with 
the apparently ever-increasing use of lasers as primary or adjunct targeting systems, necessitates the development and 
use of LO modelling and test capabilities akin to those already well established for the radar/RF bands. Survivability 
in future conflicts is likely to be best ensured when aircraft and their LW systems have the scenarios described in 
section 3 defmed in multi-spectral terms. Such scenarios would therefore fully describe the electromagnetic 
environment that the aircraft must operate correctly in and would include (as a minimum) the RF bands from HF, 
through the established microwave band (primarily C-J band with the more recent expansion of emitters into k-band), 
selected parts of the upper millimetre wave band (atmospheric windows in the 90-150 GHz area), various IR 
wavelengths (lasers, terrestrial heat sources, IR signatures of aircraft and inbound missiles) and UV wavelengths 
(lasers and missile motor plumes). Should such speculative directed energy weapons as High Power Microwave, 
Non-Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse and laser dazzle/damage [2]43],[41 prove to be viable, then these too would need 
to be included in the scenario specifications. 
These multi-spectral scenarios will enable precise specification of not only ESM, but also Laser Warners and IR/UV 
Missile Launch/Approach Warners, and will enable appropriate specification of multi-spectral test equipment for T&E 
work, particularly in the area of sensor correlation, data fusion and crew situation awareness. Such scenario 
defmition, modelling and T&E capabilities will become increasingly important for future aircraft where affordability, 
lethality, flexibility, availability and survivability considerations drive aircraft manufacturers toward much more 
highly integrated and covert sensors/systems, and faster reaction weapons systems than seen to date. Precise 
specification of systems of this level of capability, authority and probable automation - especially in the LW area - is 
seen as a prime requirement in minimising development costs/timescales and ensuring that the aircraft is fit for 
purpose. This argument is seen to be equally applicable to the upgrading of current aircraft, where increased EW 
capability and/or integration of EW elements is popular world-wide and predicted to remain so for the foreseeable 
future. To support the production of such LO scenarios the same fidelity level of data on EO sources is required as for 
the RE/radar emitter case, see section 4.3 
4.5 Modelling Shortfalls 
There are seen to be three main issues at present, which affect both environment/LW equipment models and 
simulators used for T&E and model validation: 
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Emitter/threat system fidelity: Somewhere between simple simulation and reverse engineering real equipment lies a 
cost effective simulation' of, for example, a threat radar system. For EW system perfonnance specification and 
testing, a radar emitter needs much more than merely being modelled as a zero scan, fixed frequency/pulse 
width/pulse repetition rate isotropic point source. Levels of complexity of the simulation necessary, which in many 
cases approach emulation (i.e. an accurate representation of the emitter in çyy  way the sensor/weapon system can 
determine), is largely limited by computing power, both in EWES-type tools and RF threat simulators. An example is 
the relatively small amount of data points which can be used to represent both emitter and own aircraft ESM antenna 
beam patterns. Typically large values are 500k points for a sensor antenna, split between the azimuth and elevation 
gains vs. frequency (i.e. a maximum resolution of 1 degree, 0.25dBi and 0.5 0Hz), and 4k points per full beam pattern 
for each emitter in the scenario (i.e. maximum resolution of 0.5 degree, 0.ldBi and 0.5 6Hz). In the U.S.A. the 
validation of threat simulators to be able to faithfully replicate a given threat is overseen by the CROSSBOW-S 
committee [5]. When extensive comparisons between the real threat and the simulator's version are complete (often 
>12 months per threat), they make recommendations for approval to the DoD Executive Committee on Threat 
Simulators, which manages and approves all Dol) development of surrogate systems. 
Scenario fidelity: Fidelity of the scenario is a trade-off of computing power vs. capability. To be truly representative 
all platforms must move correctly within the scenario, with such items as accurately modelled turn manoeuvres, 
6-degrees of freedom on the own aircraft with at least 3 degrees of freedom for the 'enemy' airborne systems, terrain 
modelling/masking, missile fly-out models, etc. Ranges, resolutions and accuracies of all parameters within the 
scenario need to be at least equal to, or preferably better than those of the airerafi/EW system being modelled or 
tested. All engagements/tactics (which lead to EOB definition) and movement/manoeuvres of all players must be 
faithful representations of those contained in the specification. Current EW modelling tools and simulators cannot 
fully satisfy these requirements and those of emitter/threat system emulation in real time, although the ongoing vast 
increases in computing power and speeds now becoming available offer much promise. 
Modelling vs. Simulator Capabilities: If the modelling system (e.g. EWES) and RF/EO threat simulator form an 
integral part of the specification, design and development process, then it is important, if not crucial, that their 
capabilities in a number of specific areas are very similar if not the same. Without this capability matching there is a 
real risk that correlation of results from the environment/EW equipment modelling and simulator/real EW equipment 
tests may not be possible without a substantial increase in the number of tests conducted or unnecessarily large error 
bounds andlor pass/fail criteria. This can come about, for example, if the emitters in the scenarios within the 
environment model and threat simulator start at different times and/or scan positions. When merged with the energy 
intercept algorithms for the sensor in the respective systems, it can easily be envisaged that the pulse descriptor time 
history from the environment model and simulator may well be different, possibly with marked differences (including 
missed pulses). Thus, if marginally or substantially different pulse descriptor files are presented to the ESM model 
and the real EW equipment via post-antenna injection or irradiation, then differences will result in the track file 
reports vs. time, making the correlation of modelled and test results difficult. This can also be exacerbated if the 
emitter and scenario processing within the simulator is not fully synchronised with its 1ff generation system. By 
careful consideration of these aspects it is possible to enhance repeatability, minimise these effects and thus enable an 
appropriate level of correlation between modelled and test results, leading to adequate validation of EW systems' 
performance. 
Modelling Enhancements Needed: BAe has conducted extensive investigations into the requirements for modelling 
and T&E capabilities necessary to support the conceptualisation, specification, design and development of modern RE 
EW systems, and have extended some of these investigations, which are continuing, into the EO/laser arena. The 
items of particular interest in the RF area are listed below. Most have been taken into account in the specification of 
two world-class 1ff threat simulators, an ECM response measurement system and a comprehensive EW data analysis 
capability. In addition an upgrade to our EWES capability includes changes relating to modelling vs. simulator issues 
described above. 
I. Terrain modelling: Various terrain types and surface cultures within scenario; including reflectivity aspects and 
sea states. Vertical as well as horizontal plane modelling. Grid size, terrain map input (e.g. DMA and Dm1)). 
2. Mullipath: Forward ground bounce, own transmitter vertical ground bounce. Specular/diffuse reflections = signal 
phase difference and thus changed amplitude at ESM. Own and other emitter multipath from aircraft in close 
proximity (includes need for some level of RCS modelling of aircraft involved - complex). 
3. Near field effects: dependent on frequency, transmit/receive antenna size; more relevant to large aircraft or low 
flyers. 
4. Antenna patterns: Better emitter/sensor antenna beam pattern modelling: i.e. more data points per pattern. 
5. Third party tracking: irradiation of ESM by emitter which is tracking/locked on to another aircraft in the scenario. 
6. Atmoheric effects: Attenuation varying representatively with frequency; rainfall rates; ducting. 
7. Chaff: Eject/bloom times and stream/drop characteristics. 
8. Repeatability and Correlatiort Ability to specify emitter boresight start values (e.g. all North, centre of scan on 
velocity vector of aircraft, or random). Same/sinillar parameter ranges/resolutions/accuracies as threat simulators. 
9. Emitters/Sensors on platforms, particularly aircraft: Current systems largely employ 'point platforms, e.g. each 
aircraft's emitters/sensors exist at one point in space. Need for wire grid 'model' of(at least) own aircraft on which 
emitters and sensor antennas may be placed. Need substantial computing power increase to enable this. 
10. Improved Modulation on Pulse: Improved fidelity needed. 
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II. ECM Effectiveness: Closed loop effects of own (and hostile) ECM on emitter behaviour and performance is 
required if quantitative metrics of survivability are to be specified and demonstrated in the future; cf. also 6.2 
12.Missile Modelling: Adequate fly-out model needed for missiles with active seekers. Proportional navigation 
homing is suggested minimum. Model needs to be same as that used in threat simulator. 
5. COMMONALITY OF EW AND EMC ENVIRONMENT PREDICTION NEEDS 
5.1 Realistic Environment and Probability of Exposure 
Specification of the minimum necessary RF environment(s) in which aircraft have to operate is also a key issue in the 
cost and development timescales of new and/or modified aircraft and their avionics 1 61. Modern Electromagnetic 
Compatibility (EMC) specifications, which are most often based on a worst case consideration with additional safety 
margins, simulate conditions which rarely, if evefl occur in real life. A number contain single value field strength 
levels across significant parts of the RF and radar bands, even though in some sub-bands transmitters do not exist. 
Thus there appears the possibility for cost/timescale reductions, which could be applicable across all military 
platforms, if a better RF environment prediction were to exist or be developed. The time line field strength4,ower 
density vs. frequency profile the aircraft is subjected to during its various mission types and phases, for peace- and 
war-time conditions, also affects RADHAZ. This is required to be known to ensure that aircrew are not hazarded and 
that there is no unacceptable hazard posed to on-board fuel systems and weapons/systems containing electro-explosive 
devices. For both EMC and RADHAZ, the item requiring determination therefore is, as for EW, the profile of power 
density vs. frequency vs. exposure time, i.e. the probability cf exposure, and, in the case of EMC, the consequent 
probability cf upset of avionic circuitry when the aircraft is actually irradiated with such an exposure profile. 
5.2 IHRTAJEUROCAE Prediction Methods/Limitations 
Currently the RF environment drivers behind EMC specifications in the U.K are the High Intensity Radio 
Transmission Area (HIRTA) scheme [7] for military aircraft and the European Civil Aircraft Equipment (EUROCAE) 
Use? s Guide [8] for civil aircraft. Of late the HIRTA scheme has assisted EUROCAE Working Group 33 in the 
definition of the European ItF environment. In each of these schemes a worst case is statically modelled where 
transmitters are effectively assumed to be permanently pointing their boresights directly at the aircraft under 
consideration. Both use equations based on optical point source theory to give far field power density (Pa: 
p = Aiflerw Gui x MnTr*nsmiiter Power 
d 	
x Main Beam Slant DaWive2 
with appropriate near field adaptations, particularly relevant for sub-GHz emitters, and antenna radiation patterns only 
for sub-0.6 0Hz emitters where significant off-boresight elevation and azimuth sidelobes can be encountered. 
Calculations, which take into account multi-transmitter sites, are translated into HIRTA exclusion zones which are 
simple geometric shapes (right-cylindrical for ground/shipbonie emitters and spherical for airborne emitters). With 
the possible exception of hovering or slow moving helicopters at very low levels, this represents an extreme worst 
case assessment as military aircraft moving at over 300 knots above a few hundred feet altitude are unlikely to be 
irradiated at any appreciable level by ground emitters for more than a few seconds in reality. The two schemes 
therefore, although adequate for their intended purpose, i.e. ensuring safety when in proximity to high power RF/radar 
transmitters, are both considered very conservative, due to: 
• no modelling of emitter/aircraft relative motion, 
- no modelling of emitter scan patterns, 
- inadequate transmit antenna modelling, and 
- only using worst case 1W parametrics rather than a realistic set vs. time (e.g. constant illumination by a CW source 
is unusual, whereas mode changes between search, track, lock and back to search are more realistic). 
• other shortfalls, e.g. section 4.3: terrain, multipath, weather effects and modulation on pulse. 
Since the EWES environment modelling capability addresses most of the shortfalls of these other tools/techniques, it 
is believed that there is significant scope for its use to develop realistic environment predictions upon which an 
estimation of probability of upset of avionics can be superimposed to yield higher quality EMC specifications. 
Aspects of BAe research are currently addressing this potential. 
6. EW TEST AND EVALUATION IMPROVEMENTS 
The development timescales of any avionic system is dominated by the T&E process, particularly so in the case of 
RF/EO EW systems. Table I shows the typical life cycle of aircraft EW systems prior to in-service use and shows 
T&E elements at the EW equipment supplier and the aircraft system integrator (avionic rig and aircraft ground/flight 
test). Operational Evaluation flying by Air Forces just prior to service use is a further T&E element. A major 
internal study of EW systems integration over many years and a number of aircraft types showed that many of the 
problems encountered, some 85%, could have been discovered much earlier in the development process, as shown in 
Table 2, by a combination of better T&E tools/techniques and specification/desgin methodologies. Although this 
underlined the possibility of verifying the majority of EW systems performance characteristics long before flight, 
through a combination of modelling, avionic rig and aircraft ground tests in anechoic chambers, it also showed that 
there would be a continued need for EW flight testing - albeit greatly reduced. Table 3 shows locations and 
techniques which can be used to support the development process. To minimise development costs and timescales it is 
necessary to push as much as possible of the T&E work to the top of the table. RAe Defence (Military Aircraft 
Division) is making much progress in enabling this by the provision of new/updated EW test and modelling 
capabilities. 
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6.1 Threat Simulators 
The need for, use and availability of RF threat simulators for laboratory, chamber, flight line and test/training range is 
widely recognised and documented [9-I 3J. Such simulation ranges from signal generators, a number of which now 
have both very wide frequency range (e.g. 100 kHz - 40 GHz) and internal pulse/frequency modulation capability, to 
arguably the two most capable systems at this time - the Advanced Multiple Enviromnent Simulator (AMES II) by 
Advanced Systems Development Inc., and the Combat Electromagnetic Environment Simulator (CEESIM) by 
Amherst Inc. Figures 8 and 9 are block diagrams of these two systems, showing the substantial complexity of the test 
tools required to adequately stimulate modem ESM and ECM systems. Having recognised the value of such 
simulators to the T&E process it is important from a cost standpoint, as world-class RF threat simulators are 
multi-million dollar items, to ensure that the simulator to be used at each point of the life cycle (see Table 3) is not 
over-specified. Here again is seen the importance of precise definition of the electromagnetic environment and 
scenarios, as the complexity and specification of the simulator required is directly driven by those items. From 
consideration of the scenarios and environment the key cost drivers of the simulator can be specified: 
- Number and frequency sub-banding of RF channels, yielding the pulse density capability (of the order of 1-10 
million pulses per second for modem ESM systems [14]). 
Number of simultaneous active emitters at any time. 
'Concurrency (how many of what type of emitter at any time) - a significant complexity/cost driver if a nwnber of 
pulse doppler radars, CW emitters and lower pulse repetition frequency emitters need to be simulated 
simultaneously. 
- Number of emitters and platforms per scenario. 
- Pulse % drop-out tolerable by the EW equipment under test. 
- Tolerable noise floor/bandwidth, intra-/inter-pulse noise levels, harmonics/spurious and inter-modulation signals. 
- RF Output: 4,6 or 8 port DOA; phase interferometer array. 
- Power output, both for the post-antenna injection and (amplifier/transmission system) free space irradiation cases. 
6.2 ECM Response Measurement 
To evaluate ECM systems it is necessary to stimulate theft receiver system, either ECM-specific or the ESM in the 
case of some modern ESM-ECM systems, and this is achieved by use of the simulators previously discussed. For 
high quality T&E work it is necessary to simultaneously stimulate ESM and ECM receiver elements for both 
post-antenna signal injection and irradiation cases. To enable this, special simulator frequency sub-banding, output 
power and combining arrangements may be required, especially if the simulator can combine other on-board aircraft 
transmitters and harinonics/intermodulation products thus caused into its outputs. 
ECM response measurement can be achieved through use of spectrum analysers and, more recently, by comprehensive 
and easy to use pulse modulation analysers, e.g. Hewlett Packard 5373A. However such capability is only suitable for 
simple ECM engagements and is manually and experience intensive. To be able to sort and recognise an ECM 
technique from an RF environment containing many pulsediCW emitters as well as transmissions from other aircraft 
emitters, then establish that the correct technique has been engaged spatially on the appropriate threat emitter is 
complex and well beyond the scope of such equipment. For this task a new generation of ECM Response 
Measurement System (RMS) has been specified and ordered by BAe which largely automates this task for laboratory 
and aircraft chamber/open air trials. Once again the environment and scenarios form the backbone of the specification 
of this equipment. By sampling the simulator output and the ambient RF environment, and through containing a 
pre-defmed list of ECM techniques vs. their RF parametrics, the RMS is able to quickly identify ECM transmission 
by direction, time and emitter being jammed. 
Currently the effectiveness of an ECM system is very difficult to measure absolutely. Survivability is a key issue in 
determining mission success and fleet affordability, but its quantification is made more difficult by the many 
interacting items affecting it (tactics, countermeasures engagement and/or deployment, SEAD/SOJ/ESJ support levels 
to the raid package, and so on). To quantify the survivability of an aircraft it is necessary to develop metrics which 
can be realistically specified and cost-effectively demonstrated with accaflable raeatability. Modelling has a role to 
play here [11],[15] but it is thought that a more realistic way forward, which would probably also achieve higher 
credibility with air crew, may be a statistical model determination based on chamber tests of a selected number of 
ECM types and technologies. Determination of the metrics and qualification/measurement of aircraft performance 
could be achieved via a modified threat simulator and RMS, where the threat simulator output is modified by the 
ECM transmitted from the aircraft. This topic of Measures cf Lffectiveness has attracted much attention in recent 
times, particularly in the U.S.A. where the Association of Old Crows has recently completed a study for the DoD on 
this topic [16]. 
6.3 EW Test Data Analysis 
As discussed in section 4.2, a comprehensive tool is required for the parametric analysis of EW test data and its 
correlation with simulator and/or EW environment/equipment modelling outputs. The lack of such capabilities in the 
past is believed to have contributed much to the apparent differences between equipment and aircraft EW test results. 
Such a new tool has been specified and ordered by BAe which will enable, in addition to the near real-time correlation 
capability of the ECM RMS (cf. 6.2), post-test analysis of aircraft avionics/EW equipment data and threat simulator 
data. This includes correlation of simulator-generated data with that of the EW system under test and subsequent time 
history and statistical analysis. Multi-parametric comparison of test and simulator data against engineer-defmed 
correlation 'windows' can also be carried out automatically. 
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In combination with precise scenario definitions, capable and realistic simulation, the ECM RMS, and a controlled, 
anechoic chamber electromagnetic environment, this new generation of LW analysis tool, enabled by computing 
advances in recent years, will enable quantitative and repeatable LW equipment, sub-system and on-aircraft tests. 
6.4 The Need for Correlated EO and RI? Threat Simulation 
The importance of precise specification of the EO environment and scenarios is covered in section 4.4. For T&E of 
EO equipments there is a need therefore for the generation of appropriate stimulus for irradiation of sensors and 
post-sensor injection. In the case of lasers this is fairly straight forward for the post-sensor and direct irradiation of 
the sensor (via a closed 'hood') cases for un-installed equipment and avionic rig work. For the future, the use of 
multi-spectral sensors, data fusion, knowledge-based systems and fully integrated weapons systems on aircraft mean 
that it will be necessary to provide co-ordinated RF/EO stimulus to the EW system, particularly of IRJUV 
Missile/Laser Warners and ESM-ESM, and other aircraft RF/EO sensors. This poses a T&E problem as free space 
firing of lasers poses a safety hazard and there are no established IR/UV simulators akin to the well established 
radar/RF ones. Development work on such simulators is in progress in the U.S.A. and the Real-Time JR Scene 
Simulator (KISS) by Amherst Inc., which can also have UV capability, is believed to be the world leader at this time. 
Figure 10 gives a block diagram of the RISS. Use of such a system in conjunction with a KY threat simulator and 
laser irradiation and control system, will enable controlled and simultaneous multi-spectral stimulation of aircraft 
Forward Looking 1K, JR Search & Track, passive Missile Warning Systems and Missile/Weapon Guidance Seekers. 
The use of such a comprehensive sensor stimulation suite in conjunction with an anechoic chamber may offer 
significant test quality and cost/timescale improvements on the combined aircraft ground and flight trials currently 
necessary to develop and clear such systems into service. 
7. EMPROVED EW DESIGN/T&E METHODOLOGY 
The thrusts of the previously described improved EW specification, design and T&E methodology are: 
• Obtain the agreement of Government agencies on the principle of precise RF/EO LW scenarios pre-contract 
signature. Work with those agencies and EW equipment suppliers to support timely production of scenarios. 
Explore further the application of such methodology and tools to the EMC arena. 
• Continue driving more of the LW system development process away from the highly expensive and time consuming 
flight test phase, through avionic rig, laboratory and aircraft in anechoic chamber trials, towards suitably validated 
modelling wherever possible. 
• 1995 commissioning by RAe of EWES upgrade, transportable (1.0 MN'S) and (1.5 MPPS) RF threat simulators, 
transportable ECM Response Measurement System and comprehensive LW data analysis utility. 
• Continue investigations of shortcomings of present modelling and T&E tools/techniques, particularly those 
identified herein and especially those in the area of LO threat simulation and ECM effectiveness modelling/test. 
Use this data to target improved capabilities to optimise development costs and timescales. 
• Build on over 20 years of BAe experience of Operational Analysis, LW environment modelling and LW integration 
rig and aircraft trials work. Work with LW equipment suppliers to ensure affordable and mission effective LW 
system solutions for military aircraft, whether upgrades or on new airframes. Use of these Industry capabilities can 
lead, in co-operation with Government/Air Force agencies, to much increased quality specifications leading to 
aircraft weapon systems which are fully fit for purpose at the most affordable price. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
RAe Defence Military Aircraft Division has learned many lessons from its 20+ years of involvement in EW 
equipment installed on its military aircraft. It has enacted most of the recommendations of internal study reports on 
its performance in this area and this year will augment upgraded LW environment and Operational Analysis 
modelling tools with major world-class LW test capabilities. 
This paper has highlighted a number of the issues involved in the specification, design, development and test of EW 
systems and concludes that the dominant factor in many of the key areas of Affordability, Mission Effectiveness and 
Survivability is a precise definition of the electromagnetic environment in which the aircraft and its systems must 
operate correctly. A revised specification, design and development process has been described which can be used to 
provide evidence of performance at realistic cost and with maximum integrity. A nwnber of potential enhancements 
to current generation modelling and test and evaluation tools are identified and RAe research and development work is 
ongoing in these areas. 
With environment and scenario modelling tools and techniques in place, it is believed that Air Forces, Industry and 
Governments alike would all benefit from this precise and unambiguous definition of the radio/radar and 
electro-optic environments at the pre-contract stage for new or upgraded LW equipments. 
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Figure 2: Block Diagram of EWES and AWSEM 
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Key to Figure 2: 
• Threat Scenario Definition = descriptive + initial conditions 
• Operation Analysis: Tactics and engagement rules into AWSEM = Electronic Order of Battle (BOB) 
• EOB comprises platform manoeuvres and events plus emitter events (e.g. mode changes) 
• Enhanced Scenario Preparation Interactive Tool (ESPRIT) is prime Graphical User Interface. 
• ESPRIT output = full scenario manoeuvres and BOB list for input into Scenario Generator. 
• EW Data and Scenario Ike-Processors are optional. 
• EW Data Sort/Merge Utility, used for very large scenarios, is also optional. 
• BAe currently have all but EWES Receiver Model and Scenario Pre-Processor. 
Figure 3: Computing Resources for EWES 
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Figure 4: Use of Modelling in Validation of ESM Performance 
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Figure 5: Typical ESPRIT Tactical Scenario Display 
FiEure 6: Typical EW Scenario Generator Pulse Descriptor File Listin2 
TYPE ID NAME RF RFVAR LENGTh PUT flAT AMPI. ETUDE RANGE INTERVAl. POL RAnG TIME 
w* n*sossc BRa ELEVN ma MOtE V. 
-- dep 
pit. $ FIREX 2700.00 0.0 16.00 22645 0.0 44.871 100.00 0.234 0.0 100.00 o0z0m4e1411 
- $ FIREX 2700.00 0.0 15.00 mu 00 44.5w 100.00 0.230 0.0 100.00 OOSOW.000604910 
pit. 8 FIREX 2700.00 0.0 15.00 331.79 0.0 44.255 100.00 0226 0.0 10000 00t000000024260 
pit. S AREX 2700.00 04 16.00 23343 0.0 44070 100.00 0274 00 10000 0000W.001150917 
pit. I REDEW 3000.w 0.0 10.00 233.54 0.0 45114 300.11 0.200 0.0 10000 000000.001167467 
pit. SOETEW 740000 00 3.70 233.71 04 41.633 226.47 0420 - 0.0 ¶00.00 00t0.001191417 
ptt 	 S SEATE 935000 0.0 20.00 - 334.07 00 46877 340.66 0400 0.0 100.00 0000X0.001241426 
pit. 3 CAMS 970000 00 1100 234m 0.0 41.506 20001 two 00 10000 000000001350138 
pi.ti 7VRA 15taa 0.0 5.00 23437 00 41.671 384.73 0.630 0.0 100.00 X.0000136503 
pit. ¶ REDEW 300000 00 10.00 234.2. 00 44.394 300.11 0.160 0.0 10000 0000m001367467 
pit. 8 AREX 270000 00 ¶5.00 235.3o 0.0 4443 100.00 0230 0.0 10000 000000001424470 
c-b 
Figure 7: Commonly Used EW Graphical Analysis Pages 
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Table 1: EW Development Life Cycle: 
Air Force/Government Agency Operational Requirement 
Weapon System Specification 
Air Vehicle Specification 
Aircraft Prime Contractor System/Equipment Specifications 
EW Equipment Manufacturer Hardware/Software Specifications 
Design/Build/Code Hardware/Software 
Equipment and EW Sub-System test 
Aircraft/Systems Integrator Avionic integration rig tests; aircraft ground and flight tests. 
Corrections/Modifications and specification changes if necessary. 
Air Force Operational Evaluation leading to Initial Operational Clearance. 
All parties Changes/corrections leading to Final Operational Clearance. 
Table 2: Earlier Discovers' of EW Systems Integration Problems 
030 
w 25 
20 
a- 
15 
Lu 
Lu 
'U 
a- AiRCRAFT OND. TEST 	 SUPPLIER TEST 	 SPECIFICA11ON 
AVIONIC RIG TEST 	 EQPT./PJRCRAFT DESIGN 
PHASE OF POSSIBLE EARLIER DISCOVERY 
FROM FLIGHTTEST/IN-SERVICE 	 c FROM AIRCRAFT GROUND TRIAL/BUILD 
ESS FROM AViONICS INTEGRATION RIG 
Table 3: Development Test/Evaluation Locations and Technique 
Who/Where What and How 
4ircr4 ft & EWmwui facturers: Environment/EW equipment modelling via use of EWES-type models and 
Own premises. proprietry/generic equipment models 
EWeguipment manufacturer: Rig test: software, hardware, equipment, sub-system. Post-sensor 
Own premises. injection; free space irradiation; anechoic chamber. 
lircrafvSyst ems InteRrator: Progressive integration of equipment and sub-systems into full aircraft 
Sub-System Rig, Avionic Integration Rig weapon system. Post-sensor injection and limited free space irradiation. 
Airfield (e.g. Warton, U.K.) Open air EW and EMC tests. RCS measurement, DOA measurements. 
Free space irradiation of installed EW equipments. 
Anechoic chamber (U.K.) Whole aircraft EW tests in secure and controlled electromagnetic 
environment. Irradiation using RF simulator and response measurement 
system for ESM/ECM. 
Locally (North U.K.) Local flight trials, covering test points now yet done + confirmation of 
selected items tested earlier. Signal generator(s)/threat simulator + 
amplifier/antenna. 
e.g. RAF Spadeadam EW Training U.K. flight trials: DOA, antenna coverage, EW performance 
Range, Aberporth , BA&s North Sea demonstration. Irradiation by simulators/emulators, real radars; often 
Combat Range. involving other platforms. 
U.S. anechoic chamber, e.g. Tests where either aircraft size or test requirements, e.g. multi-aircraft, 
Benefield Anechoic Facility, California. dictate out-of-U.K. tests. 
U.S. EW Flight test ranges: Nellis, Tests not possible with U.K./E.C. facilities, e.g. full aircraft in-flight RCS 
Eglin, China Lake, Patuxtent River. measurement & total weapon system performance in realistically dense 
RF environments. Free space irradiation + many emitter types/numbers. 
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Figure 9: CEESIM Block Dia2ram 
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Figure 10: Real-Time Infra-Red Scene Simulation System 
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ON JAGUAR FLY-BY-WIRE AIRCRAFT (Appendix A of[3-1 1]) 
Dl INTRODUCTION 
By considering that all panels/bay doors are perpendicular to the impinging wavefront, that 
they are not backed by cavities, and assuming that energy only enters the bays by the 
peripheral slots, some predictions may be made concerning cut-off frequencies and relative 
shielding performance of the four bay door/panels tested in Phases 2(a) and 2(b). Fig. D. I 
is a scaled representation of the outlines of the bay door/panels tested during Phase 2(b), 
whilst Fig. D.2 is that for the Front Avionics Bay tested in Phase 2(a) of these 
investigations. The figures include the bolt positions and the lengths of the slots so formed. 
D2 SLOT CUT-OFF FREQUENCIES 
For a slot with a longest dimension d, EM radiation will pass freely through the slot with no 
attenuation if Ac2d, where x = the wavelength of the radiation -l]. When x=2d the 
shielding is zero. That is the cut-off frequency f 0 is equal to 	 where c is the propagation 
velocity of the wave. From equation (I) of [3-1 1], the attenuation B, for A?2d, may be 
expressed as R = 20 log 10( )for > d > t, and t = thickness. That is, for frequencies 
below f the attenuation should increase at 20 dB per decade of decreasing frequency. 
Table D. 1 gives the predicted cut-off frequencies for the various slots found on the bay 
doors/panel tested in the Phase 2 investigations. An example calculation is given here for 
the first bolt spacing in the table, along with an estimate of the error in the derived 
Bolt spacing, d = 0.038 ± 0.002m (i.e. ± 5.3%), so 2d = 0.076m ± 5.3% 
Thus f = C - 3xI0 	 ms4 = 3.947 GHz ±2.63% (i.e. ±0.104 0Hz). 2d 	 0.076 
TABLE D.1 
PanelfBay Door (Local) Horiz.IVertical d(m) 2c1(m) f(GHz) 
55 H 0.04 0.08 3.95 
55 H 0.05 0.11 2.83 
55 H 0.07 0.14 2.08 
55 	 (13 different spacings) V,,.u,1 0.03 0.05 6.00 
0.07 0.13 1 	 2.31 
56 H 0.04 0.08 3.95 
56 H 0.04 0.08 3.85 
56 H 0.20 0.41 0.74 
56 	 (8dfferentspacings) V, 0.04 0.08 3.95 
0.20 0.39 0.77 
Front Avionics V 0.86 1.72 0.17 
Front Avionics V 0.53 1.06 0.28 
Front Avionics H 0.82 1.64 0.18 
Front Avionics H 0.79 1.58 019 
Port Gun Bay V 0.39 0.74 0.41 
Port GunBay V 0.35 0.70 0.43 
PortGunBay H 0.96 1.92 0.16 
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From the above the following predictions can be made for each bay:-
D2.1 Fort Gun Bay Door 
For vertically or horizontally polarised wavefront, no attenuation should be seen since in 
both cases the cut-off frequencies are well below the 2-12 GHz range under consideration. 
D2.2 Front Avionics Bay Door 
As for the Port Gun Bay, no attenuation should be seen for either polarisation of impinging 
wavefront over the range 2-12 GHz. 
D2.3 Panel 55 (Fully Bolted) 
For a horizontally polarised wavefront the lowest cut-off frequency should be 2.08 GHz, 
although the other two bolt spacings in this plane give f at 2.83 and 3.95 GHz, and so no 
attenuation should be seen in the range 3.95-18 GHz. For the range 2-3.95 GHz some 
attenuation may be visible but, since it will be very small, will almost certainly be swamped 
by measurement errors. For the vertically polarised case there are thirteen different bolt 
spacings, giving the situation overall that 2.31 GHz > f > 6.00 GHz. Whilst this is 
obviously a complicated case, it can be said that: 
a) above 6.00 GFIz there should be no attenuation, 
b) between 2 and 2.31 GHz there should be 0.6 dB attenuation, which will be swamped by 
measurement errors, and 
c) between 2.31 and 6 GHz there should be no more than 7.4 dB of attenuation. 
D2.4 Panel 56 (Bolted And Hinged) 
For a horizontally polarised wavefront the lowest cut-off frequency is 0.74 GHz, whilst the 
other two bolt spacings in that plane give f. values of 3.85 and 3.95 GHz. As for Panel 55 
the ma)imum possible resultant attenuation would be less than 1 dB and will not be 
discernible. For the vertically polarised case there are eight different bolt spacings, giving 
0.77 GHz C f < 3.95 GHz. So for the frequency range of interest there should be no more 
than 3.9 dB of attenuation for 2-3.95 GHz and no attenuation for 3.95-12 GHz. 
D3 BAY DOOR/PANEL INGRESS CHARACTERISTICS 
One of the characteristics of interest in the overall airframe ingress equation is whether 
horizontally or vertically polarised wave fronts are dominant components, or whether 
ingress is essentially independent of polarisation. 
D3.1 Peripheral Slot Ratios 
A first pointer may be obtained by comparing the lengths of total horizontal (H) and vertical 
(V) lengths of the periphery of each panel/door considered. Since, in D.2 it was predicted 
that most cut-off frequencies of the peripheral slots are outside the 2-12 GHz range of 
interest, this ratio of H:V can be said to apply over that frequency range. Table D.2 gives 
the total H and V lengths along with the ratio of H:V for each bay door/panel investigated. 
TABLE D.2 
Bay Door/Panel Total Length (mm) Ratio 
H : V ii v 
Front Avionics 1610.00 1390.00 1.16:1 
Port Ciun 960.00 740.00 1.30:1 
55.00 906.00 1130.00 0.80:1 
56.00 300.00 849.00 0.35:1 
From the table it can be seen that, for the Front Avionics Bay, Port Gun Bay doors and 
Panel 55, the ratios are close to 1:1, indicating there should be little difference between 
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polarisations of the impinging wavefront. Panel 56 results show a clear dominance of 
vertically polarised signal, since the ratio is close to 3:1. 
D3.2 Irradiation 'Footprint' 
Part of the Phase 2(a) investigation showed the use of Tx antenna half-power beamwidth 
and Tx-to-aircraft spacing could be used to ensure a small irradiation 'footprint' on the 
aircraft for the 4m and 25 m Slide positions. These predictions, ratified by that work, hold 
for the Phase 2(b) work with the following additions. Since the bay doors/panels of this 
phase of the investigations are close to the air intake, and partially under the left hand wing 
root, greater shielding effects should be seen as the Tx is moved to the positions towards 
the rear of the aircraft. 
D4 LIMiTATIONS OF PREDICTIONS 
The preceding predictions are meant to give pointers to the absolute and relative ingress 
performance of each of the bay doors/panels tested. They are by no means comprehensive, 
as the treatment of such a system of multi-slots on a complex shaped airframe at any 
frequency is not trivial. At microwave frequencies no evidence has been found to suggest it 
has ever been attempted or achieved. 
To aid the derivation of modelling for microwave ingress, the following is a short list of 
those areas where the above predictions are known to be limited. 
1. Airframe Shape: 
A method needs to be developed to cater for the analysis of shaped panels. In particular, it 
needs to examine how the slots are angled in all axes to the impinging wavefront. 
2. The Peripheral Slots: 
These are by no means simple slots. Each is like a section of rectangular waveguide with 
two 900 
 bends, and can be considered to be loaded by the primer/paint and any 
environmental gasketting. This will be the main reason why zero attenuation is unlikely to 
actually occur above the cut-off frequency. Due to the complex shape of the three 
dimensional slots formed at the panel periphery, it is possible that higher (than TE 0) order 
transmission modes may occur. This may then lead to higher energy ingress through a 
given slot than otherwise be expected. 
3. Bolt Spacines: 
Most panels do not have equal bolt spacings around their periphery. As a result the 
effective cut-off frequency in any axis will vary according to that spacing using this model. 
The implication of this is that an ingress model would have to address the bolt spacings for 
each panel on the aircraft, and would therefore be different for each aircraft considered. 
Some method of reducing this potentially huge analysis task needs to be developed, 
probably by consideration of the results of the planned panel ingress investigations in the 
EMC laboratory. 
4. Corners of Rectan2ular Panels: 
A right-angled slot antenna is formed between the bolt nearest the corner on both the 
hothontal and vertical sides. It has been assumed for these predictions that the corner itself 
is a bolt and therefore forms two slots. The treatment of this aspect is likely to be complex. 
S. Intra-Slot Resonances: 
The model used assumes each slot on the periphery is likened to a single slot on a thin, flat 
sheet of metal extending to infinity in each direction. This is unreal and it is highly likely 
that the slots resonate between each other in a highly complex fashion, somewhat akin to 
the slotted antennas on the dishes of some modern military radars. This factor will also lead 
to great difficulty in predicting accurately the energy entering the bays through the slots. 
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6. Cavity-Backed Slots: 
No account has been taken of the fact that the panels/doors on the aircraft are backed by 
cavities in the forms of complex shaped bays with partial loading by cables, pipes, 
equipment and their racks. Although the treatment of simple rectangular cavities can be 
extended from microwave reference books, e.g. [D-2], no work had been found on either 
empty or loaded cavities of complex shapes such as those found on aircraft. 
7. Slot Antenna "Pass-Band" 
The model used merely treats the slot as having a value of f with zero attenuation above 
that frequency and 20 dB attenuation per decade decreasing frequency below f. In fact, a 
perfect slot behaves as a resonant slot antenna where 1 is the antenna resonant frequency. 
Theory and measurements for such an antenna agree below 1, but above that frequency the 
picture is more complicated. Theory dictates that the antenna should then exhibit 
attenuation with increasing frequency, but with (lower amplitude) resonances at f, where 
n is an odd integer (1,3,5, etc.). It is highly probable that complex bay peripheral slots 
cause many resonances, some of which possibly lead to zero attenuation at many other 
frequencies above f,,. Some practical quantification of the performance above f will be 
required to establish how the model should be altered. 
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Figure D.1-1: Outline of Panels on EMC Demonstrator Aircraft 
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Figure 0.1-2: Panel 55 Bolt Spacings 
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Figure 0.1-3: Panel 56/57 Bolt Snacings 
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Figure D.I-4: Port Gun Bay Bolt Spacings 
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Figure D.2: Outline of Front Avionics Bay Door 
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APPENDIX E: AIRFRAME AITEMJATION AT MICROWAVE FREQUENCIES 
Autbors: M. Pywell and M.J.S. Price, BAe. Presented by M. Pywell at I.E.E. 7th International Conference 
on EMC, University of York, 31 August 1990. 
ABSTRACT 
Very few aircraft electromagnetic interference problems have been seen to date at microwave frequencies. 
However, with the worsening external RF environment and the growing use of more susceptible circuit 
technologies (e.g. VLSI, VHSIC) it is important to establish what level of protection is needed by avionics 
equipment. This level is determined by both the circuit's sensitivity and the frequency dependency of that 
sensitivity. To calculate the required level it is necessary to detennine the protection afforded by the 
airframe. This information then leads to a better definition of the EMC Qualification test levels required. 
Since 1987 British Aerospace (BAe) has conducted research into the microwave energy ingress 
characteristics of a typical modern military aircraft, in order to provide answers to two questions: firstly, 
how much attenuation does the airframe present to microwave electromagnetic radiation; and secondly, 
how is the energy propagated within the aircraft. Research has included the development of techniques to 
investigate the dependency of energy penetration into a bay on angle of incidence, and the local ingress via 
a bay door's peripheral slot(s) using small irradiation 'footprints'. The research shows deterministic 
modelling of airfiame ingress at microwave frequencies is likely to be impractical due to the complexity of 
the various coupling paths. Further laboratory research is required to generate even a stochastic model of 
these coupling mechanisms. 
The combination of the following items points towards potential avionic equipment upset problems at some 
point in the future if adequate design measures are not adopted: ever smaller and higher density avionic 
circuit technologies, clock rates already in the lower Gbits/second, and the increasing external microwave 
environment, reference Larsen (I). Thus it has been postulated by Denny (2,3) and others that there may 
be problems caused by radio frequency interference (RFI) in the microwave (0.3-30 GHz) region of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. Against this background a BAe research programme was initiated in 1987 to 
examine the potential threat to avionics systems posed by the above combination of potential hazards. This 
paper describes the work carried out and addresses the findings of this research. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
Prior to this research programme, the transfer function relating external electromagnetic fields to the 
microwave energy penetrating to the sites of avionic equipment was not known. The object of this research 
was therefore to establish this microwave transfer function for a typical military aircraft. More specifically, 
the objectives were to: 
i) establish the microwave attenuation, Ariwave,  of the airframe by relating internal to external fields at a 
number of avionic equipment sites. 
ii) investigate the variation of microwave penetration as a function of variations in the relative position of 
the transmitter and aircraft. 
iii) investigate the tnportation of microwave energy within the airframe. 
In an attempt to meet these objectives experimental research work was conducted using a representative, 
metal bodied aircraft. A BAe demonstrator aircraft, although no longer flight-worthy and without much of 
its avionics equipment, has proved to be an excellent tool for the research of electromagnetic energy 
ingress and transportation mechanisms within airframes in a number of frequency bands. 
TECHNIQUES USED ON AIRCRAFT 
The aircraft was used as an airframe only with both engines and all individual equipment cases removed 
but with the associated wiring looms left in place. In order to obtain meaningful results, interference fit 
light alloy plates were used to close off the engine outlets. These were electrically bonded to the inside of 
each outlet using metal loaded gasketting around each circumference. The airframe microwave attenuation 
factors were obtained by fmding the difference between the power density measured inside an equipment 
bay and that measured at exactly the same position relative to the transmitter but with no airframe present. 
This assumes that the power density incident at the surface of the equipment bay with the door open is 
equal to that received at the site calibration point, 2m above the ground. To test this assumption, power 
density measurements were taken with the receiving antenna at the fuselage skin level with the bay door 
open and compared with those taken when no airframe was present (i.e. normal calibration). The results 
show good agreement between the skin level and the nonnal calibration results (figure 1). Placing a 
receiving antenna inside an enclosed space is likely to distort the radiation pattern of the antenna thereby 
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reducing repeatability and the accuracy of any comparative measurements. To minimise this distortion 
three steps were taken. 
I) The equipment bays tested were the largest ones available. 
ii) The receiving antenna was placed as far back in the bay as possible but away from nearby structures 
and with an unobstructed wide angle view of the transmitter. 
iii) A low gain planar log spiral antenna was used since high gain horns have significant sidelobes and both 
these and the main lobe can be distorted easily. 
Using a spiral antenna has the disadvantage that higher transmitter poweis are required to compensate for 
its low gain and the polaiisation of the received signal cannot be determined. Airframe attenuation 
measurements were taken with the transmitting antenna positioned perpendicular to the centre line of the 
fuselage and directly opposite the receive point. The frequency range 2-18 GHz was swept to obtain the 
frequency response of the airframe attenuation. In addition to these measurements, two other techniques 
were used in an attempt to investigate how microwave energy penetrates and whether it is transported 
along the airframe. 
The ARC Technique 
The ARC Technique was used to investigate the effect of phase variation in the illuminating field along the 
length of the aircraft. The transmitter was moved through different positions in an arc around the aircraft 
thereby measuring the airframe leakage as a function of the angle of incidence of the external radiation. By 
measuring the internal power densities and relating them to the calibrated power densities as before, the 
level of attenuation offered by the airframe for each position around the arc can be found. For this 
technique to be most effective the aircraft must be illuminated along its whole length with an external field 
of uniform magnitude. This is best achieved using a broad beamwidth transmit horn and a large separation 
between aircraft and transmitter. The minimum separation can be found from the following equations, 
reference Price (7): 
i) lnterinsofantennabeamwidth d mjj, =0.SL0.5+ fsino_075 	 ... (1)% sin 0 
ii) For a 3 dB variation from freespace loss d. 0.51, 
	 ... (2) 
iii) For a 1 dB variation from freespace loss dma, 0.89L 	 ... (3) 
Where dma, denotes the minimum separation between aircraft and transmitter, 
L 	 denotes the length of the aircraft, and 
B 	 denotes the half power beamwidth for the transmit antenna in the azimuth plane. 
For an airframe of 14m, a transmitter maximum beamwidth of 35 degrees and a 1 dB freespace loss 
variation, the minimum separation was found to be I 2m. This distance was therefore chosen as the 
approximate radius of the arc. 
The SLIDE Technique 
The object of this technique was to establish how microwave energy penetrates the fuselage and whether it 
propagates inside the airframe. The transmitter is moved through a series of positions, parallel to the centre 
line of the airframe, termed the SLIDE. By using a narrow beamwidth antenna and a suitable separation 
between airframe and transmitter, the internal power density at one measurement point can be recorded as 
a function of the localised incident power density at a number of points along the length of the fuselage. A 
narrow beainwidth antenna is required to ensure that only a small "foot print" on the fuselage is illuminated 
and not the rest of the airframe including the equipment bay under investigation. The separation between 
airframe and transmitter is bounded by two requirements. 
i) The maximum distance is related to the number of transmitter positions required whose 3 dB "foot 
prints" do not overlap. This is given by: 
d 	
- L 	 ... (4) 
where n denotes the number of equally spaced transmitter positions along the SLIDE. (This assumes the 
SLIDE is the same length as the aircraft and the whole aircraft length is to be investigated.) 
ii) The minimum separation is limited by the radiation pattern distortion that occurs to the transmitting 
antenna when in close proximity to the airframe. 
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RESULTS OF ON-AIRCRAFT TESTS 
The experimental research work was conducted in two phases on the aircraft, with measurements being 
taken on the Warton Aerodrome test site. Initial feasibility work prior to the bulk of the investigations was 
helpful in defming the way the research should be canied out. 
Instrumentation and Test Site Calibration 
The test instnimentation used is shown schematically in figure 2. A computer system controls a synthesised 
microwave signal generator transmitting, through appropriate Travelling Wave Tube Amplifiers, to a 
suitable antenna. The double-ridged waveguide antenna was used for the 2-18 6Hz, 12m ARC work and 
2-12 6Hz SLIDE work 4m from the aircraft. A horn and parabolic reflector was used for the 12-18 6Hz, 
25m SLIDE work. At the receiver, energy is collected by a spiral antenna and passed down an ultra-low 
loss cable to the spectnzm analyser. To prevent possible microwave currents on the screen of the receiving 
antenna cable entering the aircraft, two ferrite rings were placed around the cable at the skin of the 
fuselage. Figure 3 shows the aircraft test arrangement on the test site. As this was the first time such work 
had been conducted, much effort was expended characterising the test site and establishing the test 
technique in the frequency range 2-18 6Hz. During calibration of the test site, consideration was given to 
the multipath phenomenon where reflections from the ground could have given rise to an interference 
pattern of the power density at the aircraft fuselage. Measurements showed that no discernable multipath 
effect was present for tests conducted over dry or wet asphalt and grass. Ground illumination was reduced 
by using directional transmitting antennae. 
Initial Feasibility Work 
Initial feasibility work was conducted in order to: 
a) examine the relationship between power density measured without the aircraft present and that measured 
at the aircraft skin, for use as calibration data in the derivation of attenuation factors, 
b) examine the frequency resolution for adequate characterisation of the aircraft bays, and 
c) obtain some initial attenuation factors at five 2-18 6Hz spot frequencies, for two bays on the aircraft. 
Detennination of Aliwave requires the measurement of power density in a bay and immediately outside the 
bay door. The time penalties of performing this calibration test for all relevant bays on an aircraft is large. 
An experiment was carried out to examine the difference in power density measured immediately outside 
bay doors and at corresponding points on the centre line of the aircraft with no aircraft present The results 
showed little difference between the power densities measured. Hence all of the attenuation factors have 
been determined using centre line calibration data, with a few spot checks of the validity of the assumption 
being conducted throughout the investigation. An investigation of the necessary frequency resolution was 
carried out using 0.5, 0.1, 0.02 and 0.01 6Hz steps between 2-4 0Hz. The results gave an attenuation 
factor profile which became much more resonant the finer the frequency resolution, see figure 4. As a 
compromise between potential interference and adequate characterisation the majority of tests were carried 
out at 0.1 6Hz intervals. 
Internal field measurements were taken at five spot frequencies between 2 and 18 6Hz for two locations; 
the Front Avionic and Port Gun Bays, (see figure 5). Results obtained gave a frequency independent 
airframe attenuation factor of 12-25 dB 3.5 dE for 2-12 6Hz, see figure 6. These results broadly agree 
with those of Willis (8) taken for two unspecified military aircraft in the U.K. in 1986. The results as a 
whole showed that microwave energy penetrated the airfimne over the band, with variations of attenuation 
factor with aspect angle apparently illustrating shielding and scattering of energy by the aircraft wing and 
inboard pylon. 
Attenuation Factor Investi2ations 
Following analysis of the above results a revised measurement technique was adopted for the majority of 
the microwave attenuation factor investigations. In addition, further research was to be carried out: 
i) Pseudo-Swept 2-18 0Hz measurements were used, rather than five spot frequencies. 
ii) Measurement of attenuation factors in the 12-18 6Hz band. 
iii) Examination of energy ingress through bay door/access panel peripheral slots. 
The value of airframe attenuation factors (around 20 dB) found in the initial tests was confirmed, but with 
appreciable variation highly dependent on frequency when the pseudo-swept frequency test technique was 
used. No significant difference was seen between vertically or horizontally polarised transmitting antenna. 
The results of the SLIDE measurements, with their small irradiation 'footprint' on the aircraft, strongly 
suggested that the majority of ingress in the 2-12 6Hz band occurred via the panel's peripheral slot(s), If 
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energy ingress was only via the bay door's peripheral slots then marked differences should occur between 
shoot-bolt (long slots), bolted and hinged, and fully bolted (many short slots) doors. Initial predictions were 
performed, using a 201og 10(wavelengthl(2 x slot length)) consideration, and yielded relative and absolute 
ingress performance of examples of these three bay door types. It was predicted that for the long slot panels 
all energy above 0.5 GHz would penetrate the peripheral slots equally for each transmitter polarisation. For 
the short slot panels a cut-off frequency at about 6 0Hz was predicted, as a result of the complex loaded 
waveguide formed by pairs of bolts around the panel periphery. For the hinged/ bolted panel with the hinge 
at the top, a hybrid result was predicted, with a clear difference between horizontally and vertically 
polarised incident wavefronts. 
Thus the next set of tests covered 2-12 0Hz internal field measurements in the Port Gun Bay, the bay 
behind the fully bolted Panel 55, and in the bay behind bolted/hinged Panel 56, see figure 4. Mean values 
were found of 20 dB for the frequency independent attenuation factor for the shoot-bolt type bays (Front 
Avionic and Port Gun) over the range 2-12 0Hz. The predicted large difference in the hinged/bolted panel 
bay factors for the horizontally and vertically polarised incident wavefronts was not seen in the results. 
This is not fully understood but is thought to be a result of the complex loaded and stepped waveguide 
sections formed by the bay's peripheral slots, especially shaped ones such as corners. For the bays behind 
bolted and bolted/hinged Panels, and for both transmitting antenna polarisations, the results showed, see 
figure 7, that the attenuation decreased at 17 dB per decade of increasing frequency - comparing 
favourably with the 20 dB per decade predicted. However, the cut-off frequencies predicted for the bolted 
bays were not seen in the measured data. This is believed to be a result of the limitation of very simple 
model, but suggests that airframe ingress may be too complex to model directly, and that it may have to be 
derived by a probabilistic determination which may be based upon a model of empirical data: 
- panel/door type and contouring, 	 - shape of peripheral slots, 
- cavity resonance, 	
- the characteristics of other apertures, 
- airframe material, 
	
- paint/primer/gasketting materials in the slots, and 
- the coupling paths within the airframe. 
Of the total of four bays tested during this part of the research programme only two appeared to show any 
dependence of attenuation factor on aspect angle of incident wavefront. Attenuation factors for the Port 
Gun Bay illustrated some shielding and scattering effect of the wing and pylon. Similarly, factors for the 
bolted/hinged panel bay also showed marginally the same type of effect. The other two bays tested, 
unexpectedly, showed no evidence of aspect angle dependency. Energy may be entering these bays via 
routes other than their peripheral slots. One very interesting feature seen during the investigation was the 
low attenuation factors seen for the Front Avionics Bay, when irradiated from the tail-on position. The 
factors, 10-30 dB over the range 2-12 0Hz, were as low as those found when irradiating the bay in direct 
line of sight. Since the bay is not visible from this position and the geometry does not allow that magnitude 
of specular reflection from the wing/pylon, it suggests some internal transport mechanism. This currently 
remains unexplained. Even when its resonant nature is taken into account, as seen in figure 4, the mean 
value of microwave attenuation for 2-12 0Hz on this aircraft remains in the region of 20-25 dB ±10 dB, 
independent of aspect angle and transmitting antenna polarisation. The pessimistically high entr budget is 
as a result of the extrapolation of initial calibration data, which was taken in 0.5 0Hz steps, for use with the 
0.1 0Hz steps of the attenuation factor measurements. The actual measurement error is thought to lie 
between the ±3.5dB of the earlier work and ±6 dB. 
An investigation of cavity resonances in aircraft bays was also carried out. By the judicious use of 
wide-band Radar Absorbent Material lining the bay it was shown that substantial cavity resonances, present 
within the bays, could be attenuated considerably, see figure 8. Consideration of these results against 
standard theory for empty rectangular cavities strongly suggests that multi-axis cavity excitation is present. 
During this phase of the research it was noted that there was appreciable (up to +16.5, -15 dB) difference in 
attenuation factors for the different transmitting antenna polarisations. The reason for this marked 
difference between these tests and the rest of the research results is not yet fully understood, but could 
possibly be due to the bay and door aspect ratio. 
Further investigations on aircraft were carried out, this time in the 12-17 0Hz band. These were not full 
characterisation tests, but merely to examine whether the zero attenuation factor effect apparent from the 
earlier bolted bay tests existed. The results showed an average of 22 dB of attenuation existed, again with a 
decreasing profile with increasing frequency at approxlinately 16 dB per decade, see figure 9. No firm 
conclusion could be made with the small amount of data to hand as to the real shape of the microwave 
attenuation profile. It was possible though to suggest that one of two conditions was present: 
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a) a sharp resonance effect giving approximately zero attenuation at intervals of approximately 7 GHz, 
above the cut-off frequency; or, 
b) since the 2-12, 12-16, and 16-17 GHz results all have very similar gradients for the fully bolted bay, 
there is an as yet unexplained measurement problem. It is thought that this could be partly explained if 
the primer/paint within the slots prove to be significantly lossy at these higher frequencies. 
DISCUSSION 
The results obtained from on-aircraft trials are complex and not particularly conclusive. The method of 
representing the results is a difficult choice and assessing the differences between a number of plots, i.e. as 
a function of angle of incidence, is not trivial. To assist in this task a method of calculating a "Figure of 
Merit" (FoM) has been devised. The FoM is useful for comparing similar situations. The larger the overall 
attenuation the larger the FoM. However, the quantitative measure of this FoM is not known so it is only 
used qualitatively. The accuracy of the FoM is greatest the larger the number of measurement points. The 
FoM is found from Area x Aj.twavem ... (5) 
where Area is found from figure 10. The equation derived is 
AMwaveat Aj.twave,, { Aswave 	
- 	 Ajawave0n. 	 } 	
... (6) d(Aiswave) S 	 p(Aswave) 
Figures 11 and 12 show the FoM values plotted as function of transmitter position on both the ARC and the 
SLIDE. For the Port Gun Bay, Panel 55 and Panel 56 there appears little difference between them or 
between the two senses of polarisation. The figures show interesting differences between the attenuations 
at different transmitter positions. These results, in the case of the ARC, are unexpected but in the case of 
the SLIDE the results confinn the intuitive belief that the attenuation should be lowest when the transmitter 
is directly opposite the receiver position. The FoM approach to data analysis needs to be extended to more 
of the trials data to be able to confinn these findings. It is not clear from the aircraft results whether energy 
is transported through the airframe. It would be very useful to be able to use time-gating techniques to 
study the various propagation delays experienced by the pulse. Unfortunately, restrictions on the minimum 
length of pulse for current equipment together with the dimensions of the aircraft suggests that all the 
delayed pulses will occur within a time span of about 35 us making discrimination of the various 
propagation paths almost impossible. The pulse picture would be further confused by pulse ringing caused 
by the cavity resonances. 
Computer modelling of airframe attenuation may become possible given more information about the 
mechanisms of propagation. However, such modelling is unlikely to be deterministic due to the 
complexities of the various coupling paths. An empirical approach seems more likely but expensive trials 
data would have to be gathered. This provides only part of the solution because the extent of coupling 
between the fields inside a bay and the circuitry within an equipment has still to be established. 
Investigations on a typical military aircraft have shown that incident microwave radiation in the range 
2-18 GHz is attenuated (by approximately 20 dB) by the airframe in a complex fashion which does not lend 
itself to being modelled easily. During on-aircraft tests this value has been seen to approach zero, thus 
removing any shielding of avionics by the airframe. The attenuation factor has been found to behave 
counter-intuitively for various angles of incidence. Further research work is in hand to expand the 
knowledge of airframe attenuation, internal energy transportation mechanisms and methods of data 
analysis. Much of the next phase of research must be laboratory based, where more tightly controUed test 
specimens can be used. 
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Figure 5: Location Of Bays Investigated 
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Figure 6: 2-12 GHz Airframe Attenuation Factor - Port Gun Bay 
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APPENDIX F: FREQUENCY SPACDAG CALCULATIONS FOR CAVITY 
RESONANCES IN PANELS 55 & 56 BAYS 
To obtain an estimate of the resonant frequencies of the bays, they were treated as 
simple rectangular cavities of dimensions: 
Bay (m) Height (m) Width (m) Depth (m) 
Panel 55 0.468 0.426 0.175 
Panel 56 0.381 0.300 0.600 
The theory of cavities, as given in [F-I] et aL, gives resonant frequencies: 
c) 2 (m) 2 (n) 2 
where c is the velocity of light; x, y and z are the cavity dimensions in metres; and l,m 
and n are integers corresponding to the number of standing wave maxima across 
dimensions x, y and z. If is is assumed, for the sake of argument, that the method of 
driving the cavity will only excite modes in one of the dimensions, Eqn. F. 1 simplifies to: 
cle)2 =L 
This leads to the following table, which shows the predicted frequency spacings of the 
resonances for each of the two bays, assuming only one axis in turn is excited. The 
lowest order mode is also given for a resonance within the 2-12 0Hz range of interest. 
Bay Dimension (m) Spacing (MHz) Lowest Order Mode (TEJ 
Panel 55 0.468 320.500 0,0,7 
0.426 352.100 6,0,0 
0.175 857.100 0,3,0 
Panel 56 0.381 393.700 6,0,0 
0.300 500.000 0,4,0 
0.600 250.000 0,0,8 
If resonance occurs across two dimensions then 
Y Y 
Thus for the Panel 55 and Panel 56 bays the resonances could be spaced apart by only 
14 and 46 MHz respectively. If all three dimensions are involved, the frequency spacing 
would be an order of magnitude lower. However, this is considered unlikely because of 
the orthogonal orientation of the transmitting antenna and the panel edges to the cavity. 
Reference 
[F-i] Baden-Fuller, A.J. An Introduction to Microwave Theory and Techniques, 
2nd Ed., pplO4-lOS, para. 4.13. 
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APPENDIX G: CABLE COUPLING MODEL LISTING 
'tLOSSY LINE CABLE CURRENT MODEL 	 * 
• * USING EQUATIONS DEVELOPED FROM A.A. SMITH, Jr. * 
• * Code designed and developed by M. Pywell 	 * 
• * Translated to Q Basic and Optimised by D.A. Lee 	 * 
• $ ISSUE 1, VERSION r December 1995 	 * 
DEFDBL A-Z 
DECLARE SUB complexmultiply (REAL, IMAG, REAL!, IMAG!, REAL2, IMAG2) 
DECLARE SUB eomplexdivide (REAL, IMAG, REAL!, IMAG!, REAL2, IMAG2) 
DECLARE SUB cosh (coshREAL, coshJMAG, alpha, beta, length) 
DECLARE SUB sinh (sinhREAL, sinhlMAG, alpha, beta, length) 
DECLARE SUB hilt (metalS, diameter, length, height, Ra, Ca, Rb, Cb, Reap, Lb, Pd, nptt/o freq, freqi, 
freq2, k%, rhorel, murel) 
DECLARE SUB outline (metalS, diameter, length, height, Ra, Ca, Rb, Cb, Reap, Lb, Pd, npts%, freq, freql, 
freq2) 
DECLARE SUB getdata (metalS, diameter, length, height, Ra, Ca, Rb, Cb, Reap, Lb, Pd, npts l/% freq, freq!, 
freq2, k%, rhorel, murel) 
DECLARE SUB prnt (length, height, diameter, metalS, Ra, Ca, Rb, Cb, Reap, Lb, Pd, Zo, xO, yO, npts%) 
DECLARE SUB storedata (npts%, xO, yO) 
DECLARE SUB F! (length) 
DECLARE SUB F2 (height) 
DECLARE SUB F3 (diameter) 
DECLARE SUB F4 (metalS, rhorel, murel) 
DECLARE SUB F5 (Ra) 
DECLARE SUB F6 (Ca) 
DECLARE SUB F7 (Rb) 
DECLARE SUB F8 (Cb) 
DECLARE SUB F9 (Reap) 
DECLARE SUB Flo (Lb) 
DECLARE SUB AF1 (Pd) 
DECLARE SUB AF2 (k% npts%, freq, freql, freq2) 
DECLARE SUB AF3 (npts%, freq, freqi, freq2) 
DECLARE SUB AF4 (npts%, freq, freqi, freq2) 
I 	 MAIN PROGRAM 
P1 = 314159265358# 
	
= 8001 	 'Max number due to memory limits 
DIM SHARED diskerr, diskerr$ 
DIM x(k%), y(k%) 
COLOR 2 
CALL init(metalS, diameter, length, height, Ra, Ca, Rb, Cb, Reap, Lb, Pd, npts °4 freq, freq!, freq2, k% 
rhorel, murel) 
quit =0 
DO 
CALL outline(metal$, diameter, length, height, Ra, Ca, Rb, Cb, Reap, Lb, Pd, npts%, freq, freqi, freq2) 
CALL getdata(metalt, diameter, length, height, Ra, Ca, Rb, Cb, Reap, Lb, Pd, npts°4 freq, freql, freq2, k%, 
rhorel, murel) 
GOSIJB Calculate 
CALL pmt(length, height, diameter, metalS, Ra, Ca, Rb, Cb, Reap, Lb, Pd, Zo, xO, yO,  npts%) 
CALL storedata(npts%, xO, yO) 
CLS 
LOCATE 10, 1 
	
PRINT" 	 + 	 +" 
	
PRINT" 	 RUNAGAIN[Y/N]?r 
	
PRINT" 	 +------------------+" 
	
INPUT" 	 ",yesno$ 
W UCASE$(MTDS(yesnoS, 1, 1)) 0 "Y" THEN quit = 
G-1 
LOOP UNTIL quit 
COLOR 7 
CLS 
STOP 
CALCULATION SUBROUTINE 
Calculate: 
IFnpts%> 1THEN 
DO 
CLS 
LOCATE 10, 1 
PRINT" 	 +- ----- - ---------------------------- -+ 0 
PRINT" 	 DO YOU WANT A LOG FREQUENCY SCALE [Y/N] ? 
PRINT" 
INPUT" 	 ",logs$ 
Iogs$ = UCASE$(logs$) 
IF logs$ = ""THEN Iogs$ = "N" 
LOOP UNTIL Iogs$ = °Y" OR Iogs$ = "N" 
END IF 
CLS 
LOCATE 10, 10 
PRINT "Calculating..." 
LOCATE 12, 10 
PRINT" 
oldp =0 
tstart = TIMER 
FORa%=lTOnpts% 
IFnpts%= 1 THEN 
frequency = freq 
ELSE 
IF logs$ = "Y" THEN 
frequency = EXP(LOG(freql) + ((a% -1) t(LOG(freq2) - LOG(freql)) / (npts% - 1))) 
ELSE 
frequency = freqi + (a% - 1) * (freq2 - freqi) / (npts% - 1) 
END IF 
END IF 
x(a%) = frequency 
HAPEDANCE 
W = 2 * P1 * frequency 
Zo = 276 * LOG(4 * height/ diameter) I LOG(10) 
Z1REAL = 2 * (Ra 1(1 + WA 2 * Ra A  2 * Ca" 2)) 
Z1IMAG = 2 * (-W * Ra" 2 * CaI(1 + WA 2 * Ra "2 * Ca A  2)) 
denominator = (Rcap + Rb) A 
 2 + (W * Lb - 1 / (W * )) A  2 
Z2REAL = 2 * ((Rb * (Rcap + 1/ (W "2 * Cb A 
 2)) + Reap * (Reap + W A 
 2 * Lb A 
 2)) / denominator) 
Z2IMAG = 2 * ((W * Rcap * (Reap * Lb + Rb * Lb - Lb) + (Rcap - Reap * Rb - Rb A 
 2 + Lb I Cb) I (W * 
Cb) - W * Lb A  2 I Cb) / denominator) 
-------------------------___ 
 
alpha = 8.3 * IE-08 * SQR(rhorel $ murel * frequency) / (diameter * Zo) 
Below is the 'Re-Radiation' tenn of Eqns.6.8 and 6.9; disabled in this version. 
IF metalS 0  "Lossless" THEN 
alpha = alpha + (39.728 * frequency I IE+09 + 317.0781)1(2 * Zo) 
• ENDIF 
beta = 2 * P1 * frequency I 3E+08 
DENOMINATOR 
templREAL = Zo * (Z1REAL + Z2REAL) 
templIMAG = Zo * (ZIIMAG + Z2IMAG) 
'{That was (Zo*Z1+Zo*Z2)} 
CALL cosh(coshREAL, coshIMAG, alpha, beta, length) 
CALL complexmultiply(temp3REAL, temp3IMAG, Iemp1REAL, temp 1IMAG, coshREAL, coshIMAG) 
'{That was (ZotZI+ZotZ2)Cosh(Gammats)} 
CALL eomplexmultiply(REAL, IMAG, ZIREAL, Z1IMAG, Z2REAL, Z2IMAG) 
G-2 
'(That was ZIZ2) 
temp2REAL = (Zo A  2+ REAL) 
temp2IMAG = IMAG 
'{That was (Z0A2+Z1*Z2)} 
CALL sinh(sinhREAL, sinhIMAG, alpha, beta, length) 
CALL complexmultiply(temp4REAL, temp4IMAG, temp2REAL, temp2IMAG, sinhREAL, sinhIMAG) 
'(That was (Zot2+Z1*Z2)Sinh(GanIma*s)} 
DREAL = temp3REAL + temp4REAL 
DIMAG = temp3lMAG + temp4IMAG 
CURRENT 
Ez = SQR(Pd * 377) 
'(Plane wave assumed; Ez in V/rn) 
CALL complexmultiply(REAL, IMAG, ZIREAL, Z1IMAG, coshREAL, coshIMAG) 
numeratorREAL = 4 * Ez * (SIN(beta * height) + SGN(SIN(beta * height)) * .006!!) * (Zo * sinhIMAG + 
IMAG - Z1IMAG) 
numentorlMAG =4 * Ez * (SIN(beta * height) + SGN(SIN(beta * height)) * .006!!) * (Zo * sinhREAL + 
REAL -Z1REAL) 
CALL complexmultiply(temp2REAL, temp2IMAG, alpha, beta, DREAL, DIMAG) 
'(This was GanunatDenorninator} 
CALL complexdivide(currentREAL, currentlMAG, numeratorREAL, numeratorlMAG, temp2REAL, 
ternp2IMAG) 
—VOLTAGE  
CALL complexmultiply(REAL, IMAG, currentREAL, currentiMAG, Z2REAL, Z2IMAG) 
ModulusV=SQR(REAL"2+IMAG"2) 
'(V in Volts) 
y(a%) = 20 * LOG(ModulusV / .000001)! LOG(10) 
'(Voltage in dBuV) 
•_________________________ BAR STRIP DISPLAY 
p = INT((a% I npts%) * 60 + .5) 
IF p> oldp THEN 
heft = INT((TITvIER - tstart) * (npts% - a%) / a%) 
tth = INT(tleft / 3600) 
tIm = JNT(tleft /60 - tlh * 60) 
Us = INT(tlefl + 1 - liii * 3600 - tIm * 60) 
LOCATE 14,28 
PRINT "Time Rernainin... "+ MID$(STRS(tlh), 2, 2) + ":" + MID$(STR$(tlm), 2, 2) + ":" + 
MID$(STR$(tls), 2, 2) + 
LOCATE 12, 10 
PRINT MID$(" 	 ", 1, p) 
oldp = p 
END IF 
NEX'F a% 
RETURN 
FILE ERROR 
HANDLER 
diskerr 'Called if error occurs during SUB Storedata 
diskerr = ERR 
diskerrS = ERDEV$ 
RESUME NEXT 
END 
SUB AF1 (Pd) 
LOCATE 17.42 
PRINT" 
DO 
LOCATE 23,19 
INPUT "Power Density (W/rn2) : ",Pd 
LOCATE 23, 10 
PRINT" 
LOOP UNTIL Pd >0 AND Pd <= 1000000! 
LOCATE 17,42 
PRiNT Pd; 
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itøj;'tini 
SUB AF2 (k%, npts%, freq, freqi, freq2) 
LOCATE 19,42 
PRINT" 	 'I 
oldnpts% = npts% 
DO 
LOCATE 23,23 
INPUT "Number of Points: ",npts% 
LOCATE 23, 10 
PRINT" 
LOOP UNTIL npts% >0 AND npts% <= k% 
LOCATE 19,42 
PRINT npts%; 
IF (npts% =1 AND oldnpts%> 1) OR (npts%> 1 AND oldnpts% = 1) THEN 
LOCATE 21,42 
PRINT" 
CALL AF3(npts% freq, freqi, freq2) 
END IF 
END SUB 
SUB AF3 (npts%, freq, freql, freq2) 
LOCATE 20,42 
IF npts% = 1 THEN 
freql=O 
freq2 =0 
DO 
LOCATE 23,24 
INPUT "Frequency (GHz): ", freq 
LOCATE 23, 10 
PRINT" 
LOOP UNTIL freq >0 AND freq <=30 
freq=freq* IE+09 
LOCATE 20,42 
PRINT USING "#4&IIIIIJIf/f II"; freq / 1E+09; 
ELSE 
Ireq = 0 
DO 
LOCATE 23,18 
INPUT "Start Frequency (GHz) : ", freqi 
LOCATE 23, 10 
PRINT" 
LOOP UNTIL freql >0 AND freql <30 
freql = freqi * 1E-t-09 
LOCATE 20,42 
PRINT USING 	 freql I IE-l-09; 
IF freq2 <= freql THEN CALL AF4(npts%, freq, freql, freq2) 
END IF 
END SUB 
SUB AF4 (npts°/; freq, freql, freq2) 
LOCATE 21,42 
PRINT" 
IF npts% = 1 THEN 
SOUND 2000, 4 
ELSE 
DO 
LOCATE 23,19 
INPUT "Stop Frequency (GHz): ",freq2 
LOCATE 23, 10 
PRINT" 
G-4 
LOOP UNTIL freq2 > (freqi I IE+09) AND freq2 <= 30 
freq2 = freq2 * IE+09 
LOCATE 21,42 
PRINT USING "JUt/f II f/fl//il"; freq2 I IE+09; 
END IF 
END SUB 
SUB complexdivide (REAL, IMAG, REAL I, IMAG1, REAL2, 1MA02) 
REAL = (REAL I * REAL2 + IMAG1 * IMAG2) I (REAL2 A  2 + IMAG2 A  2) 
IMAG = (IMAG! * REAL2 - REAL I * IMAG2) I (REAL2 A  2+ IMAG2 A 
 2) 
END SUB 
SUB complexmultiply (REAL, IMAG, REAL!, JMAGI, REAL2, IMAG2) 
REAL = REAL! * REAL2 - IMAG1 * IMAG2 
IMAG = IMAGI * REAL2 + IMAG2 * REAL I 
END SUB 
SUB cosh (coshREAL, coshIMAG, alpha, beta, length) 
coshREAL = .5 * (EXP(alpha * length) + 1 / EXP(alpha * length)) * COS(beta $ length) 
coshIMAG = •5* (EXP(alpha length) -1 / EXP(alpha * length)) * SIN(beta * length) 
END SUB 
SUB F! (length) 
LOCATE 4,42 
PRINT" 
DO 
LOCATE 23, 24 
INPUT "Wire Length (m) : ", length 
LOCATE 23, 10 
PRINT" 
LOOP UNTIL length > 0 AND length <= 100 
LOCATE 4,42 
PRINT length; 
END SUB 
SUB FlO (Lb) 
LOCATE 15, 42 
PRINT" 
DO 
LOCATE 23, 14 
INPUT "Load B Inductance Lb (nH): ",Lb 
LOCATE 23, 10 
PRINT" 
LOOP UNTIL Lb >= 0 AND Lb <= 100 
Lb=Lbt IE-09 
LOCATE 15,42 
PRINT CSNG(LLJ * IE+09); 
END SUB 
SUB F2 (height) 
LOCATE 5,42 
PRINT" 
DO 
LOCATE 23,5 
INPUT "Wire Height Above Ground Plane (m): ", height 
LOCATE 23,4 
PRINT" 
LOOP UNTIL height > 0 AND height <= ID+200 
LOCATE 5,42 
PRINT height 
END SUB 
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SUB F3 (diameter) 
LOCATE 6,42 
PRINT" 	 I, 
DO 
LOCATE 23,22 
INPUT "Wire Diameter (m) ", diameter 
LOCATE 23, 10 
PRINT" 
LOOP UNTIl diameter> 0 AND diameter < .1 
LOCATE 6,42 
PRINT diameter, 
END SUB 
SUB F4 (metalS, thorel, murel) 
DO 
LOCATE 7, 43 
PRINT" 
LOCATE 23,3 
INPUT "Metal Type (Lossless,Ag,Cu,Al,Brass,Nickel,Tin,Steel(max),Steel(min): ",metal$ 
LOCATE 23, 1 
SELECT CASE UCASE$(metal$) 
CASE "LOSSLESS" 
metals = "Lossless" 
thorel =0 
murel = 1 
CASE "AG" 
metalS = "Silver" 
thorel = .95 
murel=1 
CASE "CU" 
metal$ = "Copper" 
rhorel = 1 
murel = 1 
CASE "AL" 
metalS = "Aluminium" 
thorel = 1.64 
murel = I 
CASE "BRASS" 
metalS = "Bnss" 
thorel = 3.9 
murel=1 
CASE "NICKEL" 
metalS = "Nickel" 
thorel = 5.05 
murel=1 
CASE "TIN" 
metalS = "Tin" 
rhorel = 6.7 
murel = 1 
CASE "STEEL(MAX)" 
metalS = "Steel (max)" 
rhorel = 12.7 
murel=1 
CASE "STEEL(MIN)" 
metals = "Steel (mm)" 
rhorel = 7.6 
murel=1 
CASE ELSE 
metals ="" 
END SELECT 
LOOP UNTIL metalS 0"" 
LOCATE 7,43 
PRINT metalS; 
END SUB 
SUB F5 (Ra) 
LOCATE 9,42 
PRINT" 
DO 
LOCATE 23, 12 
INPUT "Load A Resistance Ra (ohms) : ",Ra 
LOCATE 23, 10 
PRINT" 
LOOP UNTIL Ra >0 AND Ra <= ID+200 
LOCATE 9,42 
PRINT Ra; 
END SUB 
SUB F6 (Ca) 
LOCATE 10,42 
PRINT" 
DO 
LOCATE 23,13 
INPUT "Load A Capacitance Ca (pF): ",Ca 
LOCATE 23, 10 
PRINT" 
LOOP UNTIL Ca >= 0 AND Ca <= 1000 
Ca = Ca * 1E-12 
LOCATE 10, 42 
PRINT Ca * 1E+12; 
END SUB 
SUB Fl (Rb) 
LOCATE 12, 42 
PRINT" 	 1. 
DO 
LOCATE 23,12 
INPUT "Load B Resistance Rb (ohms): ",Rb 
LOCATE 23, 10 
PRINT" 
LOOP UNTIL Rb >0 AND Rb <= 1D+200 
LOCATE 12,42 
PRINT Rb; 
END SUB 
SUB PS () 
LOCATE 13,42 
PRINT" 
DO 
LOCATE 23,13 
INPUT "Load B Capacitance a (pF): ", a 
LOCATE 23, 10 
PRINT" 
LOOP UNTIL Cl >= 0 AND a <= IE-f08 
Cb = a * 1E-12 
IF a = 0 THEN a = 9.809089E-45 
LOCATE 13,42 
PRINT CSNG(Cb * IE+12); 
END SUB 
SUB F9 (Reap) 
LOCATE 14,42 
PRINT" 
DO 
LOCA'FE23, 10 
INPUT "Load B Resistance Reap (ohms): ",Rcap 
LOCATE 23,9 
PRINT" 
LOOP UNTIL Reap >= 0 AND Reap <= ID+200 
LOCATE 14,42 
PRINT Reap; 
END SUB 
SUB getdata (metals, diameter; length, height, Ra, Ca, Rb, Cb, Rcap, Lb, PcI, npts%, freq, freql, freq2, k%, 
rhorel, murel) 
DO 
a$ = INKEYS 
IF LEN(a$) = 2 THEN 
Code = ASC(MID$(a$, 2, 1)) 
ELSE 
IFa$c>""THENSOUND2000, A 
Code = 0 
END IF 
SELECT CASE Code 
CASE 59 
CALL Fl(length) 
CASE 60 
CALL F2(height) 
CASE 61 
CALL F3(diameter) 
CASE 62 
CALL F4(metalS, rhorel, murel) 
CASE 63 
CALL F5(Ra) 
CASE 64 
CALL F6(Ca) 
CASE 65 
CALL F7(Rb) 
CASE 66 
CALL F8(Cb) 
CASE 67 
CALL F9(Rcap) 
CASE 68 
CALL FlO(Lb) 
CASE 104 
CALL AFI(Pd) 
CASE 105 
CALL AF2(k%, npts%, freq, freqi, freq2) 
CASE 106 
CALL AF3(npts%, freq, freql, freq2) 
CASE 107 
CALL AF4(npts°4 freq, freql, freq2) 
CASE 0, 113 
'Do nothing (Calculate option) 
CASE ELSE 
SOUND 2000, .4 
END SELECT 
LOOPUNT!LCode= 113• 
END SUB 
SUB hilt (metalS, diameter, length, height, Ra, Ca, Rb, Cb, Reap, Lb, Pd, npts% freq, freqi, freq2, k%, 
rhorel, murel) 
length = 2# 
height = .441# 
diameter= .00131911 
0-8 
metal$ = "Nickel" 
rhorel = 5.05 
murel=1 
Ra= ID+200 
Ca = .000000000000541 
Rb = 50# 
Cb = .000000000002# 
Reap = 
Lb =5 
Pd = 1# 
IFk%> 1601 THEN 
npts%= 1601 
ELSE 
npts% = k% 
END W 
freq = 0 
freql = 2000000000# 
freq2 = 18000000000# 
END SUB 
SUB outline (metals, diameter, length, height, Ra, Ca, Rb, Cb, Rcap, Lb, Pd, npts%, freq, freqi, freq2) 
CLS 
-------------------------------------------------------------- - ----- --- I-" 
PRINT " 	 LOSSY LINE CURRENT MODEL 	 Version 1.Or 
PRINT":  --------- - ------- 
- 
PRINT": 
	
[Fl] WireLength (m) 
PRINT": 
	
[172] Wire Height (m) (Above ground plane) 	 1" 
PRINT": 	 [173] Wire Diameter (m) 
PRINT " 	 [174] Wire Material 
------------- ------- 
PRIN'F" 	 [PS] LoadA - Ra(ohm) 
PRINT"I 	 [1761 LoadA - Ca(pF) 
PRINT"H-  --- ------------------------------ 
PRINT " 	 [177] Load B - Rb (ohm) 
PRIWr"l 
	
[178] LoadB - Cb(pF) 
PRINT "1 	 [P9] Load B - Reap (ohm) 
PRINT ": 
	
[PlO] Load B - Lb (nH) 
PRINT"H—  ------------------------------------------- 
PRINT " 	 [ALT-Fl] Power Density (W/m2) 
PI.JI''I'''..-...-. ---- ..-. ------------------------------------------------------ - 
PRINT": 
	
[ALT-172] Number of Points 
PRINT": 	 [ALT-P3] Start Prequency (GHz): ------------ --- 
PRINT" 	 [ALT-174] Stop Frequency ((3Hz) I [ALT-PlO] CALCULATE" 
PRINT 
LOCATE 4,42 
PRINT length; 
LOCATE 5,42 
PRINT height; 
LOCATE 6, 42 
PRINT diameter; 
LOCATE 7,43 
PRINT metalS; 
LOCATE 9,42 
PRINT Ra; 
LOCATE 10,42 
PRINT CSNG(Ca * 1E+12); 
LOCATE 12,42 
PRINT Rb; 
LOCATE 13, 42 
PRINT CSNG(Cl, * IE+12); 
LOCATE 14,42 
PRINT Reap; 
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LOCATE 15, 42 
PRINT CSNG(Lb * IE+09); 
LOCATE 17,42 
PRINT Pd; 
LOCATE 19,42 
PRINT npts%; 
IF npts% = 1 THEN 
LOCATE 20,42 
PRIN'F USING "#1/.!! II 111111 ii"; freq / IE+09; 
ELSE 
LOCATE 20,42 
PRINT USING "#tllhJfJiJIIII"; freql I 1E+09; 
LOCATE 21,42 
PRINT USING "#1/.!! 11 II II fill"; freq2 I 1E+09; 
END IF 
END SUB 
SUB pmt (length, height, diameter, metal$, Ra, Ca, Rb, Cb, Reap, Lb, Pd, Zo, xO, yO, npls%) 
PRINT 
CLS 
LOCATE 10, 1 
PRINT" +—  ---------------- 
PRINT" I Output to printer as well as screen [Y/N] ? I" 
PRINT" +----------------------------------------+" 
INPI.JT" ",Printquery$ 
CLS 
PRINT "Cable length (m) 	 :"; length 
PRINT "Height above ground plane (m) :"; height 
PRINT "Wire diameter (m) 	 :"; diameter 
PRINT "Metal type 	 ";metal$ 
PRINT "Load A: R (Ohm), C (pF) 	 :"; Ra, ",";INT(Ca * IE+15 + .5)1 1000! 
PRINT "Load B : R (Olun), C (pF) :"; Rb,","; INT(Cb * 1E+15 + .5) / 1000! 
PRINT "Load B : Reap (Ohm), L (nH) :"; Reap,","; IN'F(Lb * 1E+12 + .5) / 1000! 
PRINT "Power density (W/m"2) 	 :"; Pd 
PRINT "Characteristic Impedance (Zo) :"; Zo 
PRINT 
PRINT" FREQ (GHz) LOAD VOLTAGE (dBuV)" 
PRINT" 
IF UCASE$(Printqueiy$) = "Y" THEN 
LPRINT "Cable length (m) 
	 :"; length 
LPRINT "Height above ground plane (m) :"; height 
LPRIINT "Wire diameter (m) 	 :"; diameter 
LPRINT "Metal type 
	 : ";metal$ 
LPRINT "Load A: R (Ohm), C (pF) 	 :"; Ra; ","; INT(Ca * 1E+I5 + .5)/1000! 
LPRINT "Load B : R (Ohm), C (pF) 	 :"; Rb,","; INT(Cb * 1E+15 + .5) / 1000! 
LPRINT "Load B : Rcap (Ohm), L (nH) :"; Reap; ", "; INT(Lb * IE+12 + .5) / 1000! 
LPRJNT "Power density (WIm"2) 	 :"; Pd 
LPRINT "Characteiistic Impedance (Zo) :"; Zo 
LPRINT 
LPRINT" FREQ (GHz) LOAD VOLTAGE (dBuV)" 
LPRINT" 
END IF 
FORa%= 1 TOnpts% 
PRINT USING "11 II 11 11 1111.11 11/1/11111 	 #4JlI4Llluh/,'.'li,'.'"; x(a%) I IE+09; y(a%) 
IF UCASE$(Printquery$) = "Y" THEN LPRIN'F USING "IiIiiihIll.Iillll i/il/i 	 #1##Lll4uIfI/IfI"; x(a%) / 
1E+09; y(a%) 
NEXT a% 
IF UCASE$(Printquery$) = "Y" THEN LPRINT CHR$(12); 
PRINT 
END SUB 
SUB sinh (sinhREAL, sinhIMAG, alpha, beta, length) 
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sinhREAL = •5* COS(betat length) * (EXP(alphat length) - 1 / EXP(alpha * length)) 
sinhIMAG = .5 $ SIN(beta * length) * (EXP(alpha * length) + 1 / EXP(alpha * length)) 
END SUB 
SUB storedata (npts%, xO, YO) 
ON ERROR GOTO diskerr 
PRINT 
DO 
PRINT" 	 + 	 +" 
PRINT" 	 Doyouwanttostoredata[YIN]'fl" 
PRINT" 	 ----------- ------------ 
INPUT" 	 ",Storequery$ 
LOOP UNTIL UCASE$(Storequeiy$) = "Y" OR UCASE$(Storequery$) = "N" 
IF UCASE$(Storequery$) = "Y" THEN 
DO 
PRINT 
PRINT "Enter Drive, Path and File name for storage (e.g. B :\data\test I .dat)" 
INPUT "==>", filenameS 
diskerr=0 
OPEN filename$ FOR INPUT AS #1 
IFdiskerr=53 THEN 
storeok = I 
ELSE 
IF diskerr =0 THEN 
CLOSE #1 
DO 
PRINT 
PRINT" 	 + 	 +" 
PRINT" 	 I File Already Exists: Overwrite File IY/Ni 7 1" 
PRINT" 	 ----------------------- ----- ---------- +0 
INPUT" 	 ",Storequezy$ 
LOOP UNTIL UCASES(Storequery$) = "Y" OR UCASES(StorequeryS) = "N" 
IF UCASE$(Storequery$) = "Y" THEN 
storeok = 1 
ELSE 
storeok = 0 
END IF 
ELSE 
PRINT 
SELECT CASE diskerr 
CASE IS = 71 
PRINT "Drive "; disken$; "Not Ready"; "- Please Rectify" 
CASE IS = 76 
PRINT "Path Not Found - Please Select a Valid Path" 
CASE ELSE 
PRINT "Error; diskerr, "On Device "; disken$; "- Please Rectify" 
END SELECT 
END IF 
END IF 
LOOP UNTIL storeok = 1 
DO 
CLS 
diskerr=O 
OPEN filenameS FOR OUTPUT AS #1 
IF NOT diskerr THEN 
LOCATE 10, 10 
PRINT "Storing Data..." 
LOCATE 12, 10 
PRINT" 
oldp=0 
FORa%= 1 TOnpts% 
IF NOT diskerr THEN 
0-Il 
frequency = x(a%) I IE-'-09 
PRINT #1, CSNG(frequency);" 
IF diskerr THEN a% = npts% 
p = INT((a% I npts%) * 60 + 5) 
IFp>oldp THEN 
LOCATE 12, 10 
PRINT MID$("___________ 
oldp = p 
END IF 
";CSNO(y(a%)) 
1, p) 
END IF 
NEXT a% 
IF diskerr THEN 
lFdiskerr=61 THEN 
PRINT 
PRINT "Disk Full - Complete Data NOT STORED!" 
ELSE 
PRINT 
PRINT "Disk Ermr"; diskerr, "Data Not Stored" 
END IF 
INPUT "Please Rectify and press Return to Retiy", duni$ 
END IF 
ELSE 
SELECT CASE diskeu 
CASE IS = 70 
PRINT 
PRINT "Disk Write Protected:"; 
CASE IS = 71 
PRINT 
PRINT "Drive Not Ready: 
CASE ELSE 
PRINT 
PRINT "Error; Wskerr, "On Device"; diskerr$ 
END SELECT 
INPUT "Please Rectify and Press Return to Continue", dum$ 
END IF 
CLOSE #1 
LOOP UNTIL diskerr =0 
END IF 
EN]) SUB 
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APPENDIX H: IMPROVED ANALYSIS OF AIRFRAME MICROWAVE ATTENUATION 
MEASUREMENT DATA: L.E.E. Electronics Letters, Vol.32, No.18,29 August 1996- 
M. Pywell, I.P. MacDiannid and R.J. Simpson 
Indexing ten,w Microwave attenuation, Aircraft, Shielding, EMC 
Published data on 2.170HZ airframe attenuation is augmented by 
meastnement data from a total of six military aircraft, inchiding 
helicopters. Analysis of the results provides a method of assessing 
I-IS GHz airframe attenuation and opens up the possibility of 
aircraft microwave EMC clearance with minimal testing. 
Introduction: The first line of defence against airborne 
electronics upset by the RF enviromnent is the shielding 
afforded to the avionic circuitry by the airframe. At 
microwave frequencies of interest (>0.3-40 0Hz), where 
apertures are the dominant method of energy ingress, 
aircraft construction techniques are important. Variations in 
both the build standard of individual aircraft and the angle 
of incidence of RF radiation impinging on the airframe can 
lead to significant variation in the internal fields to which 
avionic equipments are subjected. 
With current limitations in energy ingress prediction 
methods at these frequencies, civil and military aircraft 
manufacturers are obliged to conduct costly and time 
consuming EMC tests on aircraft to ensure correct system 
operation with an adequate margin of safety. This letter 
briefly addresses the prediction issue, presents the results of 
analyses of measured airframe attenuation data from six 
fixed/rotary wing aircraft, and proposes a new method of 
assessing airframe attenuation which could minimise 
aircraft testing. 
Ene,gy Ingress Prediction: There is a lack of suitable 
analysis tools for the comprehensive modelling of energy 
ingress into whole airframes at frequencies >100 MHz. 
Derivation of values of airframe attenuation based upon 
practical measurements is thus likely to offer the best and 
most cost-effective solution to this problem at present. 
Military aircraft designers in the past have used arbitrary, 
frequency independent attenuations of between 6-20 dB as 
estimates for airframe attenuation since the early 1970's. 
Measurements taken across the band 1-18 0Hz on a number 
of aircraft since the late 1980's have shown attenuation 
values to vary between aircraft types and between 
specimens of a given type, and to range between 59 dB and 
-3.2 dB (i.e. a field strength 'gain', resulting from standing 
waves within avionic bays). 
Pmcti cal /vfeasurenzents: 	 A 1987-90 BAe research 
programme examined airframe attenuation on the 
metal-bodied Jaguar fly-By-Wire demonstrator aircraft and 
provided a considerable measurement data set to support the 
study of microwave energy ingress and propagation in 
airframes. Absolute airframe attenuation values were 
determined, wavefront polarisation and angle of arrival 
dependency was observed, and it was established that 
energy ingress occutted predominantly via avionic bay door 
peripheral slots, rather than by some other, internal, energy 
transportation mute. [I] describes the research results and 
measurement techniques used. The value of airframe 
attenuation, AA at each frequency was calculated as follows: 
AA (dB) = 	 (dBm) - Prn.a (dBm) 	 ...(l)  
where Pr.. = power measured at the measurement 
location with no aircraft present, i.e. at open air test site 
calibration, and Pr. = power inside aircraft bay with 
door or panel closed. In each test case the power measured 
was normalised to remove the variation in transmitter 
amplifier output with frequency. Transmitter feeder and 
receiving antenna cable losses were also accounted for, as 
were the gain vs. frequency characteristics of the transmit 
and receive antennas used. 
Other aircraft measurements, using similar techniques, were 
conducted by Willis on a prototype helicopter and two 
(unspecified, but certainly military) aircraft in 1986 (2], 
Carter, Stevens and Watkins on a Puma helicopter in 1991 
[3], and at BAe on a modern military aircraft in 1992. All 
available data from the above aircraft investigations (either 
actual data files or reconstituted data via digitising A A  vs. 
frequency graphs) were analysed to produce a coherent data 
set per aircraft type and measurement location. The 
frequency steps used were: 500 MFIz (one bay) and 100 
MJ-lz (three bays), with a short investigation using 20 MHz 
steps for the trials in [1]; 500 MHz for those in [2]; and 50 
MHz for those in [3] and for the modem aircraft trial. 
Although these were the principal test resolutions, for those 
>50 MHz it is acknowledged that some individual tests were 
done with higher resolution. 
New Approach to Data Analysis: For the discussions 
which follow on A. trends by aircraft and bay type, and 
subsequent comparisons between them, it was necessary to 
arrive at some common attribute. A 'Figure of Merit' 
approach, as derived in Pywell and Price [I], cannot be used 
directly to quantify A. or compare values of A A between 
different bays and test configurations. To arrive at this 
conunon attribute, all the data sets for each bay were 
arranged as a function of frequency and the mean value 
determined at each frequency. For each aircraft the the 
mathematical average of the per-bay values was determined 
at each specific frequency. This was the attribute used and 
is referred to as the 'average' A A value. To see whether any 
trends in A A exist, either between the fixed wing aircraft 
investigated or between the fixed and rotary wing aircraft, 
the data sets from these trials were examined. Table I 
summarises the A. data sets independent of frequency and 
measurement location within the aircraft, and gives the 
results of initial statistical treatment of each trial's data sets. 
Table I: Summary of Trials and Initial Statistics 
AJRCRAFr TYPE QTY. 
BAYS 
DATA 
VALUES 
AVG 
(dB) 
MAX 
(dB) 
DEVELOPMENT 
HELICOPTER 
5 507 22.8 54 
&IRC RAFT TYPE A 2 90 283 39 
IRCRAVr TYPE B 2 91 243 35 
FLY-BY-WIRE JAGUAR 4 3800 18 '6 59 
PUMA HELICOPTER 2 306 103 26.9 
MODERN FIGHTER 1 	 5 1 	 651 1 	 22 1 414 
H-I 
The table shows a wide range of A. values for the different 
fixed wing aircraft types and helicopters investigated: 
maxima (32.1 dB), minima (17.2 dB) and average (18.2 dB). 
From the data examined there appeared little correlation 
between the data sets but it was observed that the bulk of 
many of the data sets lay within ±3 dfl of the set's median, 
particularly where measurements were taken with <100 
MHz resolution. A further observation was that the median 
of the average values of A. was 21.0 dB with a to of 5.9 
dB. Together these observations suggested the possibility of 
a generic trend of airframe attenuation and to examine this 
possibility the data sets were subjected to further statistical 
treatment. The tecluuque used was to determine the 
cumulative distribution of each data set, i.e. the percentage 
of each data set vs. increasing AK  Fig. I shows the resultant 
distributions by aircraft type examined. 
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These distributions are more useful than the rapidly 
changing AA values with frequency in determining the 
contribution of AA to the potential for avionic circuit upset. 
Slight variations in frequency, aspect angle, transmit 
polarisation and internal measurement location can each 
change the attenuations measured, whereas this statistical 
representation tends to show less variation with those 
individual parameters. The comparison of the EMC 
demonstrator and other data sets, each with a significantly 
lower number of data samples, suggests that the 
distributions would be closer to that of the EMC 
demonstrator if a matching number of samples were 
available from the other trials. With the exception of the 
Carter at al. helicopter line, where only one data set has 
been analysed and thus is thought to be of lower importance, 
Fig. I suggests that a probability of >50% exists of achieving 
an AA  of>2l dB and that this may also be independent of air 
vehicle type. Using airworthiness reliability figures and 
safety factors, higher values of probability may be required 
for a flight clearance basis. 
These are important findings as, if true, it offers the 
potential for supporting the microwave EMC design and 
clearance of military and civil aircraft with minimal or no 
tests on aircraft. Appropriate confidence in safe and correct 
system operation could then be gained through equipment 
EMC qualification laboratory tests and consideration of the 
contents of a database of equipment EMC results for a given 
aircraft. 
Further research is required to explore this potential, which 
offers substantial time and cost savings to both the civil and 
military sectors of the aircraft industry. Initially all available 
measured data, including that from other sources, should be 
analysed by frequency sub-band to examine the validity of 
the A. prediction, both by aircraft type and between 
individual aircraft of a given type. if the prediction is still 
deemed valid, further confidence should be attained by 
augmenting the existing data by selected measurements on 
other military aircraft types on which data does not yet exist. 
Conclusions: The concept of statistical analysis of airframe 
attenuation, based on tests on multiple aircraft/bay types and 
numbers, has merit and is likely to offer the best and most 
cost-effective solution until maturation of rigorous 
computational EM modelling tools and techniques. 
The research has shown that a significant spread of 1-18 
(3Hz attenuation factors (-3.2 to 59 dB) can occur, although a 
possible vehicle-independent correlation has been 
demonstrated between the cumulative probability functions 
for the aircraft types examined. This represents a step 
improvement in the ability to estimate microwave airframe 
attenuation for a given aircraft type and offers the potential 
for supporting EMC design and qualification without the 
need for aircraft tests. Further study is recommended, 
commencing with a wider statistical survey of such data 
from other aircraft types. 
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